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ARISTOTLE

Politics

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INTRODUCTION

ARISTOTLE'S *Politics* raises more clearly than any other text some of the most fundamental issues which confront anyone who attempts to think seriously about the ways in which human societies are organized and governed. These issues are as pressing now as they were in the fourth century BC when the *Politics* was first written. But although the *Politics* can still speak to us with a powerful voice there are a number of ways in which it is unlike any modern text and in which it can appear puzzling to the modern reader. First, it is not the work of a narrow specialist but is part of what is probably the most comprehensive system of thought ever devised. We need therefore to relate the *Politics* to the general principles and methods of Aristotle's philosophy. Secondly, the world in which Aristotle lived was very different from our own. So, although the fundamental issues may be the same as those which concern us, the context in which Aristotle raises them may seem very unfamiliar. We have therefore to study the *Politics* against the background of the Greek world as it was in the fourth century BC—a world in which the basic unit of political organization was not the nation state but the small independent city-state or *polis*. Thirdly, there are, as one might expect, difficulties in the style, organization, and vocabulary of Aristotle's writing which have to be addressed if we are to read it with any understanding.

Aristotle on the Nature of Society

Aristotle was not only a great philosopher but also what we would now call a scientist. In particular he wrote extensively on biological topics and his study of biology clearly exercised a powerful influence on his thought in other areas. It makes sense therefore to begin a study of the *Politics* by thinking about Aristotle's conception of nature (*phusis*) in its bearing on political matters.

During the fifth century the Greeks had evidently become particularly conscious that laws and customs varied from people to people and from place to place. According to a story told by Herodotus (III. 8), the Greeks were shocked to hear that some Indian peoples ate their dead. The Indians were equally shocked to hear that the Greeks burned theirs. Thus what seemed right to one people seemed wrong to another. To understand such phenomena many Greek thinkers used the two contrasting terms *phusis* or 'nature' and *nomos*, which is commonly translated as 'law', 'custom', or 'convention'. Examples like the burial practices described by Herodotus demonstrate that *nomos*, convention, varies from place to place. But nature, *phusis*, is the same everywhere. We must therefore distinguish between what holds by *phusis* and what holds by *nomos*. This distinction between *phusis* and *nomos* could be used in different ways. One could, on the one hand, argue that there are some beliefs about right and wrong which are universally accepted and which may thus be attributed to *phusis*, even though many particular practices are based simply on a *nomos* accepted by a particular community. But, on the other hand, one could also use the distinction in more radical ways. In particular it could be argued that *all* beliefs about right and wrong are a matter of *nomos* and thus depend purely on human convention. Thus in Plato's *Republic* (358^{e}–359^{b}), Glaucon refers to the view that we would all really like the freedom to do whatever harm we want to others but do not, of course, want others to have the same freedom to harm us. We therefore make 'laws and mutual agreements'. In other words we forgo the freedom to harm other people in return for a guarantee that we will not suffer harm from them. On this view, morality and law have their basis in human convention and the state too is an artificial creation constructed by human beings to protect themselves from one another.

In the *Republic*, Plato opposes this conventionalist view by arguing that there are what he calls Forms, which cannot be perceived through the senses but can be grasped by the reason. One function of the Forms is to serve as ideal standards. The views of the ordinary man about right and wrong embody a dim recollection of the Form of justice, but a true

philosopher would be able to grasp the Form in full clarity. Thus only a society ruled by philosophers could be perfectly just. In his later work, the *Laws*, Plato says nothing of the Forms but offers instead a picture of law as the deliverance of reason—the same divine reason which governs the universe as a whole and whose operations are beautifully displayed in the movements of the heavens. Thus Plato seeks to answer those who see morality as an artificial creation by appealing to eternal standards which are outside the changing world of ordinary experience, and are grasped by reason rather than by observation.

Aristotle shares Plato's antipathy to the conventionalist view and the conception of nature and society which he offers has much more in common with Plato's than is often supposed, but the route by which he gets there is very different. Rather than turning away from the world of perception, Aristotle's method is to start with the data of experience—what he calls the phenomena. In a natural science, like biology, this means that one must study the various facts of observation in order to achieve a grasp of the underlying principles. Observation of different animals may, for example, enable one to grasp the underlying general truths about their nature. In the case of ethics and politics the phenomena include laws and customs of different communities, but they also include the different opinions of men at large and in particular of those deemed to be wise. The fact that Aristotle starts from this kind of data does not mean that he is committed to seeing all institutions as equally valuable or to accepting as true every opinion that has popular support. What it does mean is that he examines and sifts these data in order to discover the truths that lie within. It is characteristic of him not to reject an opinion outright but to see it as involving a partial truth—that is as being true in one way but not in another.

The concept of form may be as important for the understanding of Aristotle's political philosophy as it is for Plato's, but to explain its significance requires a digression. We can begin by thinking about artefacts, such as a statue or a house. A sculptor who creates a statue imposes a form on a certain quantity of matter. He may, for example, impose on a lump of stone a form like that of a man. The stone here occupies the role of matter, so the statue is a combination of matter and form; it is in-formed matter. Aristotle in fact sees the form as entering into the process of creating the sculpture in three different ways. The sculptor conceives the form in his mind before he sets to work; the sculpture he creates has that form; and the form is also the goal or end of the sculptor's activity, i.e. he seeks to produce something of that form. The process of building a house can be analysed in the same way. The builder conceives the house in his mind; he then sets to work to create that house by imposing the form on his materials; and the house is the end or goal of his activity. The house is not simply a pile of bricks and planks. In creating the house the bricks and planks are given a form—that is a structure or organization. If they cease to have that organization, the house no longer exists. If the materials are rearranged in a different form we have a different building.

Aristotle recognizes a parallel between artefacts and things such as animals or plants which exist by nature. A tree is not just a collection of roots, trunk, and branches but has a definite form. When it loses that form it ceases to be a tree. Similarly an animal is not just a heap of flesh and bone. The difference between the artefact and the plant or the animal is, of course, that plants and animals are not produced by a craftsman. In the case of an oak tree, to use a favourite example of modern commentators, an already existent tree produces an acorn which, in turn, has a natural tendency to grow into a tree. Of course, not all acorns grow into trees. Some rot or are eaten by pigs, but the nature of the acorn is to grow into a tree, provided that it encounters the right conditions. In this sense the end or goal of the acorn is to become a tree and one can grasp what an acorn is only by seeing that this is its end. The same pattern of analysis applies to human beings and other animals. A man produces a 'seed' or sperm whose nature is to grow into a man if it encounters the right conditions (in the womb). Thus living things have within them a principle of growth which impels them not to sprout randomly but to develop towards an end, i.e. to instantiate a particular form. Aristotle's conception of nature is thus thoroughly teleological. Everything which exists by nature exists for an end and one cannot grasp its nature without understanding that end.

In the *Politics* Aristotle clearly means to use an analysis of this kind. He argues that the *polis* is a compound and a whole rather than a mere aggregation (1258^a18, 1274^b39). In other words the *polis* is not simply a collection of human beings. Nor, for that matter, is it a geographical area. Rather, as Aristotle suggests in Book III, its identity consists in its organization and structure. This organization is its constitution. So the constitution stands in the role of form to the *polis*. If the constitution ceases to be in force then the *polis* ceases to exist. This view would, of course, be compatible with the view that the *polis* is an artefact, like a house. Some of Aristotle's phrases may seem to suggest this view. He talks, for example, of the statesman as a master-craftsman (*architektōn*) and speaks on one occasion of the man who first constructed a *polis* (1253^a30). But Aristotle also sees the *polis* as natural. Human beings naturally form families, the village is a natural outgrowth of the family, and the *polis* is an outgrowth of the village (I. 2). He argues too, in one of his most famous phrases, that man is a political animal: that is, man is made by nature to live in a *polis*, or more briefly he is a *polis*-animal (1253^a2–5). These claims may not be so difficult to reconcile as it might seem. Art and nature compliment rather than contradict one another. For example, we might think of the gardener whose skill enables the rose bush to fulfil its nature by producing beautiful flowers. So the man who creates a *polis* works with nature, not against it. Furthermore, man is naturally endowed with powers of practical reason, so that in creating a *polis* he is fulfilling his nature. Aristotle could well argue that man is as much a *polis*-creating as a *polis*-inhabiting animal. A more serious source of difficulty is the claim that the *polis* is prior to the individual, so that the man without a *polis* is like a hand without a body (1253^a18–23). Aristotle could argue that the *polis* is prior to man in the sense that one cannot really understand what human nature is without referring to the *polis*. He could also argue that a man without a *polis* cannot fulfil his nature and is therefore like a stunted

[illegible]

oak tree. But the analogy with the hand suggests the stronger view that one could not be a man at all without being part of the *polis*. This seems to be incompatible with Aristotle's own apparent belief that there was a time when the *polis* did not exist and human beings lived in scattered families.

Aristotle's teleological conception of nature also underpins his moral philosophy. In the *Ethics* Aristotle seeks to discover what he calls the 'good for man'. Everyone, he thinks, will agree that this consists in what he calls *eudaimonia* (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1095^{a}18–20). This term is generally translated 'happiness' but really means rather more than that. *Eudaimonia* is a general condition of well-being or the condition of one who is living well. The view that the good for man is *eudaimonia* is supported, Aristotle believes, by two considerations: (*a*) *eudaimonia* has, above everything else, the character of an end—i.e. we seek other things for the sake of *eudaimonia* but seek *eudaimonia* purely for its own sake; and (*b*) it is self-sufficient—i.e. *eudaimonia* is not only desirable in itself but there is nothing which could be added to it to make it more desirable.

To say that the good for man is *eudaimonia* is clearly not very informative unless one can say what this consists in, and the main project of the *Ethics*, in both its versions, is accordingly to discover the nature of *eudaimonia*. Here Aristotle relies heavily on his conception of nature. Since nature does nothing in vain (i.e. does everything for a purpose), man must have a purpose or function (*Nicomachean Ethics* I. 7; *Eudemian Ethics* II. 1). Just as a good flute-player is one who performs well his function of playing the flute, so a human being will achieve his good by performing well his function whatever that is. To discover man's function we need to consider what it is that distinguishes man from other creatures. We share with both plants and animals the capacity for nutrition and growth and with animals the capacity for movement and perception. What is unique to us is reason. Thus, Aristotle argues, man's purpose or function is to be found in the active life of the rational part of the soul (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1098^{a}3). The good life is one in which we perform this function well, i.e. in accordance with the appropriate standards of excellence or virtue. Thus *eudaimonia*, or *happiness*, can be defined as 'activity in accordance with excellence, and if there is more than one kind of excellence in accordance with the best and most perfect of these'. But rational activity takes two forms. There is practical reason, which one shows primarily in deliberating on behalf of oneself or one's city, but there is also theoretical reason, which one displays particularly in philosophical contemplation. There is thus an ambiguity in Aristotle's account of the good life. Is it to be sought in the life of practical reason, or of theoretical reason, or both? One might expect Aristotle to argue that the best life involves both forms of reason, but, in fact, in the closing pages of the *Nicomachean Ethics* he seems to give priority to theoretical reason and the life of contemplation. The difficulty for Aristotle is that while he sees man as a political animal, that is as a being which cannot flourish outside society, he also believes that man's highest element is the reason and that this is most perfectly exercised in a god-like life of pure contemplation. It is reasonably clear that he would wish to integrate both these points into his account of the best life, but it is much less easy to see quite how he means to do so.

Thinking about something
Seriously.

On Aristotle's understanding, the city or *polis* exists for the sake of the good life. It is he claims a form of association or partnership (*koinōnia*); all associations exist for the sake of some good; the city is the most sovereign of all associations and must be directed to the most sovereign of all goods (I. 1). The purpose of the city is thus to enable its citizens to live a life of virtue or excellence. It has to furnish not only the physical means for this life but also the necessary leisure and the kind of education and upbringing which will render its citizens virtuous. This does not, of course, mean that all cities do in practice promote a life of virtue. It may even be that no existing city does so. But the life of virtue is the goal of the city's existence and the closer a city comes to achieving that goal, the better it is. This, of course, immediately differentiates Aristotle's position from that of those, like the sophist Lycophron (1280^{b}10), who see the city as simply a device for mutual self-protection or as a kind of commercial alliance. It has a positive moral purpose. This conception informs Aristotle's discussions in the *Politics* in at least two ways. In the first place, it underpins his accounts of existing and possible constitutions. Aristotle is well aware that any state needs to provide security and stability for its inhabitants and much of his discussion, particularly in Books v and vi, is directed to these points. But, in his eyes, security and stability are not enough. A good constitution must be directed to the good of its citizens, and this means that it must not only have well-meaning rulers but must be based on the right conception of the good. In other words, it must be directed to the life of goodness or virtue as Aristotle understands it. In the second place, Aristotle's conception of the moral purpose of the *polis* quite obviously provides the framework for the incomplete account of an ideal *polis* which occupies Books vii and viii. That account is explicitly founded on the assumption that the purpose of the *polis* is to make possible a life of Aristotelian virtue. Thus a major concern for Aristotle is to describe how, given conditions that are not totally unrealistic, one might construct a community in which the citizens have the leisure for the kinds of activity which he regards as truly worth while. Disturbingly, however, he does not disguise the fact that only a limited section of the population will be able to achieve such a life. Many people lack the appropriate capacities, but, in any case, the existence of a city requires that a substantial number of its inhabitants engage in occupations which are inconsistent with a good life. Manual labour and trade not only take up time but they also render people unfit for the activities which Aristotle sees as worth while. Thus those engaged in such occupations are necessary for the existence of the *polis* but cannot strictly be members of it. It is implicit in Aristotle's conception of the good life that not everyone can achieve it, and that the rest of us are best off serving those who can.

Aristotle in the Greek World

The Greek world which Aristotle took for granted comprised well over a thousand independent city-states. These were located not only on the Greek mainland and on the islands of

the Aegean Sea but on the coast of what we now call Turkey, in Italy, on the Adriatic and Black Sea coasts, and even as far afield as Spain. More marginally the Greek world also included the growing power of Macedon, whose kings at least were recognized as Greeks and allowed to compete in the Olympic Games. Aristotle's political theory is based on an extensive knowledge of the affairs of these communities—something like a hundred of them are mentioned in the *Politics*.

The Greeks believed that they shared a common ancestry. They also shared a loose cluster of beliefs and myths about the gods and heroes which could accommodate local traditions and practice while also allowing them to recognize certain common religious shrines and festivals. But clearly what contributed most to their sense of unity was the possession of a common language (albeit with significant variation of dialect). The world as seen by the average Greek (the Greek whose views are largely echoed and justified by Aristotle) consisted of two kinds of people, Greeks and barbarians. The term 'barbarian' was applied to all those who did not speak Greek (even to those like the Egyptians who were acknowledged to have achieved a high level of civilization). It may originally have meant 'those who say "ba-ba"' i.e. people who make unintelligible noises. According to this way of thought the Greeks were not just different but better—more intelligent and inventive and more competent in military and other matters. This sense of superiority was clearly strengthened by the defeat of the Persian invasions of 490 and 480–479 and the consequent liberation of the Greek cities of Ionia (the coast and adjacent islands of modern Turkey) which had been under Persian control. Although only a small minority of the Greek cities had fought against the Persians, the fact that they had defeated the most powerful empire of their day strengthened the Greeks' sense that they were intrinsically better than the rest of the world. This sense of superiority did not prevent individual politicians or cities looking for Persian support (particularly support of a financial nature) when it suited them and it survived the 'King's Peace' of 386 which enabled the Persians to reassert their authority over the Ionian cities.

Aristotle shows little sign of recognizing the arbitrariness of the distinction between Greeks and barbarians. He believes that while Greeks are intrinsically capable of ruling as well as being ruled and are thus fitted for freedom, barbarians lack a 'ruling element' in their souls and are thus fitted to be ruled in the manner of slaves (1252^{b}5–10). Characteristically Aristotle finds a justification for this claim in the supposed facts of ✓ Biology and Geography. 'The peoples of cold countries generally, and particularly those of Europe, are full of spirit but deficient in skill and intelligence.' For this reason they are comparatively free but have no capacity for governing others. 'The peoples of Asia are endowed with skill and intelligence, but are deficient in spirit.' For this reason they continue in a condition of servility. The Greeks come between the two. They therefore combine spirit with intelligence. They can live in freedom and achieve a high level of political development. If only they could attain unity, they could govern every other people (VII. 7. 1327^{b}23–33).

The basic unit of society as Aristotle sees it is the *oikia* or household, which is constituted by the relations of husband and wife, father and sons, and master and slave (1253^{b}1–4). The household is an economic as well as a social unit (indeed our 'economics' is derived from Aristotle's word for household management). Aristotle clearly envisages that the household will produce most of what it needs by agriculture and domestic crafts such as spinning and weaving. It must also produce a sufficient surplus to purchase whatever else it needs, but Aristotle disapproves strongly of activities which are designed purely to make a profit (I. 8–10). He regards trade and most kinds of manual labour as unfit for a free man. They should be left to slave or non-citizen foreigners (1328^{b}33–1329^{a}32).

Aristotle sees the institution of slavery as essential. A slave is for him a 'living tool' or 'instrument' without which there would be no leisure for the activities which really make life worth while (1253^{b}23–33). He justifies the institution by arguing that some human beings lack the kind of rational power that is necessary for ruling or giving directions and are thus fitted by nature to be slaves, but he has to admit that, in practice, those who are enslaved may not be those who are

intended by nature for that role (1255^{b}16–1256^{a}2). In one sense Aristotle's attitude here is understandable, if not excusable. Greek society depended heavily on slavery. Without it most of what we admire in Greek civilization and most of what Aristotle thought really valuable in life would have been impossible. Given this background it is perhaps not surprising that Aristotle could convince himself that some people are born to be slaves. But Aristotle's treatment of slavery is not just a concession to contemporary prejudices. It follows naturally from his views (*a*) that the good life requires leisure from manual labour and (*b*) that nature is hierarchically organized so that the lower elements within it exist for the sake of the higher. Given these assumptions it is a natural step to the claim that some inferior kinds of men are born to enable the better kind to live a life of leisure.

It is equally unsurprising that Aristotle accepts the general Greek view that women are fitted only for a domestic role. He criticizes at some length what he takes to be Plato's suggestion that women and children should be held in common (i.e. that the family should be abolished) (II. 2–4), but gives no serious attention to the associated idea that women should be rulers. He assumes that the position assigned to women in Greek society is justified by nature, i.e. that women are fitted by nature to exercise control only in a limited domestic sphere. He argues that women, unlike natural slaves, do have the power of deliberation, but says that in them it 'lacks authority' (1260^{a}10–14). Perhaps the thought is that a woman's emotional character makes her unfitted for being ultimately in charge of anything.

The typical Greek city-state was by modern standards tiny. Athens in Aristotle's day had a territory of around 1,000 square miles and may have had a population, including women, children, slaves, and aliens, of over 200,000, but most other cities were much smaller, comprising no more than a small town and the surrounding countryside. Aristotle is certain that the city should not exceed a certain rather modest size. He notes that while it would be possible to build a wall all the way round the Peloponnese, that would not turn it into a single *polis*. Equally a huge city like Babylon or a state which consisted of a whole race of people could not be *polis* (1276^{a}25–30). A *polis* must be large enough to be self-sufficient —that is, it must provide all that is necessary for human flourishing—but it must not be allowed to grow out of proportion. The citizens, for example, must know each other if they are to choose the right candidates for office, or if they are to decide lawsuits correctly, and it must be possible for the whole citizen body to be addressed by a single herald (VII. 4). So the *polis*, as Aristotle understands it, is a face-to-face society which presupposes that the citizens know one another and can all take part in a single assembly.

Many commentators have pointed out that the Greek *polis* evidently meant much more to its citizens than the modern state does to its inhabitants, though it is difficult to express the difference with any precision. We, for example, are accustomed to draw a distinction between the state and its citizens. We may distinguish between spheres of life which are properly the concern of the state and those which are not. We may worry that the state is growing too powerful and is restricting the liberties of the citizens. It would have been difficult for the Greeks to grasp this contrast between state and citizen. When we would refer to the state of Athens or of Sparta, the Greeks would speak simply of the Athenians or the Spartans. Similarly there was no sharp distinction between law and morality. The single word *nomos* is used not only of laws incorporated in the legal code of a particular city, but of unwritten rules which are supposed to be binding on all men and of social customs which are unique to a particular community. This wide scope of *nomos* is reflected in the practice of the Greek courts. The forensic speeches of the orators, for example, often appeal to what we would think of as extra-legal considerations—that is to considerations of morality or public interest. Again we are apt to conceive of religion as a private matter—or at least as one for the Church rather than the state. But the Greeks had no conception of a Church—the cult of the gods was a public matter which was the responsibility of the *polis*. Priests were generally public officials and the temples which served as symbols of the identity and prosperity of the *polis* were erected at public expense.

Barker wrote of the *polis* as conceived by Aristotle and by Greek thought generally that 'it is a small and intimate society: it is a church as well as a state: it makes no distinction between the province of the state and that of society: it is in a word an integrated system of social ethics, which realises to the full the capacities of its members, and therefore claims their full allegiance' (lxvii). There is a danger here of idealizing the *polis*. Greek cities were often ridden with strife. Political quarrels were often fought out with a ferocity which would match any conflict of our own day and it was clearly possible for whole sections of the population to feel thoroughly alienated. As is evident in *Politics* V, which deals with the problems of civil disorder and constitutional change, Aristotle is only too aware of such conflicts. But at the same time he has high aspirations for the *polis* and does see it in much the way that Barker describes. These aspirations are implicit in the definition at the beginning of the *Politics* of the *polis* as a *koinōnia,* an association or partnership. It is in fact the most inclusive association and the one which exists for the highest goal—the living of a good life. The Greek term *koinōnia* is connected with the idea of sharing or holding something in common, so Aristotle sees the *polis* as a shared enterprise—almost like a club—in which the participants pool their resources in order to achieve a common goal—that of living a good life. This is in many ways an immensely attractive picture, but it has its unattractive side. Aristotle recognizes that, even where conditions are as favourable as ever they could be, it is not possible for everyone in the city to live what he sees as a good life. People are needed to carry out tasks which are necessary but, in Aristotle's eyes, demeaning. These people cannot be part of the *polis* because they are incapable of participating in the end to which it is directed, but they are, nevertheless, necessary for its existence. Thus Aristotle's conception of the *polis* as a common undertaking depends on the presence of slaves and resident foreigners who are not members and do not share its privileges.

Aristotle on Greek Politics

Through the fourth and fifth centuries BC a dominant theme in the politics of many Greek cities was the struggle between democracy and oligarchy. Democracy, which means literally 'the rule of the people', is commonly supposed to have originated at Athens with the reforms of Cleisthenes in 508/7. The process of democratization was carried forward by Pericles and Ephialtes, so that Athenian democracy reached its most developed form in the latter part of the fifth century. Under this form of constitution the most powerful body was the *ekklēsia* or assembly. All adult male citizens had a right to take part in the deliberations of this body and it took all major decisions. Day-to-day business was carried out by the council or *boulē*, which had 500 members chosen by lot. Most other public officials were also chosen by lot, so that every citizen had an equal chance of finding himself in one of the major offices—the most notable exception was the office of *polemarchos*, or general, which was always chosen by election.

The obvious alternative to democracy was what the Greeks called 'oligarchy' or 'the rule of the few'. Under this form of constitution participation in political affairs was restricted to those who possessed a fixed property qualification. The level of qualification could vary—quite low in the more moderate oligarchies and quite high in the more extreme ones. The normal method of choosing public officials was by election (with only those who satisfied the property qualification taking part). The quarrels between oligarchs and democrats were fought out within and between cities. In the fifth century when Athens was at the height of her power she fostered and sometimes imposed democratic regimes on other cities. Oligarchic cities tended to look for leadership to Sparta. So the Peloponnesian War, which broke out in 431 and lasted intermittently until Sparta defeated Athens in 404, was in some respects a war between democracy and oligarchy. In the fourth century no city in Greece succeeded in establishing a dominant position for long and many cities were torn apart by faction fighting. One of Aristotle's avowed aims in the *Politics* is to address this situation. In Books V and VI he investigates the causes of disorder and change and discusses the ways in which constitutions can be made more stable.

As one would expect, Aristotle is much concerned with the problems of oligarchies and democracies, but he recognizes, of course, that cities may be governed in other ways. The Greeks believed, no doubt rightly, that they had once been governed by kings. In the more recent past aristocracy had been the norm—that is political power had been in the hands of a small group of families who thought of themselves as the *aristoi*, the best people. Many cities had also experienced periods of 'tyrannical' government. A tyrant was what we should call a 'dictator', an individual who had managed to seize power for himself and establish a form of extra-legal monarchy. In Book III Aristotle provides himself with an analytical framework with which to understand these different forms of government. Constitutions, he claims, can be classified according to whether power is in the hands of one man, of a few, or of many. In each case we can distinguish a 'right' form and a 'wrong' or 'perverted' form. There are thus three 'right' constitutions and three 'deviant' ones (III. 6–7).

Among the 'right' forms of constitution kingship is the rule of one man for the common interest. Aristotle recognizes that it is likely to be rare but argues that it is the appropriate form of constitution for a people in which there is one man or one family of outstanding merit (1288^{a}15–29). The 'wrong' or 'perverted' form of constitution corresponding to kingship is tyranny, the rule of one man in his own interest. The 'right' form of government by a few is aristocracy (literally 'rule by the best people'). But Aristotle's conception of aristocracy is not quite the traditional one. Genuine aristocrats, in his eyes, owe their position not to the deeds of their ancestors, but to their own virtues (1279^{a}34–9). This form of constitution would be appropriate for a population which contained a small number of families of outstanding merit (1286^{b}3–7). The 'wrong' form of government by a few is oligarchy—a constitution in which a small number of people govern in their own interest. The right form of government by the many is not, as we might expect, government by the whole population in the general interest. Aristotle believes that it is impossible for the whole population to have the virtuous character needed to govern well. So the right form of government by the many is one in which political participation is restricted to those who can afford the armour of a hoplite soldier (1239^{a}37–^{b}4). To describe this form of government Aristotle uses the word *politeia*—the very word which he and other authors normally use with the meaning 'constitution'. (Translators often distinguish between these two uses by coining the word 'polity' to use as a translation of *politeia* when it is used in this special sense, but that, of course, blurs a significant point. Aristotle clearly thinks of this form of constitution as being the genuine constitution or constitutional government *par excellence*.) The wrong or perverted form of government by the many is democracy, which Aristotle sees as government by the masses in their own interest.

This sixfold schema has considerable limitations and Aristotle himself quickly moves beyond it. In fact he modifies it almost immediately by arguing that the distinction between oligarchy and democracy is not primarily one of numbers but of wealth. Oligarchy is the rule of the wealthy, while democracy is the rule of the poor. It is true that the wealthy are generally few in number while the poor are more numerous, but this need not necessarily be the case (III. 8). The economic division is thus fundamental. One might expect Aristotle, having made this point, to argue that political problems can be solved only by economic means, but this is not in fact the line he takes. Indeed he is critical of the proposal in Plato's *Republic* for the abolition of private property and of schemes put forward by other would-be reformers for the equalization of property (II. 5 and 7). Instead he offers a diagnosis of political conflict in terms of competing conceptions of justice. All are agreed that justice consists in some kind of equality. The democrats argue that those who are equal in being free-born citizens should have equal access to offices and honours. The oligarchs, on the other hand, argue that political privileges should be distributed in proportion to wealth, so that those whose wealth is greater receive greater privileges. Others might argue that these privileges should be proportioned to excellence of character or to nobility of birth (1280^{a}7–25). Different kinds of constitution thus rest on different conceptions of justice. The upshot might appear to be that justice is relative—that what is just in a democratic state is different from what is just in an oligarchic state and that that is all there is

to be said about the matter. This, however, is not Aristotle's own position. He argues that in distributing offices and honours we should consider the end or purpose of the city. Those who make the largest contribution to that end should be assigned the greatest privileges. Thus if wealth was the end for which the city existed then those with the greatest wealth should receive the greatest privileges. But Aristotle holds that the purpose of the city is the good life which consists in noble actions—the kind of activity that is worth while in itself. Wealth and free birth are necessary conditions of the existence of the city and thus deserve some consideration but the excellence of character which makes possible the kinds of activity that are truly worth while must have pre-eminence (1280^{a}25–1281^{b}10).

Although Aristotle's account of justice may at first sight seem to be purely formal it provides the basis for a distinctive and cogently argued approach to the problems of politics. Although political divisions rest on economic ones they are primarily, as we might say, disputes about values. Different values lead to different views as to what constitutional forms should be adopted as well as to disputes about particular policies. Aristotle argues that we should seek to solve such disputes by asking what the end of the city is, or in other words by asking what the city is for. Of course this too can be a subject of disagreement. Some think the city exists simply to protect its citizens, or as Aristotle puts it, that it exists simply for the sake of life; others think that it exists to create wealth. Aristotle is scathing about both these views, which are, of course, at least as prevalent today as they were in ancient Greece. Those who hold them fail to see the difference between a mere alliance and a city. The former at most prevents people from injuring one another. The latter is concerned to ensure that its citizens are good men. The argument here depends in part on that in the *Ethics* where Aristotle demonstrates that the good life consists in more than mere survival and cannot even be identified with the accumulation of riches, but must consist in a life of virtuous activity. The city must, so far as possible, be constituted so as to promote this kind of life.

As Aristotle himself is the first to acknowledge, recognizing that the city exists for the good life does not solve all political problems. Even if one concedes the pre-eminent claims of virtue there could still be disputes about which constitutional arrangements are appropriate. Some may argue that a single individual of outstanding excellence should be supreme. Others may claim that the excellence of the people as a whole, taken collectively, outweighs that of any individual. Still others hold that law should be supreme. The situation is even more complicated if one concedes that some account should also be taken of other claims such as those of wealth and free birth and of the varying circumstances of particular cities. In Books VII and VIII Aristotle describes a constitution for a city in which circumstances are as favourable as they are ever likely to be. In this city the citizens will receive an appropriate upbringing and training, while demeaning manual work and trade will be left to slaves and aliens. Thus all the citizens can be assumed to be men of virtue and to have time for political activity and for a cultivated leisure. But of course most legislators are less fortunate; they have to grapple with circumstances which are anything but propitious. Since politics, as Aristotle conceives it, is a practical as well as a theoretical science, the Aristotelian political scientist cannot confine himself to describing ideals. He must be able to give advice about the affairs of cities as they actually are.

The practical focus of the *Politics* is most apparent in Books IV–VI. In these books he concentrates much of his attention on democracy and oligarchy, describing their different varieties and the means by which they may be preserved. In doing so he demonstrates an extensive and detailed knowledge of the political affairs of the Greek cities and makes plenty of shrewd observations. Aristotle is acutely aware that situations vary from city to city and from time to time and that a policy which is appropriate for one kind of population may not work for another. He offers plenty of advice but does not pretend that there are universal remedies for political problems. His general approach may, however, be summed up rather crudely in three words: 'law', 'moderation' and 'mixture'.

Law plays an important part in Aristotle's discussion of these problems because he believes that there is a crucial distinction between those constitutions, on the one hand, where government is in accordance with law and those, on the other, where decisions depend purely on the ruling body. This distinction applies whatever the size of the ruling body. Aristotle has an evident horror of what he sees as extreme democracy in which the popular assembly has the power to do whatever it likes, untrammelled by law, but he has an equal horror of lawless monarchy (tyranny) or lawless oligarchy (what he calls 'dynasty'). This does not mean that the sovereignty of law is a panacea. Laws themselves may be biased. But Aristotle believes, no doubt rightly, that a ruling body which has to conform to law will be less likely to exercise its power in an arbitrary way or to exploit other sections of the population and will be more likely to consider the general good.

The theme of moderation takes several different forms. Aristotle believes that any ruling body, be it a tyrant, an oligarchy, or a democracy, will do well to adopt conciliatory policies and not to push its own interests too far. But Aristotle also argues for moderation in the constitution itself. The best kind of democracy is one which does not allow everyone indiscriminately to take part in political affairs, while the best kind of oligarchy is one which has only a moderate property qualification. There is, it appears, very little difference between the best kind of oligarchy and the best kind of democracy. Not surprisingly therefore, when Aristotle comes to discuss the type of constitution which is most generally practicable it is one with a moderate property qualification in which those whom Aristotle sees as 'the men in the middle' are dominant. The best source of stability and security is a large middle class, for the men in the middle will avoid the excesses of both the rich and the poor. Thus the constitution which Aristotle recommends as the best which could be achieved by most states in normal conditions differs little, if at all, from what he elsewhere calls 'constitutional government' or polity, the constitution where political participation is confined to those who can afford a hoplite's armour.

The idea of mixture is closely linked to that of moderation. Aristotle thinks of the constitution with a moderate property qualification as a mixture of democracy and oligarchy, but he also makes use of the distinct, and in some respects incompatible, idea that the constitution should include distinct democratic, oligarchic, and perhaps also aristocratic elements. He has some ingenious suggestions about how such mixtures might be achieved.

Problems in Aristotle's Theory

Like any great political thinker, Aristotle has attracted criticism as well as admiration, and, characteristically, the features of his thought which have been found most disturbing are closely connected to some of those which have proved most attractive. His advocacy of moderation is a case in point. There is clearly much good sense in what he has to say. If the main problem is to ensure political stability then it makes sense to seek solutions which everyone, or at least the largest possible section of the population, can live with, to make everyone feel that the considerations they hold to be most important have been taken into account, and to ensure that no single party can use the mechanisms of state to pursue its own sectional interests. Some of the measures Aristotle suggests have proved of permanent importance. He was, for example, the main source in the medieval and early modern periods for the idea that law should be sovereign—a doctrine whose lasting importance it would be difficult to deny. Nevertheless, one suspects that behind Aristotle's judicious moderation there are assumptions and values which are highly questionable. Consider for example the suggestion that the best practicable constitution is one with a moderate property qualification. A constitution of that kind would give the opportunity to participate in political affairs to the rich, even though they would have to share this privilege with the men in the middle. The really poor, on the other hand, would be excluded altogether. So from the point of view of the poor there has been no compromise at all—they have lost everything. The only reason why Aristotle could regard this kind of constitution as the best one generally practicable is that he is deeply suspicious of the political capacities of the poor. If it is not possible to ensure that political privileges are confined to those whom Aristotle considers to be of good character and education, then a moderate property qualification can at least exclude the least suitable characters. It is significant here that Aristotle recommends, not that the constitution should be acceptable to the largest number of people, but that it should be constructed in such a way that those who favour its continuance just outweigh those who do not (1296^{b}15–16, 1309^{b}16–18). In other words, participation is to be kept to the minimum consistent with stability. This makes good sense in the light of Aristotle's belief that the purpose of the city is the good life but that this can be achieved only by a few. It means, however, that the large numbers who have no possibility of achieving the good life as Aristotle conceives it are excluded from any real form of participation.

No doubt Aristotle's belief that the labouring poor should not be full members of the city reflects a deep anti-democratic prejudice. But it is not simply an expression of prejudice. It is, rather, connected with some of the leading themes in Aristotle's political and ethical philosophy. Part of the trouble is that Aristotle assumes an exalted view of what constitutes the good life. It is a life of leisure requiring freedom from the toils of manufacture, agriculture, and trade. Aristotle believes, moreover, that these latter kinds of occupation not only take up too much time but by their nature render us unfit for the good life (1337^{b}4–22). Given such a view, in any society which has existed or is likely to exist in the foreseeable future those able fully to participate in the good life must inevitably be a minority. But one might object here that Aristotle simply has too restricted a view of what might constitute human flourishing. We might for example argue that the life of, shall we say, a potter who exercises his skill and shares a social life with his workmates, family, and friends provides as much scope for the exercise of a distinctively human excellence as that of the leisured aristocrat who spends his time in political activity and in cultural pursuits. A less restricted conception of what constitutes human good could thus render the idea of the city as a partnership for the good life less exclusive.

Another consequence of Aristotle's view which is not particularly obvious in his text but has been emphasized by some modern critics is that it apparently leaves the citizens of an Aristotelian state with very little freedom to choose their own ways of life. Aristotle believes that any form of constitution if it is to survive must ensure that its citizens receive the appropriate education and have an appropriate style of life. A constitution is not just an organization of offices but embodies a view about the way in which the citizens ought to live. That Aristotle takes this seriously is clear from the account of his own ideal city. As this stands it is much more concerned with the ways in which citizens will be educated and the ways in which they will live their lives than it is with political organization in the narrow sense. The purpose of the city is to make possible the living of the good life as Aristotle understands it, but this necessarily precludes the living of other forms of life and the pursuit of other values. Barker, in his Introduction, laid some stress on this aspect of the *Politics* which he connected with what he saw as the dominant nature of the Greek *polis*. Other critics have pointed to Aristotle's view that the individual is part of the city in much the same way that a hand is part of the body. Taken at its face value this might seem to suggest that the individual has no value apart from his contribution to the larger whole which is the city.

This extreme criticism would clearly be a mistake. For Aristotle the city is not an entity over and above the citizens who are its members. It exists for the sake of the good life but it is the citizens themselves who live that life. To live well is to exercise rational choice, so the good life must leave scope for choice. This is one reason why Aristotle evidently values personal relationships and private property. But, although Aristotle values freedom, he does not see it as a matter of doing what one likes or of the right to follow one's own conception of the good life (1310^{a}28–38, 1317^{a}40–^{b}17). What counts as a good life is not a matter of individual taste but can be objectively determined by an investigation of human nature. It is the task of the statesman to know what constitutes

human excellence and to ensure that citizens are brought up to live accordingly. So although Aristotle can be acquitted of any charge of authoritarianism or of subordinating the individual to the state, it is clear that his conception of the city as existing for the sake of the good life commits him to rejecting the liberal conception of freedom which most of us now take for granted.

Aristotle Today

Barker included in his introduction to the *Politics* an account of the later history of Aristotle's political theory in which he noted that while Aristotle himself was still active, his one-time pupil Alexander was bringing to an end the kind of world which is presupposed by the *Politics*—a world in which the basic political unit was the independent self-sufficient *polis*, a world in which the distinction between Greek and barbarian was fundamental. In consequence, no doubt, of this change, the *Politics* underwent a long period of oblivion from which it was rescued by St Thomas Aquinas, through whom some of its essential doctrines passed into the general thought of the later Middle Ages. These included 'the doctrine that the law is sovereign, and that governments are the servants of the law; the doctrine that there is a fundamental difference between the lawful monarch and the tyrant who governs by his arbitrary will; the doctrine that there is a right inherent in the people, by virtue of their collective capacity for judgement, to elect their rulers and call them to account'. These ideas were absorbed by later writers such as Hooker, Locke, and Burke. Thus, Barker claimed, the legacy of the *Politics* could be summarized in one word: 'constitutionalism'.

We may baulk here at the use of the term 'legacy', as though Aristotle's will (which, as it happens, is preserved by Diogenes Laertius) included, alongside the provisions for his dependants, a neatly labelled bequest for twentieth-century political thinkers. Philosophers do not, of course, leave legacies of this kind. Rather their successors choose consciously or unconsciously to take over and adapt some of their doctrines while discarding others. But even with this qualification, Barker's account would now seem insular. What he does not mention is that Aristotle exercised a powerful influence on both Hegel and Marx. Much of Hegel's political philosophy is inspired by a vision, largely derived from Aristotle, of the Greek *polis* as an integrated ethical community which had made it possible for men to find their own identity in the collective life of their city. Marx, who had been a student of Greek philosophy, derived from the same source the idea that society is a substance, a whole, which is prior to the individual. Of course the totalitarian states erected by Marx's twentieth-century followers were about as far removed from Aristotle's ideal as anything could be, which is one reason why some of those who seek a different understanding of Marx now emphasize his Aristotelian roots.

If one was to ask what was the most important lesson which can be derived today from a reading of the *Politics*, most scholars and political theorists would probably point to the doctrine of man as a social being. This doctrine sharply distinguishes Aristotle's political philosophy from the individualism which has dominated western political thought since the Renaissance. Whereas Aristotle sees society as prior to the individual, the prevailing view sees the individual as prior to society—in Aristotelian terms society is seen as an alliance or an aggregation rather than as a whole. This individualist attitude is most starkly presented by Hobbes, who describes men in a state of nature covenanting together to set up a sovereign and thus establish civil society in order to save their skins. Central to the individualist view is the picture of human beings as having needs and desires which are independent of the society in which they live. The function of society is to make it possible for individuals to satisfy their desires. Individualist theories may take different forms depending on how these desires and needs are conceived. Hobbes, assuming that the need for security is all-important, argued for an authoritarian state. Others, like Locke, see the function of the state as the protection of property, a view which is easily transformed into the idea that the main function of the state is to provide the conditions for increasing wealth. Still others, like Mill, have stressed the variability of human needs and desires and the variety of ways in which the personality may develop. They have, therefore, seen it as the role of the state to maximize individual freedom.

Such individualist views may be opposed to what is often called communitarianism, the idea that human beings are necessarily social so that society in a sense precedes the individual. The identity of any individual depends on his place in society. On this view an individual existing wholly outside society, if that were physically possible, would barely be human. On such a view society is not simply a means which enables individuals to achieve independently specifiable needs and desires. Being part of a society is a necessary part of being human and it is society which shapes the individuals and determines what sort of people they are. Society must therefore be based implicitly or explicitly on a conception of the good life. It is in Aristotle's terms an association or partnership for the sake of the good.

In western societies, at least, individualist views have been overwhelmingly predominant for the last three hundred years. In the twentieth century they have gained strength because the only alternative to individualism seemed to be a totalitarian state of the kind erected in eastern Europe by Marx's followers. It may be no accident that as the communist regimes have crumbled there has been in the West a resurgence of interest in communitarian ideas. In this resurgence Aristotle plays a key role, for he is of all philosophers the one who affirms most clearly the social nature of man. Aristotelian ideas are thus central to the communitarian critique of individualism. To acknowledge in this way the contemporary importance of Aristotle is not, of course, to say that he is necessarily right. As we have seen, his picture of society is both attractive and disturbing. The same can be said for contemporary communitarianism. It is attractive because it offers a picture of the citizen as a member of a community seeking the common good. It thus offers an alternative to a society in which the only values seem to be those of the market and in which relations founded on competition are increasingly taken to be the norm. But it also faces precisely the same kinds of problem which we encountered in Aristotle's theory. We may ask whether a strong sense of community can be developed without drawing a sharp distinction between those who are and those who are not members, that is without inciting discrimination and prejudice against those who do not seem to belong. We may also question whether a society based on a common conception of what constitutes the good life for a human being can grant its members the freedom, which most of us would cherish, to develop their own lifestyles and personalities. The power of Aristotle's *Politics* is that it still raises such issues more clearly and forcefully than any other text.

Reading the *Politics*

In the ancient world Aristotle was praised for his elegant literary style, but sadly none of the works which he produced for general publication has survived intact. We have instead a very large amount of writing which was apparently intended, not for the general public, but for the private use of Aristotle himself, his colleagues, and pupils. So the writings of Aristotle, as we have them, are more like lecture notes than finished literary works. There are passages which are brief, allusive, and note-like alongside others in which Aristotle's thought is explained in a fuller and clearer way. Aristotle's method is often aporetic, that is he is concerned to raise and explore problems rather than to produce clearly defined answers. Sometimes he approaches the same issue from different directions in successive passages. To make matters more complicated, it is evident that Aristotle was in the habit of reworking what he had written, so that a single work may contain passages written at different times and there are even places where what seem to be different versions of the same material appear alongside each other. There are also passages where marginal notes or additions, whether by Aristotle or by his successors, appear to have been incorporated into the text. For these reasons Aristotle's works are less easy to read than, for example, the writings of Plato's early and middle periods, but they can be especially rewarding. Those who take the time and trouble to read them with care gain an unparalleled sense of contact with a great philosopher as he puzzles his way through problems which he himself finds genuinely difficult.

Some of Aristotle's longer works are more like sets of loosely connected essays than unified treatises. This is particularly so in the case of the *Politics*. Books VII and VIII are clearly part of a single, incomplete, treatise on the ideal *polis*. Books V and VI are less tightly bound together but may still be thought of as constituting a single treatise on the ways in which constitutions change and the methods of ensuring their stability. But each of the others seems to constitute a course or *methodos*, to use Aristotle's term. One might thus think of the *Politics* as containing at least six different courses, but these courses are not entirely separate. They are bound together by cross-references which indicate that Aristotle did in some sense see them as constituting a single whole.

A problem which vexed scholars of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was that of determining the correct order of the different parts of the *Politics*. The starting-point of discussions on this point is that Books VII and VIII which describe the ideal polis do not seem to follow very naturally on Books IV, V, and VI, which have a strong empirical basis and deal with the problems of existing states in the real world. In their general approach Books VII and VIII seem to belong more naturally with Book II, which deals with the ideal states proposed by other thinkers and with some actual constitutions that were widely admired in Aristotle's day, and perhaps also with Book III, which deals with citizenship and constitutions in a largely theoretical way. Moreover, the closing sentence of Book III is more or less identical with the opening sentence of Book VII, which strongly suggests that there must at some time have been a version of the *Politics* in which Books VII and VIII followed immediately after Book III. The fact that there are no cross-references from Books VII and VIII to Books IV–VI seems to support this view. Thus some scholars rearranged the books. For example, the order followed in Newman's great edition is I, II, III, VII, VIII, IV, V, VI. Against this it can be pointed out that Books IV to VI do not follow at all naturally on Books VII and VIII, and IV, at least, is closely tied by cross-references to III. Thus the revised order has as many difficulties as the traditional one. For this reason most scholars have now given up the attempt to establish a right order. The most obvious interpretation of the situation as we find it is that the various books of the *Politics* originated as notes which Aristotle prepared in connection with his own teaching and that he handled the material in different ways on different occasions.

The question of the order of the Books in the *Politics* was closely bound up with questions about their dating. The great German scholar Werner Jaeger proposed an interpretation of Aristotle based on the assumption that he began as a committed Platonist who followed an idealistic method in philosophy and moved very gradually towards a more realistic, empirically based philosophy of his own. As applied to the *Politics* this meant that Books VII and VIII, which Jaeger saw as idealistic, were written very early in Aristotle's career, whereas the more empirical Books IV to VI must have been very late. The late dating of these books receives some confirmation from the fact that they contain references to events as late as the 330s and also from the sheer amount of empirical data they include. We know from Diogenes Laertius that Aristotle wrote or caused to have written accounts of the constitutions of 158 different states. Of these only the *Constitution of Athens* survives. It is reasonable to assume that he drew on this material in composing the more empirical books of the *Politics*. But the constitutions are unlikely to have been completed before Aristotle's final period in the Lyceum. So if he did draw on them in writing Books IV–VI these books must be relatively late. In an article published in 1931 Barker accepted a view broadly in line with Jaeger's but by the time he had completed his translation he had changed his mind. In his introduction he criticized what he saw as the 'subjectivity' of Jaeger's approach and argued that the evidence of the text, particularly its cross-references, favours a view of the *Politics* as a single work composed in the period 335–322. Exercising his own subjectivity he wrote: 'Any translator of the *Politics*, who has lived with the book day on day, and month after month, is bound to become familiar with his author; and such familiarity breeds in the mind a deep sense of the unity of the author, which is perhaps the strongest argument for the unity of the structure and composition of his book' (xliv). More recently Jaeger's account of Aristotle's general philosophical development has been subject to searching criticism, particularly by G.E.L. Owen. Barker's judgement on the unity and date of the *Politics* would therefore be widely accepted. This is, of course, quite compatible with the belief that in composing the *Politics* as we now have it Aristotle drew on earlier material. The point is simply that the work as it stands is almost certainly a product of his final years and not simply a collection of pieces composed at different periods. We may still think of the work as combining idealistic and empirical elements, but the reason for that must be that Aristotle continued to see both methods as having validity.

It may finally be helpful to add something here about the relation of the *Politics* to Aristotle's ethical works. It will be obvious from the account of Aristotle's theory given above that there is a close connection between his political and ethical theories. The basis of this connection is that he sees the *polis* as existing for the sake of the good life. The basis of the *Politics* is thus fundamentally ethical. Not surprisingly therefore there are many references in it to the *Ethics*. Two versions of the *Ethics* have come down to us under the titles the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*. These versions have three books in common. Otherwise they cover similar ground but in different ways. Traditionally the Nicomachean version has been regarded as the later and more authoritative work, though this view has been challenged. Most references in the *Politics* are to the common books though there are a few passages where Aristotle seems to be thinking of doctrines in their Eudemian rather than their Nicomachean forms. On the other hand, the *Nicomachean Ethics* is more explicit than the Eudemian version on the connections between ethics and politics. At the beginning Aristotle argues that it is incumbent on the statesman to know about ethics because he is above all concerned with the good life for the individual and for the city as a whole. The last chapter of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is clearly intended to make a transition to the *Politics*. Aristotle argues that legislation is needed to ensure that the citizens receive the kind of training without which virtue is impossible. The chapter ends with a (slightly inaccurate) description of the *Politics*' programme. While this final passage may be an interpolation the general picture is clear enough. For Aristotle the good life is possible only within a properly ordered state. It is therefore the task of the statesman to make virtue possible. This ethical purpose is the most characteristic feature of Aristotle's approach to politics.

The Vocabulary of the *Politics*

Anyone who attempts to translate a text in a foreign language has to face the fact that the words of one language seldom have exact equivalents in another. The problems are serious enough when we are handling a modern text that originated in a society not very different from our own. They are obviously far more severe when the text in question originated in a culture as remote as that of fourth-century BC Greece. In this Introduction and in the notes I have indicated some ways in which Aristotle's vocabulary diverges from our own. The index is intended to serve as a glossary of Greek words and of the English terms which are used to translate them, as well as to draw attention to passages where these problems of vocabulary are discussed. But there are barriers to understanding which no glossary can overcome. The words of a language are part of a form of life. They take their meaning from the practices in which they are embedded and from their associations with one another. As this Introduction has sought to make clear, the institutions and patterns of thought which Aristotle took for granted were very different from those which constitute our world. To understand the *Politics* we have to enter imaginatively into the world of the Greek *polis* while at the same time seeking to relate it to the world of the modern state in which we live. But it is precisely because it enables us to see the problems of our own day from a very different perspective that reading the *Politics* can be so valuable.

One feature of the *Politics* which is particularly liable to be lost in translation is the way in which its thought is structured by the etymological associations of some of its key terms. I shall mention here three word families which are introduced in the first chapter of Book I and continue to play an important part throughout the work.

The first of these is the *polis* family. As we have seen, *polis* is the Greek term for a city-state and has no real equivalent in English. Barker sometimes simply used 'polis' as though it was an English word and sometimes translated it as 'state'. I have standardized the translation by rendering it throughout as 'city'. Etymologically connected with it are: *politēs*, a citizen or member of the *polis*; *politeia*, the constitution or organizational structure of the *polis*; *politeuma*, the citizen body; *politikē*, the art or science concerned with the affairs of the *polis*; and *politikos*, the statesman, the one who conducts the affairs of the *polis*. The translator is forced to render these terms with words from a variety of sources: Latin, Greek, and Germanic. There is a danger that in doing so we will lose track of the way in which the *Politics* focuses on the *polis* and on the relationships which constitute it.

The second family is the *archē* family. The noun *archē* can be used generally to describe any kind of beginning, origin, or cause but in politics it has the meaning of 'rule'. The verb *archein* means to rule, to govern, or to occupy public office. Its passive form, *archesthai*, means to be ruled or be subject to someone or something else. The noun form *archōn* can mean a ruler or anyone who occupies an office of authority. Thus one of the major concerns of *Politics* I is to distinguish different kinds of rule, to distinguish the rule of the master of slaves, for example, from the kind of rule exercised by a statesman over free citizens. Aristotle believes that the role of the free citizen of a *polis* is characteristically one of ruling and being ruled (*archein kai archesthai*).

The third family is the *koinōnia* family. Here there is the verb *koinōnein*, which means 'to share' or 'to participate' in something. The noun *koinōnia* means literally a 'sharing' or 'participation' and is generally rendered in English as 'association', 'partnership', or 'community'. It is connected with the adjective *koinos* which describes something which is shared or held in common and often refers to the public property of the city (which is held in common by all the citizens). Aristotle sees the city as a *koinōnia* and in this context the translation 'community' may seem most attractive, but there are other contexts where it is misleading (it would be strange for example to talk of the *koinōnia* partnership of husband and wife as a 'community'). I have therefore followed Barker in using the translation 'association' though this does not convey the full sense of the Greek word. In particular it may obscure one of the central and most attractive features of Aristotle's thought, his view of the *polis* as a shared undertaking or partnership among the citizens.

NOTE ON THE TEXT

IN preparing his translation of the *Politics* Sir Ernest Barker sought to produce a version in a modern idiom which could be used by students in a wide range of disciplines. It is a mark of his success in achieving this aim that the translation is still widely recommended almost fifty years after it was first published. However, in preparing an edition for the World's Classics series I have taken the opportunity for some fairly drastic revision. The most notable change is the elimination of a very large number of passages where Barker expanded his translation by adding words in square brackets which did not represent anything in the Greek text but which helped to clarify what he took to be Aristotle's meaning. While Barker's expansions were often very helpful they made it very difficult for the reader to distinguish what was being attributed to Aristotle from what were, in effect, Barker's own comments. I have therefore deleted Barker's additions except in a small number of passages where it was impossible to produce an intelligible version without some addition. In many cases this has involved a substantial rewriting of the relevant passages. I have also revised many other passages to bring them closer to the Greek or to remove expressions which are no longer in current English use or which might mislead the modern reader. I have not, however, attempted any wholesale modernization of Barker's style, which is in general elegant and intelligible. Where possible, I have tried to achieve a greater consistency in the translation of key terms.

Barker's translation was based primarily on Newman's edition of the Greek text, although he also made use of the edition by Immisch. Two more recent editions are those by Ross and Dreizehnter. Ross's edition, though in many ways admirable, was not based on a full review of all the manuscripts and is marred by some unlikely emendations. In revising the translation I have in general therefore followed Dreizehnter's text, which is based on a more thorough examination of the available manuscripts and is usually more cautious in adopting emendations. I have, however, departed from Dreizehnter's version in a very small number of passages mentioned in the notes and I have on occasion adopted a different punctuation.

Barker's version included a long introduction, extensive notes, and several appendices. Although these contained some very helpful material, advances in scholarship together with changes in philosophical fashion and in political realities have made them seem dated in some respects. I have therefore provided a new introduction and explanatory notes of my own in a format appropriate for this series. In doing so I have drawn heavily on Barker. Passages taken verbatim from his notes are acknowledged but there are many other places where I have drawn on the substance of his comments without acknowledgement. The same goes for the titles which Barker added to each of the books and in some cases to parts of books and for the italicized summaries with which he headed each chapter. I have retained these with very few modifications (mostly to keep the summaries in line with the revised translation).

Each Book of the *Politics* has traditionally been divided into chapters. These divisions do not have Aristotle's own authority and sometimes interrupt the flow of the argument, but since they provide the customary way of referring to substantial sections of the text I have used them throughout. Book and chapter numbers are given at the head of each page. In making more detailed references it is customary to use the page, column, and line numbers of the Berlin edition of Aristotle's works published under the editorship of I. Bekker in 1831. The reference for the opening of *Politics* I under this system is 'page 1252, column a, line 1', or, more briefly '1252a1'. References are given in this form at the beginning of each paragraph. The same system is used for the cross-references in the notes.

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

ARISTOTLE AND GREEK POLITICS

510–322

510	The tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons who have ruled Athens off and on for around fifty years is overthrown.
508–507	Under the leadership of Cleisthenes a democratic constitution is established at Athens.
490	Persian invasion defeated by the Athenians at the battle of Marathon.
480–479	A second much larger Persian invasion defeated by the co-operative efforts of many Greek cities at the battles of Salamis and Plataea. The Athenian fleet is mainly responsible for the victory at sea and the Spartan army for the victory on land.
477	Many of the city-states around the Aegean sea join in establishing a military alliance (called the Delian League). The Athenians gradually convert this league into an empire. Other Greek states (mostly with oligarchic governments) look to Sparta for leadership. So there is a situation of what we would call 'cold war' between the democratic states led by Athens and more conservative oligarchic states led by Sparta.
431	Outbreak of Peloponnesian War between Athens and her empire on the one side and Sparta and her allies on the other. Initially the Athenians fare quite well but Sparta eventually gets the upper hand. Many ascribe Athens' failures to bad decisions taken by the democratic assembly.
404	Athens defeated.
404–403	The Spartans establish an oligarchy in Athens but the democracy is soon restored.
395–386	The Corinthian War: Athens, Corinth, and Thebes challenge Spartan supremacy. The war is ended by the Persian-sponsored King's Peace.
384	Aristotle born at Stagira, the son of Nicomachus, a doctor who has served as personal physician to King Amyntas III of Macedon.

371	The Thebans under Epaminondas defeat Sparta at the battle of Leuctra. This effectively ends Sparta's career as an important power.
367	Aristotle goes to Athens. (The traditional view is that the purpose of his going there was to study in Plato's Academy. But Plato himself was away in Sicily at this time and it is possible that Aristotle's reason for going to Athens was as much for safety as for study. Amyntas had been assassinated in 369 and Nicomachus had also died. There have even been suggestions, based on slender evidence, that Aristotle studied for a short period with the rhetorician Isocrates before joining the Academy.)
362	The death of Epaminondas at the battle of Mantinea brings Theban supremacy to an end.
359	Philip assumes power in Macedonia.
353	The Sacred War gives Philip the chance to begin military interference in Greece. Demosthenes rouses the Athenians to oppose him.
348/7	Aristotle leaves Athens for Atarneus. (The traditional view is that he left in anger at not being appointed to succeed Plato as head of the Academy. It is more likely that he was forced to leave by anti-Macedonian sentiment following the capture of Olynthus, a city allied to Athens.)
347–345	Aristotle joins Erastus and Coriscus, fellow members of the Academy, at Atarneus, where they enjoy the patronage of the ruler Hermias. Hermias establishes them at Assos. Aristotle's marriage to Hermias' niece, Pythias, may date from this period.
345/4	Aristotle moves to Mytilene on Lesbos.
343/2	Aristotle moves to Macedon. He is traditionally supposed to have acted as tutor to Alexander, the son of King Philip, but there is little contemporary evidence for this.
341/40	Hermias is betrayed to the Persians and dies under torture.
338	Battle of Chaeronea. Philip defeats the Athenians and Thebans and acquires effective control over Greece. At the congress in Corinth he announces his intention to invade Persia.
336	Philip is assassinated; his son Alexander succeeds to the throne of Macedon and to the leadership of Greece.
335/4	Aristotle returns to Athens, where he establishes his own school in the Lyceum. During this period he evidently enjoys close relations with Antipater, the Macedonian general who is left in charge of Greece by Alexander.
334	Alexander invades Persia.
323	Alexander dies. Athens and some other Greek cities stage an unsuccessful attempt to throw off Macedonian control.
323	Aristotle leaves Athens for Chalcis in Euboea. His departure is almost certainly connected with the Athenian revolt against Macedon following the death of Alexander.
322	Aristotle dies at Chalcis.

THE POLITICS

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BOOK I
THE HOUSEHOLD AND THE CITY

A: The Political Association and its Relation to other Associations (Chapters 1–2)

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CHAPTER 1

All associations have ends: the political association has the highest; but the principle of association expresses itself in different forms, and through different modes of government.

1252^{a}1 Observation shows us, first, that every city [*polis*] is a species of association,* and, secondly, that all associations come into being for the sake of some good—for all men do all their acts with a view to achieving something which is, in their view, a good.* It is clear therefore that all associations aim at some good, and that the particular association which is the most sovereign of all, and includes all the rest, will pursue this aim most, and will thus be directed to the most sovereign of all goods. This most sovereign and inclusive association is the city [or *polis*], as it is called, or the political association.

1252^{a}7 It is a mistake to believe that the statesman is the same as the monarch of a kingdom, or the manager of a household, or the master of a number of slaves.* Those who hold this view consider that each one of these differs from the others not with a difference of kind, but according to the number, large or small, of those with whom he deals. On this view someone who is concerned with few people is a master, someone who is concerned with more is the manager of a household, and someone who is concerned with still more is a statesman,* or a monarch. This view abolishes any real difference between a large household and a small city; and it also reduces the difference between the 'statesman' and the monarch to the one fact that the latter has an uncontrolled and sole authority, while the former exercises his authority in conformity with the rules imposed by the art of statesmanship and as one who rules and is ruled in turn. But this is a view which cannot be accepted as correct.*

1252^{a}18 Our point will be made clear if we proceed to consider the matter according to our normal method of analysis. Just as, in all other fields, a compound* should be analysed until we reach its simple elements (or, in other words, the smallest parts of the whole which it constitutes), so we must also consider analytically the elements of which a city is composed. We shall then gain a better insight into the way in which these differ from one another; and we shall also be in a position to discover whether there is any kind of expertise to be acquired in connection with the matters under discussion.

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CHAPTER 2

To distinguish the different forms of association we must trace the development successively of the association of the household, that of the village, and that of the city or polis. *The* polis, *or political association, is the crown: it completes and fulfils the nature of man: it is thus natural to him, and he is himself 'naturally a* polis-*animal'; it is also prior to him, in the sense that it is the presupposition of his true and full life.*

1252^{a}24 In this, as in other fields, we shall be able to study our subject best if we begin at the beginning and consider things in the process of their growth.* First of all, there must necessarily be a union or pairing of those who cannot exist without one another. Male and female must unite for the reproduction of the species—not from deliberate intention, but from the natural impulse, which exists in animals generally as it also exists in plants, to leave behind them something of the same nature as themselves. Next, there must necessarily be a union of the naturally ruling element with the element which is naturally ruled, for the preservation of both. The element which is able, by virtue of its intelligence, to exercise forethought, is naturally a ruling and master element; the element which is able, by virtue of its bodily power, to do the physical work, is a ruled element, which is naturally in a state of slavery; and master and slave have accordingly a common interest.

1252^{b}2 The female and the slave are naturally distinguished from one another. Nature makes nothing in a miserly spirit, as smiths do when they make the Delphic knife* to serve a number of purposes: she makes each separate thing for a separate end; and she does so because the instrument is most perfectly made when it serves a single purpose and not a variety of purposes. Among barbarians, however, the female and the slave occupy the same position*—the reason being that no naturally ruling element exists among them, and conjugal union thus comes to be a union of a female who is a slave with a male who is also a slave. This is why our poets have said,

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> Meet it is that barbarous peoples should be governed by the Greeks*

the assumption being that barbarian and slave are by nature one and the same.

The first result of these two elementary associations is the household or family. Hesiod spoke truly in the verse,

> First house, and wife, and ox to draw the plough,*

for oxen serve the poor in lieu of household slaves. The first form of association naturally instituted for the satisfaction of daily recurrent needs is thus the family; and the members of the family are accordingly termed by Charondas 'associates of the breadchest', as they are also termed by Epimenides* the Cretan 'associates of the manger'.

1252^{b}17 The next form of association—which is also the first to be formed from more households than one, and for the satisfaction of something more than daily recurrent needs—is the village. The most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony [or offshoot] from a family;* and some have thus called the members of the village by the name of 'sucklings of the same milk', or, again, of 'sons and the sons of sons'. This, it may be noted, is the reason why cities were originally ruled, as the peoples of the barbarian world still are, by kings. They were formed of people who were already monarchically governed, for every household is monarchically governed by the eldest of the kin, just as villages, when they are offshoots from the household, are similarly governed in

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virtue of the kinship between their members. This is what Homer describes:

> Each of them ruleth
> Over his children and wives,*

a passage which shows that they lived in scattered groups, as indeed men generally did in ancient times. The fact that men generally were governed by kings in ancient times, and that some still continue to be governed in that way, is the reason that leads everyone to say that the gods are also governed by a king. People make the lives of the gods in the likeness of their own—as they also make their shapes.

1252^{b}27 When we come to the final and perfect association,* formed from a number of villages, we have already reached the city [or *polis*]. This may be said to have reached the height of full self-sufficiency;* or rather we may say that while it comes into existence for the sake of mere life, it exists for the sake of a good life.* For this reason every city exists by nature,* just as did the earlier associations [from which it grew]. It is the end or consummation to which those associations move, and the 'nature' of things consists in their end or consummation; for what each thing is when its growth is completed we call the nature of that thing, whether it be a man or a horse or a family. Again the end, or final cause, is the best and self-sufficiency is both the end, and the best.

1253^{a}2 From these considerations it is evident that the city belongs to the class of things that exist by nature, and that man is by nature a political animal.* He who is without a city, by reason of his own nature and not of some accident, is either a poor sort of being, or a being higher than man: he is like the man of whom Homer wrote in denunciation:

> Clanless and lawless and hearthless is he.*

The man who is such by nature at once plunges into a passion of war; he is in the position of a solitary advanced piece in a game of draughts.

1253^{a}7 It is thus clear that man is a political animal, in a higher degree than bees or other gregarious animals. Nature, according to our theory, makes nothing in vain; and man alone of the animals is furnished with the faculty of language. The mere making of sounds serves to indicate pleasure and pain, and is thus a faculty that belongs to animals in general: their nature enables them to attain the point at which they have perceptions of pleasure and pain, and can signify those perceptions to one another. But language serves to declare what is advantageous and what is the reverse, and it is the peculiarity of man, in comparison with other animals, that he alone possesses a perception of good and evil, of the just and the unjust, and other similar qualities; and it is association in these things which makes a family and a city.

1253^{a}18 We may now proceed to add that the city is prior in the order of nature to the family and the individual. The reason for this is that the whole is necessarily prior to the part.* If the whole body is destroyed, there will not be a foot or a hand, except in that ambiguous sense in which one uses the same word to indicate a different thing, as when one speaks of a 'hand' made of stone; for a hand, when destroyed [by the destruction of the whole body], will be no better than a stone 'hand'.* All things derive their essential character from their function and their capacity; and it follows that if they are no longer fit to discharge their function, we ought not to say that they are still the same things, but only that, by an ambiguity, they still have the same names.

1253^{a}25 We thus see that the city exists by nature and that it is prior to the individual.* For if the individual is not self-sufficient when he is isolated he will stand in the same relation to the whole as other parts do to their wholes. The man who is isolated, who is unable to share in the benefits of political association, or has no need to share because he is already self-sufficient, is no part of the city, and must therefore be either a beast or a god. There is therefore a natural impulse in all men towards an association of this sort. But the man who first constructed such an association* was none the less the greatest of benefactors. Man, when perfected, is the best of animals; but if he be isolated from law and justice he is the worst of all. Injustice is all the graver when it is armed injustice; and man is furnished from birth with weapons which are intended

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to serve the purposes of wisdom and goodness,* but which may be used in preference for opposite ends. That is why, if he be without goodness [of mind and character], he is a most unholy and savage being, and worse than all others in the indulgence of lust and gluttony. The virtue of justice belongs to the city; for justice is an ordering of the political association, and the virtue of justice consists in the determination of what is just.

B: The Association of the Household and its Different Factors (Chapters 3–13)

সংসার উপাদান

CHAPTER 3

§1. The constituent elements of the household. The three relations of master and slave, husband and wife, parent and child. The fourth element of 'acquisition'.

1253ᵇ1 Having ascertained, from the previous analysis, what are the elements of which the city is constituted, we must first consider the management of the household; for every city is composed of households. The parts of household management will correspond to the parts of which the household itself is constituted. A complete household consists of slaves and freemen. But every subject of inquiry should first be examined in its simplest elements; and the primary and simplest elements of the household are the connection of master and slave, that of the husband and wife, and that of parents and children. We must accordingly consider each of these connections, examining the nature of each and the qualities it ought to possess. The factors to be examined are therefore three: first, the relationship of master and slave; next, what may be called the marital relationship (for there is no word in our language which exactly describes the union of husband and wife); and lastly, what may be called the parental relationship, which again has no single word in our language peculiar to itself. But besides the three factors which thus present themselves for examination there is also a fourth, which some regard as identical with the whole of household management, and others as its principal part. This is the element called 'the art of acquisition';* and we shall have to consider its nature.

1253ᵇ14 We may first speak of master and slave, partly in order to gather lessons bearing on the necessities of practical life, and partly in order to discover whether we can attain any view, superior to those now generally held, which is likely to promote an understanding of the subject. There are some who hold that the exercise of authority over slaves is a kind of knowledge. They believe (as we said in the beginning)* that household management, slave ownership, statesmanship, and kingship are all the same. There are others, however, who regard the control of slaves by a master as contrary to nature. In their view the distinction of master and slave is due to law or convention; there is no natural difference between them:* the relation of master and slave is based on force, and so has no warrant in justice.

দাসত্ব প্রথা

CHAPTER 4

§2. Slavery. The instruments of the household form its stock of property: they are animate and inanimate: the slave is an animate instrument, intended (like all the instruments of the household) for action, and not for production.

1253ᵇ23 Property is part of the household and the art of acquiring property is part of household management, for it is impossible to live well, or indeed at all, unless the necessary conditions are present. Thus the same holds true in the sphere of household management as in the specialized arts: each must be furnished with its appropriate instruments if its function is to be fulfilled. Instruments are partly inanimate and partly animate:* the steersman of a ship, for instance, has an inanimate instrument in the rudder, and an animate instrument in the look-out man (for in the arts a subordinate is of the nature of an instrument). Each article of property is thus an instrument for the purpose of life, property in general is a quantity of such instruments, the slave is an animate article of property, and subordinates, or servants, in general may be described as instruments which are prior to other instruments.

We can imagine a situation in which each instrument could do its own work, at the word of command or by intelligent anticipation, like the statues of Daedalus or the tripods made by Hephaestus, of which the poet relates that

> Of their own motion they entered the conclave of Gods on
> Olympus.*

A shuttle would then weave of itself, and a plectrum would do its own harp-playing. In this situation managers would not need subordinates and masters would not need slaves.

1254ᵃ1 The instruments of which we have just been speaking are instruments of production; but property is an instrument of action.* From the shuttle there issues something which is different, and exists apart, from the immediate act of its use; but from garments or beds there comes only the one fact of their use. We may add that, since production and action are different in kind, and both of them need instruments, those instruments must also show a corresponding difference. Life is action and not production; and therefore the slave is a servant in the sphere of action.

1254ᵃ8 The term 'article of property' is used in the same way in which the term 'part' is also used. A part is not only a part of something other than itself: it also belongs entirely to that other thing. It is the same with an article of property. Accordingly, while the master is merely the master of the slave, and does not belong to him, the slave is not only the slave of his master; he also belongs entirely to him.

1254ᵃ13 From these considerations we can see clearly what is the nature of the slave and what is his capacity: anybody who by his nature is not his own man, but another's, is by his nature a slave; anybody who, being a man, is an article of property is another's man; an article of property is an instrument intended for the purpose of action and separable from its possessor.

CHAPTER 5

There is a principle of rule and subordination in nature at large: it appears especially in the realm of animate creation. By virtue of that principle, the soul rules the body; and by virtue of it the master, who possesses the rational faculty of the soul, rules the slave, who possesses only bodily powers and the faculty of understanding the directions given by another's reason. But nature, though she intends, does not always succeed in achieving a clear distinction between men born to be masters and men born to be slaves.

1254ᵃ17 We have next to consider whether there are, or are not, some people who are by nature such as are here defined; whether, in other words, there are some people for whom slavery is the better and just condition, or whether the reverse is the case and all slavery is contrary to nature.* The issue is not difficult, whether we study it philosophically in the light of reason, or consider it empirically on the basis of the actual facts. The relation of ruler and ruled is one of those things which are not only necessary, but also beneficial; and there are species in which a distinction is already marked, immediately at birth, between those of its members who are intended for being ruled and those who are intended to rule. There are also many kinds both of ruling and ruled elements. (Moreover the rule which is exercised over the better sort of subjects is a better sort of rule—as, for example, rule exercised over a man is better than rule over an animal. The reason is that the value of something which is produced increases with the value of those contributing to it; and where one element rules and the other is ruled, there is something which they jointly produce.) In all cases where there is a compound, constituted of more than one part but forming one common entity, whether the parts be continuous or discrete, a ruling element and a ruled can always be traced. This characteristic is present in animate beings by virtue of the whole constitution of nature; for even in things which are inanimate there is a sort of ruling principle, such as is to be found, for example, in a musical harmony.* But such considerations perhaps belong to a more popular method of inquiry; and we may content ourselves here with saying that animate beings are composed, in the first place, of soul and body, with the former naturally ruling and the latter naturally ruled. When investigating the natural state of things, we must fix our attention, not on those which are in a corrupt, but on those which are in a natural condition.* It follows that we must consider the man who is in the best state both of body and soul, and in whom the rule of soul over body is accordingly evident; for with vicious people or those in a vicious condition, the reverse would often appear to be true—the body ruling the soul as the result of their evil and unnatural condition.

1254^{b}2 It is possible, as we have said, to observe first in animate beings the presence of a ruling authority, both of the sort exercised by a master over slaves and of the sort exercised by a statesman over fellow citizens. The soul rules the body with the authority of a master: reason rules the appetite with the authority of a statesman or a monarch.* In this sphere it is clearly natural and beneficial to the body that it should be ruled by the soul, and again it is natural and beneficial to the affective part of the soul that it should be ruled by the reason and the rational part; whereas the equality of the two elements, or their reverse relation, is always detrimental. The same principle is true of the relation of man to other animals. Tame animals have a better nature than wild, and it is better for all such animals that they should be ruled by man because they then get the benefit of preservation. Again, the relation of male to female is naturally that of the superior to the inferior, of the ruling to the ruled. This general principle must similarly hold good of all human beings generally.

1254^{b}16 We may thus conclude that all men who differ from others as much as the body differs from the soul, or an animal from a man (and this is the case with all whose function is bodily service, and who produce their best when they supply such service)—all such are by nature slaves. In their case, as in the other cases just mentioned, it is better to be ruled by a master. Someone is thus a slave by nature if he is capable of becoming the property of another (and for this reason does actually become another's property) and if he participates in reason to the extent of apprehending it in another, though destitute of it himself. Other animals do not apprehend reason* but obey their instincts. Even so there is little divergence in the way they are used; both of them (slaves and tame animals) provide bodily assistance in satisfying essential needs.

1254^{b}27 It is nature's intention also to erect a physical difference between the bodies of freemen and those of the slaves, giving the latter strength for the menial duties of life, but making the former upright in carriage and (though useless for physical labour) useful for the various purposes of civic life—a life which tends, as it develops, to be divided into military service and the occupations of peace. The contrary of nature's intention, however, often happens: there are some slaves who have the bodies of freemen, as there are others who have a freeman's soul. But, if there were men who were as distinguished in their bodies alone as are the statues of the gods, all would agree that the others should be their slaves.* And if this is true when the difference is one of the body, it may be affirmed with still greater justice when the difference is one of the soul; though it is not as easy to see the beauty of the soul as it is to see that of the body.

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1254^{b}39 It is thus clear that, just as some are by nature free, so others are by nature slaves, and for these latter the condition of slavery is both beneficial and just.

CHAPTER 6

Legal or conventional slavery: the divergence of views about its justice, and the reason for this divergence. In spite of the divergence, there is a general consensus—though it is not clearly formulated—that superiority in goodness justifies the owning and controlling of slaves. Granted such superiority in the master, slavery is a beneficial and just system.

1255^{a}3 But it is easy to see that those who hold an opposite view are also in a way correct. 'Slavery' and 'slave' are terms which are used in two different senses; for there is also a kind of slave, and of slavery, which owes its existence to law. (The law in question is a kind of understanding that those vanquished in war are held to belong to the victors.) That slavery can be justified by such a convention is a principle against which a number of jurists bring an 'indictment of illegality',* one might against an orator. They regard it as a detestable notion that someone who is subjugated by force should become the slave and subject of one who has the capacity to subjugate him, and is his superior in power. Even among men of judgement there are some who accept this and some who do not. The cause of this divergence of view, and the reason why the opposing contentions overlap one another, is to be found in the following consideration. There is a sense in which good qualities, when they are furnished with the right resources, have the greatest power to subjugate; and a victor is always pre-eminent in respect of some sort of good. It thus appears that 'power never goes without good qualities'; and the dispute between the two sides thus comes to turn exclusively on the point of justice.* (In this matter some think that being just consists in goodwill* while others hold that the rule of the stronger is in itself justice.) If these different positions are distinguished from one another, no other argument has any cogency, or even plausibility, against the view that one who is superior in goodness ought to rule over, and be the master of, his inferiors.

1255^{a}21 There are some who, clinging, as they think, to a sort of justice (for law is a sort of justice), assume that slavery in war is just. Simultaneously, however, they contradict that assumption; for in the first place it is possible that the original cause of a war may not be just, and in the second place no one would ever say that someone who does not deserve to be in a condition of slavery is really a slave. If such a view were accepted, the result would be that men reputed to be of the highest rank would be turned into slaves or the children of slaves, if they [or their parents] happened to be captured and sold into slavery. This is the reason why they do not like to call such people slaves, but prefer to confine the term to barbarians. But by this use of terms they are, in reality, only seeking to express that same idea of the natural slave which we began by mentioning. They are driven, in effect, to admit that there are some who are everywhere slaves, and others who are everywhere free. The same line of thought is followed in regard to good birth. Greeks regard themselves as well born not only in their own country, but absolutely and in all places; but they regard barbarians as well born only in their own country—thus assuming that there is one sort of good birth and freedom which is absolute, and another which is only relative. We are reminded of what Helen says in the play of Theodectes:*

> Scion of Gods, by both descent alike,
> Who would presume to call me serving-maid?

When they use such terms as these, men are using the one criterion of the presence, or absence, of goodness for the purpose of distinguishing between slave and freeman, or again, between the well-born and the low-born. They are claiming that just as man is born of man, and animal of animal, so a good man is born of good men. It is often the case, however, that nature wishes but fails to achieve this result.*

1255^{b}4 It is thus clear that there is some reason for the divergence of view which has been discussed—it is not true that the one group are natural slaves and the other natural freemen. It is also clear that there are cases where such a distinction exists, and that here it is beneficial and just that the former should actually be a slave and the latter a master—the one being ruled, and the other exercising the kind of rule for which he is naturally intended and therefore acting as master. But a wrong exercise of his rule by a master is a thing which is disadvantageous for both master and slave. The part and the whole, like the body and the soul, have an identical interest; and the slave is a part of the master, in the sense of being a living but separate part of his body. There is thus a community of interest, and a relation of friendship, between master and slave, when both of them naturally merit the position in which they stand. But the reverse is true, when matters are otherwise and slavery rests merely on legal sanction and superior power.

CHAPTER 7

The training of slaves, and the art of using them properly. How they may be justly acquired.

1255^{b}16 The argument makes it clear that the rule of the master and that of the statesman are different from one another, and that it is not the case that all kinds of rule are, as some thinkers hold, identical.* One kind of rule is exercised over those who are naturally free; the other over slaves; and again the rule exercised over a household by its head is that of a monarch (for all households are monarchically governed), while the rule of the statesman is rule over freemen and equals. Now masters are not so termed in virtue of any knowledge which they have acquired, but in virtue of their own endowment; and the same is true of slaves and freemen generally. But there may be a kind of knowledge which belongs to masters, and another which belongs to slaves; and the latter would be of the nature of the knowledge taught by the man of Syracuse, who instructed servants for pay in the discharge of their ordinary duties. Instruction in such subjects might be extended further: it might include, for example, the art of cookery and other similar forms of skilled domestic service. The reason why this might be done is that the duties differ; some are of a higher standing, even if others are needed more. As the proverb says:

> Slave may go before slave, and master may go before master.*

All such forms of knowledge are necessarily of a servile character. But there is also a form of knowledge belonging to the master, which consists in the use of slaves: a master is such in virtue not of acquiring, but of using slaves. This knowledge belonging to the master is something which has no great or majestic character: the master must simply know how to command what the slave must know how to do. This is why those who are in a position to escape from being troubled by it delegate the management of slaves to a steward, and spend on politics or philosophy the time they are thus able to save. The art of acquiring slaves for ownership differs both from the art of being a master and from that of being a slave—that is to say, when it is justly practised; for in that case it is a particular form of the art of war, or of the art of hunting.

$1255^{b}39$ This should be an adequate account of the distinction between master and slave.

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CHAPTER 8

✓ ***3. Property and the art of acquisition.*** *The art of household management is distinct from that of acquisition. It has to provide a stock of requisites for the household; and the different methods by which this is done produce different ways of life—the hunting, the pastoral, the agricultural, and so forth. Nature intends and provides the requisites for household use; and the acquisition of such requisites is a natural mode of acquisition. Property in them is limited to the amount required by household needs; and it is the nature of all true wealth to be so limited.*

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$1256^{a}1$ We may now study generally all forms of property and the art of acquiring it,* following our normal method; for we have already seen that the slave is an article of property. The first problem which may be raised is whether the art of acquiring property is identical with that of household management, or is a part of it, or is ancillary to it; and whether, if it is ancillary, it is so in the sense in which the art of making shuttles is ancillary to the art of weaving, or in the sense in which the art of casting bronze is ancillary to the art of sculpture. These are ancillary in a different way; the one provides instruments, and the other the material. (By 'material' we mean the substance from which a product is made; as wool, for instance, serves the weaver; and bronze the sculptor.) That the art of household management is not identical with the art of acquiring property is obvious. It is the function of the latter simply to provide, but it is the function of the former to use what has been provided; for what art can there be, other than that of household management, which will use the resources of the household? But the question whether the art of acquisition is a part of it, or a separate art altogether, is one which admits of a divergence of views. If someone who is engaged in acquisition has to consider from what different sources he can get goods and property, and if property and wealth include many different parts, we shall first have to consider whether farming is a part of the art of acquisition, or a separate art: indeed we shall have to ask that question generally, in regard to all modes of occupation and gain which are concerned with the provision of subsistence. There are a number of different modes of subsistence; and the result is a number of different ways of life, among both animals and human beings. It is impossible to live without means of subsistence; and among the animals we may notice that differences in the means of subsistence have produced consequent differences in ways of life. Some wild animals live in herds, and others are scattered in isolation, according as they find it convenient for the purpose of getting subsistence—some of them being carnivorous, some herbivorous, and some, again, omnivorous. Nature has thus distinguished their ways of life, with a view to their greater comfort and their better attainment of these things: indeed, as the same sort of food is not naturally agreeable to all the members of a class, and as different sorts suit different species, there are also different ways of life even within the class of carnivorous animals—and equally in that of the herbivorous. The same is also true of men. Their ways of life also differ considerably. The most indolent are the pastoral nomads. They acquire a subsistence from domestic animals, at their leisure, and without any trouble; and as it is necessary for their flocks to move for the sake of pasturage, they also are forced to follow and to cultivate what may be called a living farm. There are others who live by hunting; and of these, again, there are different kinds, according to their different modes of hunting. Some live by being freebooters;* some, who live near lakes and marshes and rivers, or by a sea which is suitable for the purpose, gain a livelihood by fishing; others live by hunting birds or wild animals. Most of mankind, however, derive their livelihood from the soil, and from cultivated plants.

1256^{a}40 The different ways of life (at any rate if we take into account only those who follow an occupation dependent on their own labours, and do not provide themselves with subsistence by exchange and petty trade) may be roughly classified as pastoral, freebooting, fishing, hunting, and farming. But there are some who live comfortably by means of a combination of different methods, and who supplement the shortcomings of one way of life, when it tends to fall short of being sufficient in itself, by adding some other way. For example, some combine the pastoral way of life with the freebooting; others combine farming with hunting; and similar combinations may be made of other ways of life; as need impels people so they shape their lives.

1256^{b}7 This kind of capacity for acquisition is evidently given by nature to all living beings, from the moment when they are first born to the days when their growth is finished. There are animals which, when their offspring is born, bring forth along with it food enough to support it until it can provide for itself: this is the case with those which reproduce themselves by grubs, and with animals which do so by eggs. Animals which are viviparous have food for their offspring in themselves, for a certain time, of the nature of what is called milk.

✓ **1256^{b}15** Likewise we must evidently believe that similar provision is made for adults. Plants exist for the benefit of animals, and some animals exist for the benefit of others.* Those which are domesticated, serve human beings for use as well as for food; wild animals, too, in most cases if not in all, serve to furnish us not only with food, but also with other kinds of assistance, such as the provision of clothing and similar aids to life. Accordingly, if nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, all animals must have been made by nature for the sake of men. It also follows that the art of war is in some sense a natural mode of acquisition. Hunting is a part of that art; and hunting ought to be practised, not only against wild animals, but also against human beings who are intended by nature to be ruled by others and refuse to obey that intention, because this sort of war is naturally just.

1256^{b}26 It follows that one form of acquisition is naturally a part of the art of household management, in the sense that the manager of a household must either have available or ensure the availability of a supply of objects which are capable of being stored and are either necessary for life or useful to the association of the city [*polis*] or the household. These are the objects which may be regarded as constituting true wealth, for the amount of household property which suffices for a good life is not unlimited, nor of the nature described by Solon* in the verse,

> There is no bound to wealth stands fixed for men.

There is a bound fixed, as is also the case in the means required by the other arts. All the instruments needed by all the arts are limited, both in number and size, and wealth may be defined as a number of instruments used in a household or city.

1256ᵇ37 It is thus clear that there is a natural art of acquisition* which has to be practised by managers of households and statesmen; and the reason for its existence is also clear.

CHAPTER 9

The 'art of acquisition', as a way of acquiring property distinct from the natural way of the household. It originates in exchange, when exchange is conducted through the medium of currency and for profit. The view thus arises that the art of acquisition is specially concerned with accumulating a fund of currency. But there is a contrary view that currency is a mere convention, and not the true object of the art of acquisition. This contrary view has its truth. There is a natural form of the art of acquisition, which is not distinct from, but a part of, the art of household management. This natural form of acquisition aims at the accumulation not of currency, but of true wealth—and therefore not at the infinite, but at the finite.

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1256ᵇ40 But there is a second form of the art of getting property, which is particularly called, and which it is just to call, 'the art of acquisition'.* It is this second form which gives rise to the opinion that there is no limit to wealth and property. There are many who hold it to be identical with the other form previously mentioned, because it has affinities with it. In fact it is not identical, and yet it is not far removed. The other form previously mentioned is natural: this second form is not natural, but is rather the product of a certain sort of experience and skill.

1257ᵃ5 We may start our discussion of this [second] form from the following point of view. All articles of property have two possible uses.* Both of these uses belong to the article as such, but they do not belong to it in the same manner, or to the same extent. The one use is proper and peculiar to the article concerned; the other is not. A shoe, for example, can be used both for wearing and for exchange. Both of these uses are uses of the shoe as such. Even the man who exchanges a shoe, in return for money or food, with someone who needs the article, is using the shoe as a shoe; but since the shoe has not been made for the purpose of being exchanged, the use which he is making of it is not its proper and peculiar use. The same is true of all other articles of property. Exchange is possible in regard to them all: it arises from the natural facts of the case, and is due to some men having more, and others less, than suffices for their needs. We can thus see that retail trade is not naturally a part of the art of acquisition. If that were the case, it would only be necessary to practise exchange to the extent that sufficed for the needs of both parties.

1257ᵃ19 In the first form of association, which is the household, it is obvious that there is no purpose to be served by the art of exchange. Such a purpose only emerged when the scope of association had already been extended. The members of the household had shared all things in common: those who lived separately from one another, had at their disposal a number of different things, which they had to exchange as need arose, by way of barter—much as many barbarian tribes still do to this day. On this basis things which are useful are exchanged themselves, and directly, for similar useful things, but the transaction does not go any further; wine, for instance, is given, or taken, in return for wheat, and other similar commodities are similarly bartered for one another. When used in this way, the art of exchange is not contrary to nature, nor in any way a form of the art of acquisition. Exchange simply serves to satisfy the natural requirements of sufficiency. None the less it was from exchange, as thus practised, that the art of acquisition developed,* in the sort of way we might reasonably expect. The supply of men's needs came to depend on more foreign sources, as men began to import for themselves what they lacked, and to export what they had in superabundance: and in this way the use of a money currency was inevitably instituted.* The reason for this was that all the naturally necessary commodities were not easily portable; and people therefore agreed, for the purpose of their exchanges, to give and receive some commodity which itself belonged to the category of useful things and possessed the advantage of being easily handled for the purpose of getting the necessities of life. Such commodities were iron, silver, and other similar metals. At first their value was simply determined by their size and weight; but finally a stamp was imposed on the metal which, serving as a definite indication of the quantity, would save people the trouble of determining the value on each occasion.

1257^{a}41 When in this way a currency had once been instituted, there next arose, from the necessary process of exchange, the second form of the art of acquisition, the one which consists in retail trade. At first, we may allow, it was perhaps practised in a simple way: but in process of time, and as the result of experience, it was practised with a more studied technique, which sought to discover the sources from which, and the methods by which, the greatest profit could be made. The result has been the emergence of the view that the art of acquisition is specially concerned with currency, and that its function consists in an ability to discover the sources from which a fund of money can be derived. In support of this view it is urged that the art is one which produces wealth and money; indeed those who hold the view often assume that wealth is simply a fund of currency, on the ground that the arts of acquisition and of retail trade are concerned with currency. In opposition to this view it is sometimes held that currency is a sham, and entirely a convention. Naturally and inherently [the supporters of the view argue] a currency is a nonentity; for if those who use a currency give it up in favour of another, that currency is worthless, and useless for any of the necessary purposes of life. A man rich in currency [they proceed to urge] will often be at a loss to procure the necessities of subsistence; and surely it is absurd that a thing should be counted as wealth which a man may possess in abundance, and yet none the less die of starvation—like Midas* in the fable, when everything set before him was turned at once into gold through the granting of his own avaricious prayer.

1257^{b}17 For this reason some people seek a different conception of wealth and of the art of acquisition. They are right to do so. The natural form of the art of acquisition, like the natural form of wealth, is something different.* It is part of the management of the household while retail trade serves to make money, and that only by the exchange of commodities. The latter may be seen as concerned with currency; for currency is both a basic unit and a limiting factor in exchange.

1257^{b}23 A further point of difference is that the wealth produced by this [second] form of the art of acquisition is unlimited.* The art of medicine recognizes no limit in respect of the production of health, and the arts generally admit no limit in respect of the production of their ends (each seeking to produce its end to the greatest possible extent)—though medicine, and the arts generally, recognize and practise a limit to the means they use to attain their ends, since the end itself constitutes a limit.* The same is true of the retail form of the art of acquisition. There is no limit to the end it seeks; and the end it seeks is wealth of the sort we have mentioned and the mere acquisition of money. But the art of household management, as distinct from the art of acquisition, has a limit; and the object of that art is not an unlimited amount of wealth. It would thus appear, if we look at the matter in this light, that all wealth must have a limit. In actual experience, however, we see the opposite happening, and all who are engaged in acquisition increase their fund of currency without any limit or pause.

1257^{b}35 The cause [of this contradiction] lies in the close connection between the two different modes of acquisition. They overlap in the sense that they both use the same object, that is, they use the same property but not in the same way. The object of the one is simply accumulation, and that of the other something quite different.* This explains why some men believe that mere accumulation is the object of household management; and why they stick to the idea that they must keep intact their wealth in currency, or increase it indefinitely.

But the fundamental cause of this state of mind is concern about living, rather than about living well; and since their desire for that is unlimited, their desire for the things that produce it is equally unlimited. Even those who do aim at well-being seek the means of obtaining physical enjoyments; and, as what they seek appears to depend on the activity of of acquisition, they are thus led to occupy themselves wholly in the making of money. This is why the second form of the art of acquisition has come into vogue. Because enjoyment depends on superfluity, men address themselves to the art which produces the superfluity necessary to enjoyment; and if they cannot get what they want by the art of acquisition, they attempt to do so by other means, using each and every capacity in a way not consonant with its nature. The proper function of courage, for example, is not to produce money but to give confidence. The same is true of military and medical ability: neither has the function of producing money: the one has the function of producing victory, and the other that of producing health. But those of whom we are speaking turn all such capacities into forms of the art of acquisition, as though to make money were the one aim and everything else must contribute to that aim.

1258^{a}14 We have thus discussed the unnecessary form of the art of acquisition: we have described its nature, and we have explained why men need its services. We have also discussed the necessary form: we have shown that it is different from the other, and is naturally a branch of the art of household management, concerned with the provision of subsistence, and not therefore unlimited in its scope, as the other form is, but subject to definite bounds.

CHAPTER 10

[illegible]

Household management is concerned with the use, and not (except in the way of general supervision) with the acquisition, of property; generally the householder should be able to count on nature supplying the means he needs. Acquisition for acquisition's sake shows its worst side in usury, which makes barren metal breed.

1258^{a}19 The argument of the last chapter provides a clear solution to the problem which we originally raised. 'Does the art of acquisition belong to the province of the manager of the household and the statesman? Or is it outside that province, and should property be regarded as something which they can simply take as given?' It may be urged, in favour of the second alternative, that just as the art of the statesman does not produce human stock, but counts on its being supplied by nature and proceeds to use her supply, so nature must also provide the physical means of subsistence—the land, or sea, or whatever it be. Then, and upon that basis, it is the province of the householder to manage properly these means. It is not the business of the art of weaving to produce wool, but to use it, and to distinguish the sorts of wool which are good and suitable from those which are poor and unsuitable. If the art of acquisition were held to be a part of the art of household management, the question might be raised why the art of medicine should not equally be held to be a part; and it might be argued that the members of a household must needs have health, in the same way as they must needs have life or any of the other necessaries. There is a sense in which it is the business of the manager of a household or of a ruler to see to the health of the members of his household or city; but there is another sense in which it is not their business but that of the doctor. Similarly, in the matter of property, there is a sense in which it is the business of the manager of a household to see to its acquisition and another sense in which that is not his business, but part of an ancillary art. But in general, as we have already noticed, a supply of property should be ready to hand.

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1258^{a}35 It is the business of nature to furnish subsistence for each being brought into the world; and this is shown by the fact that the offspring of animals always gets nourishment from the residuum of the matter that gives it its birth. The natural form, therefore, of the art of acquisition is always, and in all cases, acquisition from fruits and animals. That art, as we have said, has two forms: one which is connected with retail trade, and another which is connected with the management of the household. Of these two forms, the latter is necessary and laudable; the former is a method of exchange which is justly censured, because the gain in which it results is not naturally made, but is made at the expense of other men. The trade of the petty usurer is hated with most reason: it makes a profit from currency itself, instead of making it from the process which currency was meant to serve. Currency came into existence merely as a means of exchange; usury tries to make it increase. This is the reason why it got its name; for as the offspring resembles its parent, so the interest bred by money is like the principal which breeds it, and it may be called 'currency the son of currency.'* Hence we can understand why, of all modes of acquisition, usury is the most unnatural.

CHAPTER 11

A practical consideration of the art of acquisition. The divisions of that art which may be made on practical grounds. Instances of the successful practice of the art, especially by the creation of monopolies.

1258^{b}9 We have now discussed sufficiently that part of our subject which is related to pure knowledge: it remains to consider the part which is related to actual use. All subjects of this nature may be treated liberally in theory, but have to be handled in practice as circumstances demand. The parts of the art of acquisition which are of actual use are the following. The first is an experience of farm-stock. This involves knowing which are the most profitable breeds, and on what soil, and with what treatment, they will give us the greatest profit—knowing, for example, the right way of stocking horses, or cattle, or sheep, or any other kind of farm-stock. We need experience to tell how different breeds compare with one another in point of profit, or what breeds are most profitable on what sorts of soil: for some breeds thrive on one sort of soil, and some on another sort. Other useful parts of the art of acquisition are experience in cultivation, not only of cornland but also of land planted with vines and olives; experience in bee-keeping; and experience in the rearing of such fish and

(i) পশুপালন

(ii) কৃষিকাজ

(iii) মৌমাছি পালন/মৎস্য চাষ.

fowl as may help to provide subsistence. These are the parts and the original elements of the art of acquisition in its most proper form. We now come to exchange. This includes, first and foremost, commerce (which is divided into the three operations of the provision of a ship, the carriage of freight, and offering for sale—operations which differ from one another in the sense that some have a greater margin of safety, and others a greater margin of profit); it includes, in the second place, investment at interest; and it also includes, in the third place, service for hire. This last part of exchange is partly a matter of skilled craftsmen in the mechanical arts, and partly of unskilled workers who can render only the service of bodily labour. A third form of the art of acquisition is a form intermediate between the first and second; for it possesses elements both of the first, or natural, form, and of the form which consists in exchange. It is concerned with things extracted from the earth or with products of the earth which bear no fruit but are still of use; and we may thus cite, as examples, lumbering and all [forms of] mining.* Mining, in its turn, has many forms, because there are many species of metals extracted from the earth.

ব্যবসা.

সুদ ব্যবসা.

মজুরি. নিয়োগ. শ্রম.

1258^{b}33 A general account has now been given of the various forms of acquisition: to consider them minutely, and in detail, might be useful for practical purposes; but to dwell long upon them would be in poor taste. Suffice it to say that the occupations which require most skill are those in which there is least room for chance: the meanest are those in which most damage is done to physique: the most servile are those in which most use is made of physical strength: the least noble are those in which there is least need for the exercise of goodness.

1258^{b}39 There are books on these subjects by several writers: Charetides of Paros and Apollodoros of Lemnos have written on the cultivation of cornland and land planted with vines and olives: others have written on other themes; anyone who is interested should study these subjects with the aid of these writings. A collection ought also to be made of the scattered stories about the ways in which different people have succeeded in making a fortune. They are all useful to those who value the art of acquisition. There is, for example, the story which is told of Thales of Miletus.* It is a story about a scheme for making money, which is fathered on Thales owing to his reputation for wisdom; but it involves a principle of general application. He was reproached for his poverty, which was supposed to show the uselessness of philosophy; but observing from his knowledge of meteorology (so the story goes) that there was likely to be a heavy crop of olives, and having a small sum at his command, he paid deposits, early in the year, for the hire of all the olive-presses in Miletus and Chios; and he managed, in the absence of any higher offer, to secure them at a low rate. When the season came, and there was a sudden and simultaneous demand for a number of presses, he let out the stock he had collected at any rate he chose to fix; and making a considerable fortune he succeeded in proving that it is easy for philosophers to become rich if they so desire, though it is not the business which they are really about. The story is told as showing that Thales proved his own wisdom; but as we have said, the plan he adopted, which was, in effect, the creation of a monopoly, involves a principle which can be generally applied in the art of acquisition. Some cities, therefore, as well as individuals, adopt this resource when in need of money: they establish, for instance, a monopoly in provisions. In Sicily a man with whom a sum of money had been deposited bought up all the iron from the ironworks; and afterwards, when retailers came from their shops to get a supply, he was the only seller from whom they could buy. He did not raise the price to any extent; but he gained, none the less, a profit of a 100 talents on an outlay of 50. This speculation came to the notice of Dionysius [the ruler of Syracuse] and he ordered the man to leave the city, though he allowed him to take his gains: the reason was his discovery of a way of making profit which was injurious to the interests of Dionysius himself. Yet his idea was simply the same as that of Thales; and what both of them did was merely to establish a private monopoly. But a knowledge of these methods is useful to statesmen—cities, like households, but to an even greater extent, are often in want of financial resources and in need of more ways of gaining them. This is the reason why some of those who adopt a political career confine their political activity to matters of finance.

CHAPTER 12

4. Marriage, parenthood, and the general management of the household. The nature of marital authority, which is like that exercised by a statesman over his fellow citizens. The nature of parental authority, which is like that of a king over his subjects.

1259ᵃ37 We said, in a previous passage, that there were three parts of the art of household management—the first, of which we have already spoken, being the art of controlling slaves: the second, the art of exercising paternal authority; and the third, that of exercising marital authority. While the head of the household rules over both wife and children, and rules over both as free members of the household, he exercises a different sort of rule in each case. His rule over his wife is like that of a statesman over fellow citizens; his rule over his children is like that of a monarch over subjects.* The male is naturally fitter to command than the female, except where there is some departure from nature; and age and maturity are similarly fitter to command than youth and immaturity. In most cases where rule of the statesman's sort is exercised there is an interchange of ruling and being ruled: the members of a political association aim by their very nature at being equal and differing in nothing. It is none the less true that when one rules and the other is ruled, [the former] desires to establish a difference, in outward forms, in modes of address, and in titles of respect. This may remind us of the saying of Amasis about his foot-pan.* The relation of the male to the female is permanently that in which the statesman stands to his fellow citizens. Paternal rule over children, on the other hand, is like that of a king over his subjects. The male parent is in a position of authority both in virtue of the affection to which he is entitled and by right of his seniority; and his position is thus in the nature of royal authority. Homer was right, therefore, to use the invocation

Father of Gods and of men

to address Zeus, who is king of them all. A king ought to be naturally superior to his subjects, and yet of the same stock as they are; and this is the case with the relation of age to youth, and of parent to child.

CHAPTER 13

The art of household management is a moral art, aiming at the moral goodness of the members of the household; and this is true in regard to slaves as well as to other members. The goodness of the head of the household has a quality of its own: the different classes of members have also different qualities of goodness. This is part of a general law that goodness is relative to function, and that it is the function of some to guide, and of others to be guided—and guided, too, in different ways. The master's duty of guiding the slaves of the household. The subjects of marriage and parenthood (only briefly mentioned in the previous chapter) are to be reserved for future treatment, in connection with the city and the proper mode of its government (Book VII, *Chapters 17–18).*

$\mathbf{1259^{b}18}$ It is clear from the previous argument that the business of household management is concerned more with human beings than it is with inanimate property; that it is concerned more with the good condition of human beings than with a good condition of property (which is what we call wealth); and, finally, that it is concerned more with the goodness of the free members of the household than with that of slaves. Here a preliminary question may be raised in regard to the slave. Has he any 'goodness' beyond that of discharging his function as an instrument and performing his menial service—any goodness of a higher value, such as temperance, fortitude, justice, and the rest of such moral qualities?* Or has he no 'goodness' outside the area of the bodily services he renders? Either alternative presents difficulties. If slaves have a 'goodness' of the higher sort, in what respect will they differ from freemen? If they have not it would be surprising since they are human beings, with a share in reason.* Practically the same question may be asked in regard to a woman and a child. Do they have their own forms of goodness? Must a woman be temperate, brave, and just? Is it, or is it not, possible for a child to be licentious or temperate?

$\mathbf{1259^{b}32}$ In general we must raise the following question about those who are naturally ruled and about those who rule: 'Is their goodness the same or does it differ?' If we say that both of them ought to share in the nobility of goodness, why should one of them permanently rule, and the other be permanently ruled? The difference between them cannot be simply a difference of degree: the difference between ruler and ruled is one of kind, and degree has nothing to do with the matter. On the other hand, it would be strange if one of them ought to share and the other ought not. How can the ruler rule properly, or the subject be properly ruled, unless they are both temperate and just? Anyone who is licentious or cowardly will utterly fail to do his duty. The conclusion which clearly emerges is that both classes must share in goodness, but that there must be different kinds of goodness, just as [there are also different kinds of goodness] among those who are naturally ruled.

$\mathbf{1260^{a}4}$ The view here suggested takes us straight to the nature of the soul. The soul has naturally two elements, a ruling and a ruled; and each has its different goodness, one belonging to the rational and ruling element, and the other to the irrational and ruled. What is true of the soul is evidently also true of the other cases; and we may thus conclude that it is natural in most cases for there to be both a ruling element and one that is ruled.* The rule of the freeman over the slave is one kind of rule; that of the male over the female another; that of the grown man over the child another still. It is true that all these people possess in common the different parts of the soul; but they possess them in different ways. The slave is entirely without the faculty of deliberation; the female indeed possesses it, but in a form which lacks authority; and children also possess it, but only in an immature form. We must assume that the same holds with regard to moral goodness: they must all share in it, but not in the same way—each sharing only to the extent required for the discharge of his or her function. The ruler, accordingly, must possess moral goodness in its full and perfect form, because his function is essentially that of a master-craftsman,* and reason is such a master-craftsman; but other people need only to possess moral goodness to the extent required of them. It is thus clear that while moral goodness is a quality of all those mentioned, the fact still remains that temperance—and similarly courage and justice—are not, as Socrates held,* the same in a woman as they are in a man. One kind of courage is concerned with ruling, the other with serving; and the same is true of the other forms of goodness.

1260^{a}24 This conclusion also emerges clearly when we examine the subject in more detail. To speak in general terms, and to maintain that goodness consists in 'a good condition of the soul', or in 'right action', or in anything of the kind, is to be guilty of self-deception. Far better than such general definitions is the method of simple enumeration of the different forms of goodness, as followed by Gorgias.* We must therefore hold that what the poet said of women

> A modest silence is a woman's crown*

contains a general truth—but a truth which does not apply to men. And since a child is immature its goodness is obviously not a matter of its relation to itself, but of its relation to its end and to the authority that guides it. Similarly, too, the goodness of the slave is a matter of his relation to his master.

1260^{a}33 We laid it down, in treating of slaves, that they were useful for the necessary purposes of life. It is clear, on that basis, that they need but little goodness; only so much, in fact, as will prevent them from falling short of their duties through intemperance or cowardice. If this be true, the question may be raised whether artisans too ought not to have goodness, seeing that they often fall short of their duties through intemperance. But does not the case of the artisan differ greatly from that of the slave? The slave is a partner in his master's life: the artisan is less closely attached to a master. The extent of the goodness incumbent on him is proportionate to the extent of the servitude to which he is subject; since the mechanical type of artisan is subject only to what may be called a limited servitude.* Again the slave belongs to the class of those who are naturally what they are; but no shoemaker, or any other artisan, belongs to that class. It is therefore clear that the task of producing in the slave the sort of goodness we have been discussing belongs to the master of the household, not to whoever instructs him in his work. This is why those who withhold reason from slaves, and argue that only command should be employed,* are making a mistake: admonition ought to be applied to slaves even more than it is to children.

1260^{b}8 This may be sufficient as a discussion of these topics. There remain for discussion a number of questions: the relation of husband and wife, and that of parent and child; the nature of the goodness proper to each partner in these relations; the character of the mutual association of the partners, with its qualities and defects and the methods of attaining those qualities and escaping those defects. All these are questions which must be treated later in the discourses which deal with constitutions.* Every household is a part of a city and the relationships we have mentioned are parts of the household. Moreover, the goodness of every part must be considered with reference to the goodness of the whole. We must therefore consider the constitution before we proceed to deal with the training of children and women—at any rate if we hold that the goodness of children and of women makes any difference to the goodness of the city. And it must make a difference. Women are a half of the free population: children grow up to be partners in the constitution.

1260^{b}20 As we have already discussed some aspects [of the household], and as we are to discuss the rest at a later stage, we may dismiss our present inquiry as finished, and make a new start. Let us first examine the theories of those who have expressed opinions about the best form of constitution.*

BOOK II
REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONS

A: Constitutions in Theory (Chapters 1–8)

CHAPTER 1

1. Plato's **Republic.** *Before describing our own conception of the best constitution we must consider both those constitutions that are in force in cities considered to be well governed and those constitutions that have been proposed by our predecessors. In doing so we should note that political association is a sharing: so we may ask 'How much should be shared?' In Plato's* Republic *it is proposed that women, children, and property should be held in common.*

1260^{b}27 Our purpose is to consider what form of political association is best for people able so far as possible to live as they would wish.* We must therefore consider not only constitutions actually in force in cities that are said to be well governed, but also other forms of constitution which people have proposed if these are thought to have merit.* In this way we will be able to see in what respects these constitutions are properly designed and useful. What is more, when we proceed to look for something different from them, we shall not seem to be the sort of people who desire at all costs to show their own ingenuity, but rather to have adopted our method in consequence of the defects we have found in existing forms.

1260^{b}36 Our starting-point must be the one that is natural for such a discussion. It is necessary either that the citizens have all things in common, or that they have nothing in common, or that they have some things in common, and others not.* It is clearly impossible that they should have nothing in common: the constitution of a city involves in itself some sort of association, and its members must in the first place share a common locality. Just as a single city [*polis*] must have a single locality, so citizens are those who share in a single city. But is it better that a city which is to be well conducted should share in all the things in which it is possible for it to share, or that it should share in some things and not in others? It is certainly possible that the citizens should share children and women and property with one another. This is the plan proposed in the *Republic* of Plato, where 'Socrates'* argues that children and women and property should be held in common. We are thus faced by the question whether it is better to remain in our present condition or to follow the rule of life laid down in the *Republic.**

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CHAPTER 2

Community of women and children. Criticisms of the end or object (unity) which Plato proposes to attain by it: (a) *carried to its logical extreme, that object would produce a one-man city;* (b) *it neglects the social differentiation necessary in a city (a differentiation which, even in a city of 'equals and likes', produces the distinction of rulers and ruled);* (c) *it thus makes self-sufficiency impossible, because self-sufficiency involves different elements making different contributions.*

1261^{a}10 A system in which women are common to all involves, among many others, the following difficulties. The *object* for which Socrates states that it ought to be instituted is evidently not established by the arguments which he uses.* Moreover, the end which he states as necessary for the city [*polis*] is impracticable;* and yet he gives no account of the lines on which it ought to be interpreted. I have in mind here the idea, which Socrates takes as his premiss, that the greatest possible unity of the whole city is the supreme good. Yet it is obvious that a city which goes on becoming more and more of a unit, will eventually cease to be a city at all. A city, by its nature, is some sort of plurality. If it becomes more of a unit, it will first become a household instead of a city, and then an individual instead of a household; for we should all call the household more of a unit than the city, and the individual more of a unit than the household. It follows that, even if we could, we ought not to achieve this object: it would be the destruction of the city.*

Unit [illegible]

1261^{a}22 Not only is the city composed of a *number* of people: it is also composed of different *kinds* of people, for a city cannot be composed of those who are like one another.* There is a difference between a city and a military alliance. An alliance, formed by its very nature for the sake of the mutual help which its members can render to one another, possesses utility purely in virtue of its quantity, even if there is no difference of kind among its members. It is like a weight which depresses the scales more heavily in the balance. In this respect a *city* will also differ from a tribe, assuming that the members of the tribe are not scattered in separate villages, but [are united in a confederacy] like the Arcadians.* A real unity must be made up of elements which differ in kind. It follows that the stability of every city depends on each of its elements rendering to the others an amount equivalent to what it receives from them—a principle already laid down in the *Ethics.** This has to be the case even among free and equal citizens. They cannot all rule simultaneously;* they must therefore each hold office for a year, unless they adopt some other arrangement or some other period of time. In this way it comes about that all are rulers, just as it would if shoemakers and carpenters changed their occupations so that the same people were not always following these professions. Since the arrangement [followed in the arts and crafts] is also better when applied to the affairs of the political association, it would clearly be better for the same people always to be rulers wherever possible. But where this is impossible, through the natural equality of all the citizens—and also because justice requires the participation of all in office (whether office be a good thing or a bad)—there is an imitation of it, if equals retire from office in turn and are all, apart from their period of office, in the same position. This means that some rule, and others are ruled, in turn, as if they had become, for the time being, different people. We may add that even those who are rulers differ from one another, some holding one kind of office and some another.

1261^{b}6 These considerations are sufficient to show, first, that it is not the nature of the city to be a unit in the sense in which some thinkers say that it is, and secondly, that what is said to be the supreme good of a city is really its ruin. But surely the 'good' of each thing is what preserves it in being.

1261^{b}10 There is still another consideration which may be used to prove that the policy of attempting an extreme unification of the city is not a good policy. A household is something which attains a greater degree of self-sufficiency than an individual; and a city, in turn, is something which attains self-sufficiency to a greater degree than a household. But it becomes fully a city, only when the association which forms it is large enough to be self-sufficing. On the assumption, therefore, that the higher degree of self-sufficiency is the more desirable thing, the lesser degree of unity is more desirable than the greater.*

CHAPTER 3

Community of women and children (continued). Criticisms of such community considered as a means for producing the end of unity: (a) as all collectively, and not each individually, are parents, there will be no real feeling, but rather a general apathy; (b) kinship will be fractional kinship (when 1,000 are father to the same child, each father is only 1/1,000 father); (c) nature will 'recur', and spoil the scheme.

1261^{b}16 Even if it were the supreme good of a political association that it should have the greatest possible unity, this unity does not appear to follow from the formula of 'All men saying "Mine" and "Not mine" at the same time', which, in the view of 'Socrates',* is the index of the perfect unity of a city. The word 'all' has a double sense:* if it means 'each separately', the object which 'Socrates' desires to realize may perhaps be realized in a greater degree: each and all separately will then say 'My wife' (or 'My son') of one and the same person; and each and all separately will speak in the same way of property, and of every other concern. But it is not in the sense of 'each separately' that all who have children and women in common will actually speak of them. They will all call them 'Mine'; but they will do so collectively, and not individually.* The same is true of property also; [all will call it

'Mine'] but they will do so in the sense of 'all collectively', and not in the sense of 'each separately'. It is therefore clear that there is a certain fallacy in the use of the term 'all'. 'All' and 'both' and 'odd' and 'even' are liable by their ambiguity to produce captious arguments* even in reasoned discussions. We may therefore conclude that the formula of 'all men saying "Mine" of the same object' is in one sense something fine but impracticable, and in another sense does nothing to promote harmony.

1261^{b}32 In addition to these problems the formula also involves another disadvantage: What is common to the greatest number gets the least amount of care. People pay most attention to what is their own: they care less for what is common; or, at any rate, they care for it only to the extent to which each is individually concerned. Even where there is no other cause for inattention, people are more prone to neglect their duty when they think that another is attending to it: this is what happens in domestic service, where many attendants are sometimes of less assistance than a few. [The scheme proposed in the *Republic* means that] each citizen will have a thousand sons: they will not be the sons of each citizen individually: any son whatever will be equally the son of any father whatever. The result will be that all will equally neglect them.

1262^{a}1 Furthermore each person, when he says 'Mine' of any citizen who is prosperous or the reverse, is speaking fractionally. He means only that he is 'Mine' to the extent of a fraction determined by the total number of citizens. When he says 'He is mine' or 'He is so-and-so's', the term 'Mine' or 'So-and-so's' is used with reference to the whole body concerned—the whole thousand, or whatever may be the total number of citizens. Even so he cannot be sure; for there is no evidence who had a child born to him, or whether, if one was born, it managed to survive. Which is the better system—that each of two thousand, or ten thousand, people should say 'Mine' of a child in this fractional sense, or that each should say 'Mine' in the sense in which the word is now used in ordinary cities? As things are, one man calls by the name of '*My* son' the same person whom a second man calls by the name of '*My* brother': a third calls him '*My* cousin' or '*My* relative', because he is somehow related to him, either by blood or by connection through marriage; while besides these different modes of address someone else may use still another, and call him '*My* clansman' or '*My* tribesman'. It is better to be someone's own cousin than to be his son after this fashion.* Even on Plato's system it is impossible to avoid the chance that some of the citizens might guess who are their brothers, or children, or fathers, or mothers.* The resemblances between children and parents must inevitably lead to their drawing conclusions about one another. That this actually happens in real life is stated as fact by some of the writers on descriptive geography. They tell us that some of the inhabitants of upper Libya have their women in common; but the children born of such unions can still be distinguished by their resemblance to their fathers. Indeed there are some women, and some females in the animal world (mares, for instance, and cows), that show a strong natural tendency to produce offspring resembling the male parent: the Pharsalian mare which was called the 'Just Return'* is a good example.

CHAPTER 4

Community of women and children (continued). Problems arise when parents do not know their children, or children their parents. At best such a community produces a watery sort of friendship. The addition to it of a scheme of transposition of ranks raises further difficulties.

1262^{a}25 There are also other difficulties which those who construct such a community will not find it easy to avoid. We may take as examples cases of assault, homicide, whether unintentional or intentional, fighting, and slander. All these offences, when they are committed against father or mother or a near relative, differ from offences against people who are not so related, in being breaches of natural piety.* Such offences must happen more frequently when men are ignorant of their relatives than when they know who they are; and when they do happen, the customary penance can be made if people know their relatives, but none can be made if they are ignorant of them. It is also surprising that, after having made sons common to all, he should simply forbid lovers from engaging in carnal intercourse.* Nor does he forbid other familiarities which, if practised between son and father, or brother and brother, are the very height of indecency, all the more as this form of love [even if it is not expressed] is in itself indecent. It is surprising, too, that he should debar male lovers from carnal intercourse on the one ground of the excessive violence of the pleasure, and that he should think it a matter of indifference that the lovers may be father and son, or again that they may be brothers.

1262^{a}40 Community of women and children would seem to be more useful if it were practised among the farmers rather than among the guardians. The spirit of friendship* is likely to exist to a lesser degree where women and children are common; and the governed class ought to have little of that spirit if it is to obey and not to attempt revolution. Generally, such a system must produce results directly opposed to those which a system of properly constituted laws should produce, and equally opposed to the very object for which, in the view of 'Socrates', this community of women and children ought to be instituted. Friendship, we believe, is the chief good of cities, because it is the best safeguard against the danger of factional disputes. 'Socrates' himself particularly commends the ideal of the unity of the city; and that unity is commonly held, and expressly stated by him, to be the result of friendship. We may cite the argument of the discourses on love,* where 'Aristophanes', as we know, speaks of lovers desiring out of friendship to grow together into a unity, and to be one instead of two. Now in that case it would be inevitable that both or at least one of them should cease to exist. But in the case of the political association there would be merely a watery sort of friendship: a father would be very little disposed to say 'Mine' of a son, and a son would be as little disposed to say 'Mine' of a father. Just as a little sweet wine, mixed with a great deal of water, produces a tasteless mixture, so family feeling is diluted and tasteless when family names have as little meaning as they have in a constitution of this sort, and when there is so little reason for a father treating his sons as sons, or a son treating his father as a father, or brothers one another as brothers. There are two things which particularly move people to care for and love an object. One of these is that the object should belong to yourself: the other is that you should like it. Neither of these motives can exist among those who live under a constitution such as this.

1262^{b}24 There is still a further difficulty. It concerns the way in which children born among the farmers and craftsmen are to be transferred to the guardian class,* and vice versa. How such transposition is actually to be effected is a matter of great perplexity; and in any case those who transfer such children, and assign them their new place, will be bound to know who are the children so placed and with whom they are being placed. In addition, those problems of assault, unnatural affection, and homicide, which have already been mentioned, will occur even more in the case of these people. Those transferred from the guardian class to that of the other citizens will cease for the future to address the guardians as brothers, or children, or fathers, or mothers, as the case may be; and it will have the same effect for those who have been transferred from among the other citizens to the guardians. Such people will no longer avoid committing these offences on account of their kinship.

1262^{b}35 This may serve as a determination of the issues raised by the idea of community of women and children.

CHAPTER 5

Community of property. Three possible systems of property. The difficulties of a system under which ownership and use are both common: the merits of a system under which ownership is private and use is common—it gives more pleasure, and it encourages goodness more. Communism cannot remedy evils which really spring from the defects of human nature: it is also based on a false conception of unity, and neglects the true unity which comes from education; finally, it is contradicted by experience. Plato's particular scheme of community of property leaves the position of the farming class obscure. The system of govern-

ment which he connects with his scheme is too absolute, and is likely to cause discontent: it also deprives the ruling class of any happiness.

1262^{b}39 The next subject for consideration is property.* What is the proper system of property for citizens who are to live under the best form of constitution? Should property be held in common or not? This is an issue which may be considered in itself, and apart from any proposals for community of women and children. Even if women and children are held separately, as is now universally the case, questions relating to property still remain for discussion. Should use and ownership both be common?* For example, there may be a system under which plots of land are owned separately, but the crops (as actually happens among some tribal peoples) are brought into a common stock for the purpose of consumption. Secondly, and conversely, the land may be held in common ownership, and may also be cultivated in common, but the crops may be divided among individuals for their private use: some of the barbarian peoples are also said to practise this second method of sharing. Thirdly, the plots and the crops may both be common.

[illegible]

1263^{a}8 When the cultivators of the soil are a different body from the citizens who own it, the position will be different and easier to handle; but when the citizens who own the soil do the work themselves, the problems of property will cause a good deal of trouble. If they do not share equally in the work and in the enjoyment of the produce, those who do more work and get less of the produce will be bound to raise complaints against those who get a large reward and do little work. In general it is a difficult business to live together and to share in any form of human activity, but it is specially difficult in such matters. Fellow-travellers who merely share in a journey furnish an illustration: they generally quarrel about ordinary matters and take offence on petty occasions. So, again, the servants with whom we are most prone to take offence are those who are particularly employed in ordinary everyday services.

1263^{a}21 Difficulties such as these, and many others, are involved in a system of community of property. The present system would be far preferable, if it were embellished with social customs and the enactment of proper laws. It would possess the advantages of both systems, and would combine the merits of a system of community of property with those of the system of private property. For, although there is a sense in which property *ought* to be common, it should in general be private. When everyone has his own separate sphere of interest, there will not be the same ground for quarrels; and they will make more effort, because each man will feel that he is applying himself to what is his own.

1263^{a}30 On such a scheme, too, moral goodness will ensure that the property of each is made to serve the use of all, in the spirit of the proverb which says 'Friends' goods are goods in common'.* Even now there are some cities in which the outlines of such a scheme are so far apparent, as to suggest that it is not impossible; in well-ordered cities, more particularly, there are some elements of it already existing, and others which might be added. [In these cities] each citizen has his own property; part of which he makes available to his friends, and part of which he uses as though it was common property. In Sparta, for example, men use one another's slaves, and one another's horses and dogs, as if they were their own; and they take provisions on a journey, if they happen to be in need, from the farms in the countryside. It is clear from what has been said that the better system is that under which property is privately owned but is put to common use; and the function proper to the legislator is to make men so disposed that they will treat property in this way.

[illegible]

1263^{a}40 In addition, to think of a thing as your own makes an inexpressible difference, so far as pleasure is concerned. It may well be that regard for oneself is a feeling implanted by nature, and not a mere random impulse. Self-love is rightly censured, but that is not so much loving oneself as loving oneself in excess.* It is the same with one who loves money; after all, virtually everyone loves things of this kind. We may add that a very great pleasure is to be found in doing a kindness and giving some help to friends, or guests, or comrades; and such kindness and help become possible only when property is privately owned. But not only are these pleasures impossible under a system in which the city is excessively unified; the activities of two forms of goodness are also obviously destroyed. The first of these is temperance in the matter of sexual relations* (it is an act of moral value to keep away from the wife of another through temperance): the second is generosity in the use of property.* In a city which is excessively unified no man can show himself generous, or indeed do a generous act; for the function of generosity consists in the proper use which is made of property.

[illegible]

1263^{b}15 This kind of legislation may appear to wear an attractive face and to demonstrate benevolence. The hearer receives it gladly, thinking that everybody will feel towards everybody else some marvellous sense of friendship—all the more as the evils now existing under ordinary forms of government (lawsuits about contracts, convictions for perjury, and obsequious flatteries of the rich) are denounced as due to the absence of a system of common property.* None of these, however, is due to property not being held in common. They all arise from wickedness. Indeed it is a fact of observation that those who own common property, and share in its management, are far more often at variance with one another than those who have property separately—though those who are at variance in consequence of sharing in property look to us few in number when we compare them with the mass of those who own their property privately.*

1263^{b}27 What is more, justice demands that we should take into account not only the evils which people will be spared when they have begun to hold their property in common, but also the benefits of which they will be deprived. Their life can be seen to be utterly impossible.

1263^{b}29 The cause of the fallacy into which 'Socrates' falls must be held to be his incorrect premiss.* It is true that unity in some respects is necessary both for the household and for the city, but unity in all respects is not. There is a point at which a city, by advancing in unity, will cease to be a city: there is another point at which it will still be a city, but a worse one because it has come close to ceasing altogether to be a city. It is as if you were to turn harmony into mere unison, or to reduce a theme to a single beat. The truth is that the city, as has already been said, is a plurality; and education is therefore *the* means of making it a community and giving it unity. It is therefore surprising that one who intends to introduce a system of education, and who believes that the city can achieve goodness by means of this system, should none the less think that he is setting it on the right track by such methods as he actually proposes, rather than by the method of social customs, of mental culture, and of legislation.* An example of such legislation may be found in Sparta and Crete, where the legislator has made the institution of property serve a common use by the system of common meals.

1264^{a}1 There is another matter which must not be ignored: we are bound to pay some regard to the long past and the passage of the years, in which these things would not have gone unnoticed if they had been really good. Almost everything has been discovered already;* though some things have not been combined with one another, and others are not put into practice. It would shed a great deal of light on these matters, if we could watch the actual construction of such a constitution. The foundation of any city will always involve the division and distribution of its members into classes, partly in the form of associations for common meals, and partly in that of clans and tribes. It follows that the only peculiar feature of the legislation* is the rule that the guardians are not to farm the land; and even that is a rule which the Spartans are already attempting to follow.

1264^{a}11 'Socrates' does not explain the character of the whole constitution so far as concerns those who share in it, nor indeed is it easy to explain. The mass of the citizens who are not guardians will be, in effect, nearly the whole of the citizen body. But their position is left undefined.* We are not told whether the farmers are also to have property in common, or to own it individually; nor do we learn whether their women and children are to be common to them all, or to belong to each separately.

1264^{a}17 The first alternative is that all things should belong to them all in common. In that case, what will be the difference between them and the guardians? What advantage will they gain by accepting the government of the guardians? What convinces them actually to accept it?—unless it be some device such as is used in Crete, where the serfs are allowed to enjoy the same general privileges as their masters, and are excluded only from athletic exercises and the possession of arms.

1264^{a}22 The second alternative is that these institutions should be the same for the farmers as they are in most cities today. In that case, we may inquire, what the character of their association* will be? There will inevitably be two cities in one, and those cities will be opposed to one another—the guardians being made into something of the nature of an army of occupation, and the farmers, artisans, and others being given the position of ordinary civilians. Again, legal complaints, and actions at law, and all the other evils which he describes as existing in cities as they are, will equally exist among them. Certainly 'Socrates' says that, in virtue of their education, they will not need a number of regulations* (such as city ordinances, market by-laws, and the like); but it is also true that he provides education only for the guardians. A further difficulty is that he has the farmers control their holdings on condition that they pay a quota of their produce to the guardians. This is likely to make them far more difficult to handle, and much more filled with high ideas of their own importance, than other people's helots, penestae,* or serfs.

1264^{a}36 In any case there is no indication whether it is necessary for these arrangements to be the same [for the farmers as for the guardians] or not, nor are other matters connected with this made clear—matters such as the position of the farmers in the political system, the nature of their education, and the character of the law they are to observe. We thus find it difficult to discover what the farming class will be like, and yet this is a matter of the highest importance if the common life of the guardians is to be preserved. The third and last alternative is that the farmers should have a system of community of women, combined with a system of private property. In that case, who will see to the house while the men are seeing to the business of the fields? And, for that

matter, who will see to the house, when the farmers have property as well as women in common? It is strange, too, that Plato should draw an analogy from the animal world in order to prove that women should follow the same pursuits as men. Animals do not have households to manage.*

1264^{b}6 There is also an element of danger in the method of government which 'Socrates' proposes to institute. He makes the same people be rulers all the time. This is a system which must cause factional conflict even among the elements which have no particular standing, and all the more, therefore, among the high-spirited and martial elements. It is obviously necessary for him to make the same people rulers all the time. The 'divine gold'* cannot be sometimes mixed in the souls of one group and sometimes in those of another, but must always be in the same people. This is why he says that when they were first created 'the god mixed gold in the composition' of some, silver in that of others, and brass and iron in that of the rest, who were to be craftsmen and farmers. It is a further objection that he deprives his guardians even of happiness,* maintaining that the object of the legislator should be for the whole city to be happy. It is impossible for the whole city to be happy unless all, or most, or at least some of its parts are happy. The quality of being happy is not of the same order as the quality of being even. That may exist in a whole without existing in either of its parts: the quality of being happy cannot. Furthermore, if the guardians are not happy, who else is? Certainly not the craftsmen, or the mass of the common people.

1264^{b}24 We may thus conclude that the constitution which 'Socrates' describes raises all the difficulties we have mentioned, and others which are no less serious.

CHAPTER 6

2. *Plato's* Laws. *The scheme of the* Laws *is not greatly different from that of the* Republic. *It postulates too large a territory, but fails to pay proper attention to the problem of foreign relations. It does not sufficiently define the amount of property required, or the object for which it is required; nor does it make* *proper provision for a balance between property and population. The system of government is a sort of 'constitutional government', but it is not properly balanced: the method of electing officials and councillors is too oligarchical.*

1264^{b}26 The same, or nearly the same, is true of the *Laws*;* which is a later work. This makes it advisable for us to examine briefly the constitution there described. A further reason for doing so is that in the *Republic* 'Socrates' attempted to resolve only a very small number of issues—mainly the proper method for ensuring community of women and children and community of property, and the structure of the constitution. He divides the population into two parts: one consists of the farmers, the other of the military class; and from this last is selected a third part, the deliberative and sovereign class. But so far as the farmers and artisans are concerned, 'Socrates' leaves it unsettled whether they are to share in some offices or in none, and whether or not they are to bear arms and join in military service. He thinks that the women should join in the military service and enjoy the same education as the male guardians; but otherwise he has filled up the dialogue with digressions extraneous to the main theme, and with a discussion of the proper manner of educating the guardians.

1265^{a}1 The great bulk of the *Laws* is concerned with legislation. He says little about the constitution;* and in what he does say, though he speaks of desiring to institute a form of government which will be more in the reach of existing cities, he gradually brings the form he proposes round again to the other type* [i.e. to that described in the *Republic*]. In all matters other than community of women and property, he provides identical institutions for both of his constitutions. Education is the same in both: the members of both are to live a life free from menial duties: there is the same arrangement for common meals in both. The only differences are that in the *Laws* there are to be common meals for women and the number of citizens who bear arms,* which in the *Republic* is only 1,000, is to be fixed at a total of 5,000.

1265^{a}10 All the Socratic dialogues are original:* they show

ingenuity, novelty of view, and a spirit of inquiry. To handle everything well is perhaps a difficult thing. Take, for example, the number of citizens which has just been mentioned. We cannot overlook the fact that such a number will require a territory of the size of Babylon or some space which is similarly unlimited in extent. It will need all that to support 5,000 people in idleness, especially when we reflect that they will be augmented by a crowd of women and attendants many times as great as themselves. It is right to assume the most desirable conditions but not to assume anything which is plainly impossible.

1265^{a}18 It is stated [in the *Laws*] that there are two factors to which the legislator should pay regard in enacting laws: the territory of the city, and the inhabitants of that territory.* But there is also a third factor. If a city is to live a political life, and not a life of isolation, it is a good thing that its legislator should also pay regard to neighbouring countries. For example, a city should employ not only such instruments of war as are serviceable in its own territory but also such as are serviceable for use abroad. Even if one does not accept this way of life* as desirable for the individual or for the city as a whole it is none the less essential to be formidable to enemies both when they are invading one's territory and when they are in retreat.

1265^{a}28 The amount of property should also be considered; and we have to ask whether it is not better to determine it in a different, or rather a more definite, way. He states that the amount should be 'sufficient for a life of temperance', as though this was equivalent to 'sufficient for a good life'; the latter is, of course, a more general expression and it is, moreover, possible for a life to be both temperate and miserable. A better definition would be, 'sufficient for a life of temperance *and* generosity',* for if these qualities are separated, generosity will be accompanied by luxury, and temperance by hardship. They are the only qualities to be desired in the use of wealth: one cannot, for example, [be said to] use wealth in a meek or in a manly spirit; but one can use it both in a temperate and in a generous spirit. These must therefore be the qualities involved in the use of wealth.

1265^{a}38 It is strange that he should distribute landed property in equal lots, without making any corresponding arrangements to fix the number of citizens.* He imposes no restriction on the production of children, on the assumption that however ② many children may be born [in some families], infertility [in others] will keep the number level. The reason [why he makes this assumption] is that it appears to be what actually happens in existing cities. But a constant population will need to be maintained with far more accuracy than it is in existing cities. As things are now, properties can be freely divided to cover the whole population, however large it may be, and nobody need be destitute, but under these proposals the properties are indivisible, and any surplus population which may arise, whether it be large or small, will have no property at all. One would have thought that it was even more necessary to limit the rate of reproduction so that no more than a certain number of children should be produced, than to limit property. The rate of reproduction should be fixed to allow for the chances both of mortality among children and of infertility among married couples. If no restriction is imposed on the rate of reproduction (and this is the case in most of our existing cities), poverty is the inevitable result; and poverty produces, in its turn, factional disputes and wrongdoing. Pheidon of Corinth, one of the earliest legislators, held that the number of family plots and the number of citizens should be kept equal to one another, even if the citizens had all started originally with plots of unequal size; but what we find in the *Laws* is the opposite.

1265^{b}16 We must leave to a later occasion* any discussion of the improvements which might be suggested in this scheme. Another omission in the *Laws* is the failure to explain how the rulers are to differ from the ruled. He simply uses a simile: the relation of ruler and ruled, he suggests, should be like that of warp and woof,* which are made out of different wools. It is a further omission that while he allows someone's whole property to be increased fivefold,* he does not explain why his plot of land should not also be allowed to increase up to some given point. The distribution of the farmhouses is another subject which needs further consideration: it hardly seems to conduce to efficiency of household management. He assigns two quite separate plots of land* to each of its citizens but it is difficult to live in two houses.

1265^{b}26 The whole system tends to be one neither of democracy nor of oligarchy, but rather an intermediate form, of the sort which is usually called 'constitutional government' [or polity]:* the citizens, for example, are drawn only from those who bear arms. If his view in constructing this constitution is that it represents the form which is most readily attainable by most cities, he may very well be right; but if he regards it as the form which comes next in merit to his first form of constitution [i.e. that in the *Republic*], he is mistaken: one might commend more highly the constitution of Sparta, or some other form of a more aristocratic character.* There are, indeed, some thinkers who hold that the best constitution should be a mixture of all constitutions; and they commend, for this reason, the constitution of Sparta. Some say that the Spartan constitution is composed of all the three elements, monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy: monarchy is represented by the two kings; oligarchy by the Council of Elders; and democracy by the Ephors, who are drawn from the ranks of the people. Others, however, regard the Ephoralty as representing tyranny; and these consider that the element of democracy appears in the system of common meals, and in the general habit of daily life. But in the *Laws* it is claimed that the best constitution should be composed of democracy and tyranny, forms which one would classify either as not constitutions at all or as the worst of all constitutions.* Those who combine more forms put forward a better view; for a constitution is better when it is composed of more numerous elements.

1266^{a}5 It is a further objection that this constitution has really no element of monarchy, but only the elements of oligarchy and democracy, with a particular inclination towards oligarchy.* This appears clearly in the method proposed for appointing officials.* The use of the lot for the purpose of finally choosing officials from those who have been previously elected combines democracy with oligarchy. But compelling the richer citizens to attend the assembly, to vote in elections of officials, and to discharge other forms of political duty, while the other citizens are allowed to abstain is oligarchical. So is the attempt to secure a greater number of office-holders from the wealthier class, and to fill the highest offices from the ranks of those whose assessments are highest. He also makes the method of electing councillors oligarchical. All the citizens, it is true, are compelled to take part in the election of candidates from the first assessment class, and of an equal number from the second. They then elect candidates from the third class, but it is not compulsory for everyone to take part in election of candidates from the third and fourth classes, indeed in the election from the fourth class only the members of the first and second classes are compelled to vote. [All this relates to the process of pre-election.] Then, from those [chosen in this way], there must next, he says, be elected, an equal number for each assessment class. The result will be that the electors who have the largest assessments and are of better character will form the majority, because many of the common people, not being compelled to vote, will not do so.

1266ª22 These considerations, and others which will be mentioned when the time comes for us to examine this sort of constitution, are sufficient to prove that it should not be formed by combining democracy and monarchy. We may add that there is also a danger in the method of electing the officials by the double process of pre-election and a final election. If a knot of people, even of moderate size, decide to act in combination the elections will always be decided according to their preference.

1266ª28 These are the considerations which are raised by the constitution described in the *Laws*.

[illegible]

CHAPTER 7

3. Phaleas of Chalcedon. *His proposal for the equalization of property in land. It would involve regulation of the population: it would also involve determination of the exact standard on which equality was to be achieved. Generally, equality matters more in the moral, or educational, sphere than in the material: disorder and crime are due to moral defects as well as to economic causes. The amount and distribution of property in a city are affected by considerations of foreign as well as domestic policy; but the essential criticism of Phaleas is that he lays too much emphasis on material factors.*

1266ª31 There are also a number of other schemes for new constitutions, some of them proposed by laymen, and others by men who were versed in philosophy or statesmanship. They all come nearer to the existing constitutions, under which people are now actually living, than does either of the schemes proposed by Plato. No other thinker has proposed such novelties as community of wives and children or common meals for women: on the contrary, thinkers have rather started from the immediate necessities of life. Thus there are some who hold that the proper regulation of property is more important than any other object, because, so they say, it is about this issue that factional conflicts always arise. Phaleas of Chalcedon* was the first to suggest this and he proposed accordingly that all the citizens should have equal amounts of property. He thought that in new colonies this could be achieved, without any difficulty, at the moment of their foundation. Cities which were already established would present a greater problem; but even here equality could be introduced—and that in the shortest possible time—if the rich gave dowries but did not receive them, and the poor, conversely, received but did not give them. Plato, when he was writing the *Laws*, was of the opinion that the amount of property should be left unrestricted up to a given point; beyond that point, he was in favour of restriction, proposing, as has already been said, that no citizen should be allowed to accumulate to an extent which would make his property more than five times as large as the smallest property owned by any other citizen.

1266ᵇ8 Those who propose such legislation ought not to forget, as they continually do, that regulation of the amount of property ought to be accompanied by regulation of the number of children in the family. If the number of children gets out of proportion to the amount of the property, the abrogation of the law must necessarily follow; and, apart from this abrogation, it is a sorry thing that a large number of people should be reduced from comfort to penury. It is difficult for men who have suffered that fate not to be revolutionaries. Even in times past, there were some who clearly recognized that such equality had an influence on the character of a political association. We may cite the example of Solon's legislation;* and in other cities too there is a law which prevents men from acquiring land to any extent they desire. Similarly there are laws to be found which prevent the *sale* of property: among the Locrians, for instance, there is a law to the effect that men cannot sell their property unless they can prove that an evident misfortune has befallen them. There are also laws which provide that the original lots must be maintained intact: it was the abrogation of such a law at Leucas, to mention one instance, which made the constitution excessively democratic; as a result, those who possessed the necessary legal qualification no longer came into office. But it is possible that equality of property may exist, and yet the amount possessed by each individual may be either unduly large, which leads to luxury, or unduly small, which results in penury. It is therefore clear that it is not enough for the legislator to establish the equality of property: it is [also] necessary to aim at a moderate amount. But even if one were to fix the same moderate amount for each, there would still be no gain. It is more necessary to equalize people's desires than their properties; and that is a result which cannot be achieved unless they are adequately trained by the influence of laws. Phaleas, however, might possibly retort that this is just the view which he himself propounds; for it is his opinion that cities should practise equality in two things: property and education. But in that case we ought to be told what is to be the character of the education. There would be no real gain if it were merely one and the same for all; for it is possible for education to be one and the same for all, and yet to be of a character which will produce a disposition to covet wealth, or to covet office, or to covet both. This raises a further point: factional conflict arises not only from inequality of property, but also from inequality of offices. But these two kinds of inequality work in opposite ways. The masses become revolutionary when the distribution of property is *unequal*. Men of education become revolutionary when the distribution of office is *equal*.* This is the point of the saying:

> Office and honour are one and the same for the good and the bad man.*

1267^{a}2 But people do not commit crimes solely because of a lack of necessities, a condition for which Phaleas thinks equality of property will be a remedy since it will serve to prevent men from stealing simply through cold or hunger. They also commit crimes to get the pleasure it gives and to rid themselves of desire. If they have a desire which goes beyond the simple necessities of life, they will turn criminals to cure it. This is not the only reason: even when they do not have any desire they do wrong just in order to enjoy those kinds of pleasure which are unaccompanied by pain.

1267^{a}9 What is the remedy for these three kinds of crime? For the first kind, we may answer, some modicum of property and some sort of work; for the second, a temperate disposition; as for the third kind, we can only say that if there are men who want to get unmixed pleasure purely by their own effort, they will find no cure except in the aid of philosophy; for all pleasures other than that of philosophy need the assistance of others. The greatest crimes are committed not for the sake of necessities, but for the sake of superfluities. Men do not become tyrants in order to avoid exposure to cold. This is the reason why great honours are paid to someone who kills not a mere thief, but a tyrant. We thus see that the general scheme of the constitution proposed by Phaleas avails only against the lesser crimes.

1267^{a}17 Furthermore, while Phaleas seeks to arrange most of the details of his scheme with a view to the proper working of the constitution internally, he ought also to make arrangements to meet the problem of defence against all neighbouring and foreign cities. It is therefore necessary that the constitution should be constructed with a view to military strength; and of this Phaleas has nothing to say. The same applies to property. It should be adequate not only as a basis for the political activities of the citizens internally, but also as a resource for meeting external dangers. This latter consideration suggests the proper amount. On the one hand, it should not be so large that neighbouring and more powerful cities will covet it, while its owners are unable to repel an attack: on the other hand, it should not be so small that those who own it are unable to sustain the burden of a war even with cities equal and similar to their own. Phaleas has given us no indication; but we must not forget that *some* amount of property is an advantage. Perhaps, therefore, the best criterion of that amount is that stronger cities shall find no advantage in going to war with a city because its wealth is excessive, but will go to war with it only in circumstances in which they would do so even if its wealth were less than it is. There is an historical incident which illustrates our argument. When the Persian Autophradates was planning to besiege Atarneus, Eubulus* asked him to consider the length of time which it would take to capture it, and to calculate the expense which a siege of that duration would mean. He was willing, he said, to surrender the town immediately for less than that amount. By saying this he caused Autophradates, after a little reflection, to abandon the siege.

1267^{a}37 A system which gives equal properties to all the citizens has a certain advantage, in that it helps to prevent mutual discord; but the advantage, on the whole, is inconsiderable. The educated would be aggrieved by the system, feeling that they deserved something more than mere equality; indeed, as a matter of actual observation, they often rise in revolt and cause civic discord for this very reason. The wickedness of human beings is insatiable: at first two obols were a sufficient allowance,* but now that this has become the tradition men are always wanting something more, and are never contented until they get to infinity. It is the nature of desire to be infinite, and most people live for the satisfaction of desire. The source from which a remedy for such evils may be expected is not the equalization of property, but rather a method of training which ensures that the better sort of people have no desire to make themselves richer while the poorer sort have no opportunity to do so. The latter object will be attained if those concerned are put in an inferior position without being subjected to injustice.

1267^{b}9 Even in regard to his proposal for equality of property Phaleas has expressed himself imperfectly. He would equalize property only in land; but wealth may also consist in slaves, cattle, and money, and in addition there will be a considerable stock of what are called movables. The proper course is either to deal with all these forms of wealth by an equal distribution or by fixing a moderate maximum, or to leave all alike unregulated. It is also evident, from the legislation proposed by Phaleas, that he proposes to institute only a small body of citizens: the artisans are all to be public slaves, and are not to furnish any addition to the citizen body. It may be the case that one class of artisans—those who are employed on public property—should be made public slaves. If so, it ought to be done on the lines which are followed at Epidamnus, or on the scheme which Diophantus once sought to introduce at Athens.*

1267^{b}19 These observations on the constitution proposed by Phaleas will enable one to judge whether his suggestions are good or bad.

CHAPTER 8

নগর পরিকল্পনা
(হিপোডামাস)

Hippodamus of Miletus. A planner of towns, who also sought to plan cities on new lines. His advocacy of 'triads'—three social classes; three divisions of the territory; three sorts of laws. Criticism of his three classes and three divisions of territory. Criticism of his legal novelties, and especially of his proposal to reward the inventors of reforms. Tradition has its claims; and the value of a law-abiding habit may be greater than that of legal reforms.

1267^{b}22 Hippodamus* the son of Euryphon, a citizen of Miletus, was the first man without practical experience of politics who attempted to handle the theme of the best form of constitution. He was a man who invented the planning of towns in separate quarters, and laid out the Piraeus with regular roads. In his general life, too, he was led into some eccentricity by a desire to attract attention; and this made some people feel that his way of life was too studied and artificial. He wore his hair long and expensively adorned: he had flowing robes, made from a cheap but warm material, which he wore in summer-time as well as in winter; and he aspired to be learned about nature generally.

1267^{b}30 The city which he planned to construct was one of 10,000 citizens, divided into three classes: the first of artisans, the second of farmers, and the third a defence force equipped with arms. The territory was to be similarly divided into three parts. One was intended for religious purposes; the second for public use; and the third was to be private property. The first part was to meet the expenses of the regular worship of the civic deities; the second part, that devoted to public use, was to support the defence force; and the third was to be the private property of the farming class. Hippodamus also believed that there are only three classes of laws,* for he held that there are three main issues, wanton assault, damage, and homicide, from which lawsuits arise. He proposed, too, that there should be a single supreme court, to which all cases that appeared to have been improperly decided should be referred; and this court, on his plan, was to be constituted of elders selected for the purpose. He also held that judgements should not be given in the courts by the method of dropping a pebble into the voting urn: each juryman should deposit a tablet. If he gave an absolute verdict of condemnation against the defendant, he would write that verdict on the tablet: if he gave an absolute verdict of acquittal, he would leave the tablet blank; if he wished to record a [qualified] verdict, partly of condemnation, and partly of acquittal, he would specify the nature of this verdict. He considered that the present arrangement results from poor legislation: it compels a juryman to violate his judicial oath by deciding the case in favour of one side or the other.

1268^{a}6 He also proposed a law that honours should be conferred on those responsible for any invention of benefit to the city; and he further suggested, as a novelty not hitherto included in the legislation of any city, that the children of those who had been killed in action should be supported at the public expense. (Actually, such a law is already in existence at Athens, and also in other cities.) Finally, the public officials, on his scheme, were all to be elected by the people: the people was to be constituted of the three classes already mentioned; and the officials whom they elected would take charge of public matters, matters relating to aliens, and matters relating to orphans.

1268^{a}14 These are the main and most notable features in the political arrangements proposed by Hippodamus. The first criticism which we may raise concerns the division of the citizen body. The artisans, the farmers, and those who bear arms all share in the constitution; but the farmers do so without possessing arms, and the artisans without possessing either land or arms. This makes them both, in effect, the slaves of the class in possession of arms. It is thus impossible that they should share in all the [offices and] honours; for necessarily members of the class which possesses arms must be appointed as generals and protectors of the citizens, and must thus hold, in the main, the highest offices. But how can those who do not share in the constitution be disposed in a friendly way towards the constitution? It may be rejoined that the class which possesses arms ought to be superior to both of the other classes. [We may answer that] it will be difficult for them to be superior unless they are also numerous. But, in that case, is there any need for the other two classes to share in the constitution, or to control the appointment of officials? And are the farmers really of any service to the city? Artisans are necessary (for every city needs artisans), and they can earn a living from their crafts in the city proposed by Hippodamus as they do in other cities. If the farmers had provided the means of subsistence for those who bear arms, they might reasonably have been counted as an integral part of the city; but on the scheme of Hippodamus they own their own land as private property, and they will farm it for their private benefit.

1268^{a}35 A further difficulty arises with regard to the third part of the territory which is to be common property, and from which the members of the defence force are to draw their subsistence. If the members of the defence force farm this common land themselves, there will be no distinction, such as Hippodamus wishes to establish, between the military and the farming class. If, on the other hand, those who farm this common land are to be distinct both from the class of those who farm their own land and from the military class, we shall have a fourth class in the city; and this class will have no share in anything whatsoever and will be extraneous to the constitution. Again, if one makes the same persons who farm their own land farm the common land as well, the crops produced by each farmer will not be sufficient in quantity for two households; and the question may also be fairly asked, 'Why not start at once with a system by which the farmers, using all the same land, and the same estates, will at one and the same time get subsistence for themselves and provide it for the military class?' There is great confusion on all these matters.

1268b4 The law he proposes in regard to judicial decisions is also unsatisfactory. He prescribes that a juryman should give a qualified verdict, even though the case on which he gives his decision is stated without qualification. This is, in effect, to prescribe that the juryman should become an arbitrator. A qualified verdict is possible in a court of arbitration, even when there are several arbitrators (for they can confer with one another in order to determine their verdict); but in courts of law this is impossible, since most legislators, far from permitting this, lay down measures to ensure that the jurymen shall *not* communicate.* How could a decision not produce confusion when a juryman is of the opinion that damages should be given, but not to the amount for which the plaintiff sues? A plaintiff, for example, may sue for 20 minae but a juryman will give a verdict for 10 (or a plaintiff may sue for a still larger sum and a juryman will give a verdict for something still less); another juryman will give a verdict for 5, and still another a verdict for 4. In this way, it is obvious, the various jurymen who give a qualified verdict will each award a different proportion of the amount claimed. Some will award the whole sum claimed, while some will award nothing at all. What is the method of estimating [the total effect of] the decisions thus given?

1268b17 Furthermore, we must notice that a plain verdict of pure acquittal or pure condemnation never compels a juryman to violate his oath,* provided that the case itself has been duly laid in a plain and unqualified form. The juryman who gives a verdict for acquittal does not decide that the defendant owes nothing; he only decides [for example] that he does not owe 20 minae. The only juryman who really violates his oath is one who gives a verdict *against* the defendant although he does not believe that he owes the 20 minae claimed by the plaintiff.

1268b22 As for the idea that some honour ought to be conferred on those who suggest an improvement which is of benefit to the city, legislation in such a sense cannot be safely enacted, and has only a specious sound. It might encourage malicious accusations and changes in the constitution. But the proposal also involves another problem, and suggests a further argument. Some people raise a doubt whether cities lose or gain by changing their traditional laws even if some other law is better. If [on this issue we take the line that] change is *not* a gain, it is difficult to agree readily with the proposal made by Hippodamus; it is possible that people might propose the overthrow of the laws, or of the constitution, as being for the common good. However, as the issue has now been mentioned, it will be as well to define our views about it a little further. It is, as we have said, an issue which is open to debate; and a case may be made for the view that change is the better policy. Certainly in other branches of knowledge change has proved beneficial. We may cite in evidence the changes from traditional practice which have been made in medicine, in physical training, and generally in all kinds of craft and skill; and since politics must be seen as one of these, it seems that the same must also be true of it. It can also be argued that the actual facts provide an indication. In ancient times customs were exceedingly simple and barbaric: Greeks went about armed, and bought their brides from each other. Indeed the relics of ancient customs which are still in existence, here and there, are absurd. There is, for instance, a law at Cyme, relating to homicide, that if an accuser can produce a certain number of witnesses from his own kinsmen, the person accused shall be liable to the charge of murder. All men, as a rule, seek, not what is sanctioned by tradition, but what is good; and the earliest known human beings, whether they were 'earth-born', or the survivors of some cataclysm, were in all probability similar to ordinary or even foolish people [today]. (Indeed that is actually the tale that is told of the 'earth-born' men.) It would therefore be an absurdity to remain constant to their notions. But besides these considerations, it may also be urged that to leave *written* laws unchanged is not a good policy. The reason is that in matters of political organization, as in the arts generally, it is impossible for everything to be written down precisely: what is written down must be in general terms, but actions are concerned with particulars.*

1269^{a}12 But while these arguments go to show that in *some* cases, and at *some* times, law ought to be changed, there is another point of view from which it would appear that change is a matter which needs great caution. When we reflect that the improvement likely to be effected may be small, and that it is a bad thing to accustom men to abrogate laws light-heartedly, it becomes clear that there are some errors made by legislators and by rulers which had better be left untouched. The benefit of change will be less than the loss which is likely to result if men fall into the habit of disobeying the government. We must also notice that the analogy drawn from the arts is false. To change the practice of an art is not the same as to change a law. The law has no other source of strength through which to secure obedience apart from habit. But habit can be created only by the passage of time; and a readiness to change from existing to new and different laws will accordingly tend to weaken the general power of law. Further questions may also be raised. Even if it is allowable to make a change, does that hold true or not of all laws and in all constitutions? And again, should change be attempted by anyone whatsoever, or only by certain people? These points make a great difference. We may therefore dismiss this question for the present. It belongs to a different occasion.

B: Actual Constitutions which Approach the Ideal (Chapters 9–12)

CHAPTER 9

*1. **The Spartan constitution.** The problem of finding a leisured class for the purposes of government: serfdom as a solution: the Spartan Helots. The undue influence of women at Sparta: the bad distribution of property, and its bad effects on the army. The defects of the Ephorate, the Council of Elders, and the dual kingship: defects of the Spartan system of common meals. The bad results of Spartan militarism, and the bad state of the public finances at Sparta.*

1269^{a}29 When we consider the constitutions of Sparta and Crete—or indeed, for that matter, of any other city*—two questions emerge. The first is whether any of their provisions is good or bad when judged by the standard of the best system: the second is whether any provision runs contrary to the principles and character of their constitutions as established.* It is generally agreed that leisure, or in other words freedom from the necessity of labour, should be available in a well-ordered city; but it is difficult to see by what mode of organization this leisure is to be secured.* The Penestae [or serfs] of Thessaly have often revolted against the Thessalians; and the Helots have similarly revolted against the Spartans, for whose misfortunes they are always on the watch, just as if they lay in an ambush. Nothing similar, it is true, has hitherto happened in Crete. Perhaps the reason is that the neighbouring cities, although engaged in mutual hostilities, never enter into any alliance with revolting serfs: it is not to the interest of any, as each has serfs of its own. The neighbours of Sparta, on the other hand, Argos, Messenia, and Arcadia, have been her enemies. Likewise the early revolts of their serfs against the Thessalians were due to the fact that they were still engaged in hostilities with the peoples on their borders, the Achaeans, the Perrhaebians, and the Magnesians. Even if there were no added trouble, in the handling of serfs there is the irksome business of deciding on what footing one should associate with them: if they are kept on a loose rein, they become insolent, and proceed to claim equality with their masters: if they have a hard life, they fall into conspiracy and hatred. The moral is plain. Those who suffer in this way from having a system of serfdom have not discovered the best mode of organization.

1269^{b}12 The indulgence permitted to women is damaging both to the purpose of the constitution and to the happiness of the city. Just as husband and wife are parts of the family, so it is clear that a city should also be considered as divided almost equally into the male and female populations. In all constitutions, therefore, where the position of women is poorly regulated, one half of the citizen body must be considered as left untouched by the laws. This is what has actually happened at Sparta. The legislator who made the Spartan code intended to make the whole citizen body hardy; but if he fulfilled that intention, as he obviously did, in regard to the men, he has wholly neglected to achieve it in regard to the women, whose lives are full of every kind of licence and luxury. The inevitable result, in such a constitution, is the worship of wealth, especially if, as happens with most military and martial races, the citizens are dominated by the women. (But the Celts are an exception to this general rule: so, too, are such peoples as openly approve of homosexual attachments.) There was wisdom in the earliest author of myths when he paired Ares and Aphrodite: the facts show that such peoples are prone to passionate attachments either to men or to women. It was attachments of the latter sort which were common in Sparta; and the result was that, in the days of her hegemony, affairs largely fell into the hands of women. But what is the difference between rulers being ruled by women and women being actually rulers? The result is the same. Even in the matter of courage, which is useless in all life's ordinary affairs and only of use, if it has a use, in time of war, the women of Sparta have had a most mischievous influence. They showed this during the Theban invasion;* unlike the women of other cities, they were of no use whatever, and caused more confusion than the enemy.

1269^{b}39 The licence enjoyed by women seems to have come about originally at Sparta in a way which it is easy to understand. The men were absent from their own country for long periods on military expeditions: they were at war with the Argives, and then with the Messenians and Arcadians. When the men returned to a life of leisure and submitted themselves to the legislator they were well prepared by their experience of military life (a life which requires many kinds of human excellence). But, as the story goes, when Lycurgus* attempted to bring the women within the range of his laws, they opposed him, and he had to abandon the attempt. These are the causes of what happened, and are thus the source of [the Spartans'] error; but we have to remember that we are not concerned with what can, or cannot, be excused, but with what is right or wrong.

1270^{a}11 The defects in the position of women in Sparta, as we have already suggested, seem not only calculated to produce some lack of harmony in the constitution, if we take that by itself, but also to foster the growth of avarice. One might, indeed, pass from the observations just made to a criticism of the unequal distribution of property. While some of the Spartans have come to possess far too much property, others have been reduced to the tiniest amount; and in this way the land has mostly passed into the hands of a very few people. This matter has been badly handled in their laws. The legislator, very rightly, made it improper to buy or sell property in land; but he also allowed any person who so desired to give or bequeath his property—though the same results must necessarily follow in the one case as in the other. About two-fifths of the whole country actually belongs to women; this is due to the number of heiresses and the practice of giving dowries. It would have been better to have had no dowries at all, or to have fixed them at a small, or at any rate a moderate, amount. As it is, a citizen may give the daughter who inherits his property to any man whom he likes (rich or poor); and if he dies intestate before he has done so, the man who is left in the position of guardian gives her to whoever he chooses. The result has been that while the territory could have supported 1,500 horse and 30,000 foot, the actual number was less than 1,000. The history of the Spartans has shown that the effects of this arrangement have been bad for them. The city was unable to withstand a single blow* and was ruined for want of men. It is said that, under the early kings, the Spartans were in the habit of sharing [citizenship with foreigners], and that, as a result, there was no want of men, in spite of the long wars they were fighting: indeed they are said to have numbered, at one time, as many as 10,000 citizens. Whether this statement is true or false, Sparta would have done better to keep her ranks filled by maintaining an equal distribution of property. Such a reform is, however, impeded by the law concerning the birth-rate. Anxious for the Spartans to be as numerous as possible, the legislator encouraged citizens to have as many children as possible; they have a law that the father of three sons should be exempt from military service, and the father of four entirely free from all taxes. Yet it is obvious that, if many children are born, and the land is divided accordingly, a large number of the citizens must necessarily be reduced to poverty.

$1270^{b}6$ Moreover there are deficiencies in the way the Ephorate is organized. The Ephors at Sparta have a sovereign authority in matters of the highest importance; but they are all drawn from the people at large, and it often happens that very poor men, whose lack of means renders them open to bribery, attain this office. They have often shown this tendency in the past; and there is a recent instance in the affair at Andros,* when some of the Ephors, by taking bribes, did everything in their power to ruin the whole city. Furthermore, this institution is so important, and so much in the nature of a dictatorship, that even the kings have been compelled to court the favour of the Ephors. As a result, damage has also been done to the whole constitution, which, from being an aristocracy has tended to turn into a democracy. But the Ephorate does hold the constitution together. The people at large are contented because they have a share in the most important office; and this result, whether it be due to the legislator or to chance, has a beneficial effect on their affairs. If the constitution is to survive, every part of the city must have a common desire for its existence and for the continuance of its arrangements.* The kings have this because of the honour that is paid to them; the upper classes have it because there is the Council of Elders (this office is a reward for excellence); and the general population have it because of the Ephorate (which is open to all citizens).

$1270^{b}26$ It is right and proper that all should be eligible for the office, but not that the election should be conducted on the present method, which is far too childish.* Again, the Ephors are just ordinary men, but they have power to decide important cases; and it would be better, therefore, that they should not decide at their discretion, but on the basis of written rules set down in legal form. Finally, their mode of life is not in agreement with the aim of the city. It permits too much indulgence, whereas for the other citizens, the arrangements incline so much to the opposite extreme of severity that men cannot endure their rigour, and escape from the law into the secret enjoyment of sensual pleasures.

$1270^{b}35$ The institution of the Council of Elders has also its defects. If the members of the council were men of probity, and adequately trained in manly virtues, it might be argued that the institution was of benefit to the city. Even so, it would be dubious whether councillors should be life-judges in important cases: the mind, as well as the body, is subject to old age. But when, as a matter of fact, the training of the councillors is such that even the legislator has no confidence in their character as good men, the arrangement is unsafe. It is evident from experience that those who have held the office of councillor have often been influenced by bribery and favouritism in dealing with public affairs. This is a reason why they should not be free from scrutiny of their conduct. It is true that the Ephors can apparently scrutinize the conduct of every official; but this is too sweeping a prerogative for them to possess, nor is it the way in which, in our view, the councillors should be subjected to scrutiny.

$1271^{a}9$ The system by which they appoint councillors involves a childish method of selection;* and there is an impropriety in requiring that, to be eligible, a man should openly seek election. The man who deserves the office should have it whether he wants it or not. Here the legislator is plainly doing what he did with the rest of the constitution. He has imposed this requirement [that candidates *seek* election] on the election of councillors because he wants to make his citizens generally ambitious of honours; for no one would seek to hold office unless he was ambitious. Yet ambition and avarice are exactly the motives which lead men to commit nearly all intentional crimes.

1271a18 The general theme of kingship, and the question whether it is good or bad for cities to have kings, may be left to another occasion. But it would be better if they did not come to the throne on the principle now followed [in Sparta]; instead the choice of a king should in every case be based on his manner of life. On the present system it is clear that even the legislator himself must be of the opinion that he cannot produce good and honourable kings. At any rate he shows no confidence that they will be sufficiently good men; this is why it was the practice to send opponents of the kings with them on embassies, and why it was considered that factional disputes between the kings served as a political safeguard.

1271a26 The legal arrangements made by its founder for regulating the system of common meals (or, as the Spartans call them, *phiditia*), may also be criticized. The cost of such gatherings ought to be defrayed from public funds, as it is in Crete; but the rule at Sparta is for each man to bring his own contribution, in spite of the fact that some of the citizens are extremely poor and unable to bear the expense. The natural result is the very opposite of the legislator's intention. The system of common meals is meant to be democratic, but with these regulations it is the reverse of democratic. Citizens who are extremely poor find it difficult to share in the common meals; and yet it is the traditional rule of the constitution that those who cannot contribute their quota are debarred from participating in it.

1271a37 Other writers have also censured, not without justice, the law relating to the office of admiral. They are right to do so since it is a cause of factional conflict. The office of admiral is a sort of second kingship, rivalling the kings, who are supreme commanders for life.

1271a41 There is another criticism one might make of the principle that underlies the Spartan legislation, a criticism also made by Plato in his *Laws.** The whole system of legislation is directed to fostering only one part [or element] of goodness, goodness in war, because that sort of goodness is useful for gaining power. As a result the Spartans remained secure as long as they were at war; but they collapsed as soon as they acquired an empire. They did not know how to use their leisure and they had never accustomed themselves to any discipline other than and superior to that of war. There is another defect at Sparta which is equally grave. The Spartans hold that the 'goods' for which men strive are to be attained through goodness rather than badness of character. They are right in thinking this; but they are wrong in supposing that these 'goods' are greater than goodness of character.*

1271b10 Another defect at Sparta is the state of the public finances. The public treasury is empty, at a time when they are compelled to wage major wars; and the taxes are not properly paid. Because most of the land is in the hands of citizens, they do not look closely at each other's payments. The effect of the legislator's work is here the reverse of beneficial: he has reduced the city to penury while encouraging private avarice. This may serve as an account of the Spartan constitution, and these are the defects which are particularly open to censure.

CHAPTER 10

2. The Cretan constitution. *Crete possibly the model of Sparta: similarities between the two. The Cretan system of common meals is superior to the Spartan; but the Cretan Cosmoi, who correspond to the Spartan Ephors, are inferior to them. Cretan 'feudalism': confederations of nobles: feuds and factions: Crete hitherto saved from their evil effects by its geographical isolation.*

1271b20 The Cretan constitution* is close to that of the Spartans; in some ways it is no worse but in most respects it is less polished. It is said that most features of the Spartan constitution were copied from the Cretan. This may well be the case, for institutions of an older origin are generally less elaborate than the more modern. Tradition records* that Lycurgus, when he relinquished the office of guardian to King Charillus and went abroad, spent most of his time in Crete, to which he was drawn by ties of connection, the people of Lyctus being a colony from Sparta. Those who came to the colony adopted the system of law which they found existing among the inhabitants at the time of their settlement. This is why these laws are still in use among the subject peoples [of Crete], who regard them as a system of law created by Minos.*

1271^{b}32 The island seems to be naturally designed,* and admirably situated, for ruling in the Greek world. It commands the whole of the sea on whose shores nearly all of the Greeks are settled: it is not far from the Peloponnese on the one side, and close to the corner of Asia round Triopium and Rhodes on the other. This explains why Minos could establish a maritime empire. He subdued some of the neighbouring islands, and sent colonies to others. Finally he carried his attacks as far as Sicily, where he died near Camicus.

1271^{b}40 The Cretan system parallels the Spartan. The Helots cultivate the land for the Spartans while the subject peoples [Perioikoi], do so for the Cretans; and in both places there is a system of common meals, which the Spartans, in former times, used to call *andria* (and not, as they now do, *phiditia*), a term still used by the Cretans, and a proof that the institution came from Crete. The same goes for the constitutional system. The Spartan Ephors have the same power as the Cretan *Cosmoi*: the only difference is that the Ephors are five in number, and the *Cosmoi* ten. Similarly the Spartan elders are equivalent to the Cretan; but the latter are called the Council. The Cretans formerly had a monarchy; but afterwards abolished it, and the *Cosmoi* are now in command of the army. All citizens can take part in the assembly; but its only power is that of ratifying the decisions of the elders and the *Cosmoi*.

1272^{a}12 The arrangements for common meals in Crete are better than they are at Sparta. At Sparta each citizen contributes individually the quota allotted to him, and if he fails to do so he is legally debarred, as has already been noted, from a share in the constitution. In Crete things are placed on a more communal footing. The whole of the agricultural produce and livestock raised on the public land, and all the rents paid by the subject peoples, are divided, with one part going to the cult of the gods and the discharge of public services, and the other to the provision of common meals. This makes it possible for all alike, men, women, and children, to be fed at the public cost.* The legislator devised a number of ingenious measures both to encourage an abstemious form of diet (something he saw as beneficial) and to ensure the segregation of women, to prevent them from having too many children. For the same reason he encouraged homosexual connections. (Whether he was right or wrong is a question which may be left for a later occasion.)*

1272^{a}26 It is clear that the arrangements for common meals in Crete are superior to those at Sparta. On the other hand, those for the *Cosmoi* are inferior even to the Ephoralty. They share the defect of the board of Ephors—that of being appointed without any proper qualification—but do not present the same constitutional advantage as the Ephors. In the Spartan system, under which every citizen is eligible for the Ephoralty, the people at large share in this highest of offices, and therefore wish the constitution to survive. In Crete, however, the *Cosmoi* are drawn from a limited number of families, and not from the citizens as a whole; while the members of the Council of Elders are drawn, in their turn, from those who have served as *Cosmoi*. This Cretan Council of Elders may be criticized on the same grounds as the Spartan. Their lack of accountability, and their life-tenure, are both prerogatives beyond their desert; and their power of acting at their own discretion—and not on the basis of written rules—is dangerous. It is not proof of the institutions being properly organized that the people should remain contented in spite of their exclusion from it. The *Cosmoi*, unlike the Ephors, have no opportunity of using their powers for their own profit: they live on an island, remote from those who might corrupt them.

1272^{b}1 The remedy which the Cretans provide for the defects of this institution is curious, and more fitted to government by clique* than to a constitutional state. Again and again a faction is formed—either by some of their own colleagues, or by a group of private citizens—which proceeds to eject the *Cosmoi* from office; and they are also allowed to resign their office before their term has expired. Surely it is better that all such matters should be regulated by law, and not settled by the mere will of men, which is a dangerous standard for action. Worst of all, however, is the practice of suspending the office of the *Cosmoi,* to which powerful people often resort when they are unwilling to submit to justice. This proves that the Cretan system, if it has some of the elements of a constitution, is not really a constitution at all, but a government by a clique. It has become customary for powerful men to cause dissension among the people and among their own friends to set up monarchies of their own, to form factions, and to fight among themselves. In effect such a state of things simply means that for a time the city goes out of existence and the political association is dissolved. A city which is brought to this pass is in danger: those who wish to attack it will now have also the power to do so. But Crete itself, as has already been noted, is saved from this danger by its geographical position; and distance has here the same effect as laws for the expulsion of aliens.* This also explains why the subject peoples there stay quiet, while the Helots of Sparta are often in revolt. The Cretans have no share in dominions overseas; and it is only lately that foreign forces have penetrated into the island*—with results which have gone to show the frailty of their laws.

So much for the Cretan type of constitution.

CHAPTER 11

3. The Carthaginian constitution. *Similarities of Carthage and Sparta, with the balance, in some respects, in favour of Carthage. The constitution of Carthage is generally based on the principle of aristocracy; but it deviates from that principle, partly towards democracy and partly towards oligarchy. Its main defect is that it attaches too much importance to wealth, and is thus, in effect, a moneyed oligarchy. Another defect is the habit of pluralism. Carthage has sought to correct her defects by a policy of encouraging the emigration of the poor; but while this policy has been fortunate in its results, it is not an adequate remedy.*

1272$^{\mathrm{b}}$24 The constitution of Carthage* is generally accounted a good constitution, and one which is in many respects different from others; but the chief thing about it is its likeness, at a number of points, to the Spartan. Indeed the three constitutions with which we are here concerned—the Cretan, the Spartan, and the Carthaginian—are all closely related to one another, and they all differ greatly from other constitutions. Many of the institutions at Carthage are certainly good. It is a proof of a well-ordered constitution that the people has stood firm by the political system: there have been no factional conflicts worth mentioning, nor any attempt at a tyranny. There are the following similarities with the Spartan constitution: the common meals shared by the 'messes' at Carthage are similar to the Spartan *phiditia.* The office of the 'Hundred and Four' is similar to the Ephoralty, but better in so far as the elections to the office are made on the basis of merit, while the Ephoralty is recruited haphazardly. Finally, the kings and the Council of Elders at Carthage are analogous to the Spartan kings and Council of Elders. But here again it is to the credit of Carthage that her kings are drawn neither from a single family nor [indiscriminately] from any family. Rather they are drawn from any family which is outstanding at the time, and they are drawn from it by election, and not by seniority. Kings, after all, have considerable powers: and if they are worthless characters, they can do a great deal of harm—as, indeed, they have actually done at Sparta.

1273$^{\mathrm{a}}$2 Most of the features which may be criticized as deviations,* are features common to all of the constitutions with which we are here concerned. But [in the case of the Carthaginian constitution] some of the deviations from its underlying principle of aristocracy or 'constitutional government' are in the direction of democracy, while others are in that of oligarchy. It is a deviation in the former direction that while the kings and the Elders, if they are both agreed, can freely decide whether or not they will submit any issue to the assembly, the assembly is equally free to deal with an issue if they are *not* agreed about its submission. Again, when the kings and the Elders submit a proposal, the assembly is not confined to hearing and approving the decision of the rulers: it has the power of decision, and any of its members who so desire may oppose the proposal. This does not happen under the other constitutions [i.e. those of Sparta and Crete]. On the other hand, the following features are oligarchic: the boards of five, which are in control of many important matters, select their own members; these boards choose the 'Hundred and Four', who are the highest authority; what is more, the members of these boards hold office longer than other officials (they are virtually in office both before and after the period of regular tenure). Aristocratic features are the fact that the officials are not paid or appointed by lot, and other similar practices; and the rule that *all* lawsuits may be decided by the boards, and not some by one body and some by another, as is the case at Sparta.

1273^{a}21 The Carthaginian system deviates most markedly from aristocracy in the direction of oligarchy by following the widely held view that office-holders should be chosen on grounds of means as well as on grounds of merit, because poor men are unable to rule well and have no leisure.

1273^{a}25 If selection on grounds of means is characteristic of oligarchy and selection by merit of aristocracy, the way in which the constitutional affairs of the Carthaginians are organized would seem to be something different from either. Both grounds are taken into consideration in the elections, especially in those for the highest offices, the kings and the generals. This deviation from the pure principle of aristocracy must be regarded as an error on the part of the lawgiver. From the outset one of his most pressing duties is to see that the most meritorious have the opportunity to be at leisure and to refrain from unworthy occupations, not only when they are in office, but even when they are not. Even if it is right to take means too into consideration, in order to secure men of leisure, it is disgraceful to make the highest of offices (those of the kings and the generals) open to purchase. This custom puts riches in a more honourable position than merit, and imbues the whole city with a spirit of avarice. When the sovereign body in a city attaches value to something, the opinion of the other citizens will necessarily follow its lead, and where merit does not receive the highest place of honour an aristocratic constitution cannot have a secure existence. Besides, when money has been spent to get office, the purchasers may naturally be expected to fall into the habit of trying to make a profit on the transaction. If people who are poor but honest want to make profit, we can hardly expect worse characters who are already out of pocket to refrain from doing so. So those who would make the best rulers should rule; and even if the legislator abandons any attempt to make honest citizens wealthy, he ought at any rate to provide for their having leisure during the period for which they hold office.

1273^{b}8 It would also appear to be a defect that one person should hold a number of offices, which is a practice in vogue at Carthage. Each job is done best when it is done by one man; and the lawgiver should see that this rule is followed, and not set the same man to be both flute-player and cobbler. Accordingly, except in a small city, it is at once more statesmanlike and more democratic that a larger number of citizens should share in office. Then, as we have already argued,* the work is shared more widely and each particular job is done better and more quickly. This is clearly evident in military and naval matters. In both, the practice of ruling and being ruled extends to everyone concerned.

1273^{b}18 The Carthaginians have a constitution which is in practice oligarchical; but they get away with this by an excellent means—from time to time a section of the populace is planted out among the dependent cities and thus grows wealthy. In this way they remedy defects of the constitution and give it stability. But this may be said to be the effect of chance; they ought to be kept free of factional conflict by the work of the legislator. In the present position of affairs the law provides no remedy to ensure internal peace if some misfortune occurs and the masses revolt against their rulers.

1273^{b}24 Such is the character of the three constitutions—the Spartan, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian—which are justly held in high regard.

CHAPTER 12

*4. **Postscript on other legislators.** Solon and the constitution of Athens. The earliest legislators. Various notes (e.g. on the severity of Draco's laws, and on the legislation of Pittacus about the offences committed under the influence of drink).*

1273^{b}27 Some of those who have put forward a view about constitutional matters* have taken no part in political affairs of any kind or description, but have lived for the whole of their lives in a private capacity; we have already mentioned practically everything worthy of note concerning these. Others, again, were experienced statesmen who served as lawgivers, some for their own and others for foreign cities. Some of these simply drew up laws: others were authors of constitutions as well as of laws. Lycurgus and Solon* are both in the latter category: they established both laws and constitutions.

1273^{b}35 The constitution of Sparta has already been described. Solon is held by some to have been an excellent lawgiver. They say that he swept away an oligarchy which was far too absolute, that he emancipated the people from serfdom, and that he instituted the 'ancestral democracy', thereby establishing an admirably 'mixed' constitution: the Council of the Areopagus is oligarchic; the method of electing office-holders is aristocratic; and the lawcourts are democratic. In actual fact, however, it would appear that two of these elements (the council and the election of office-holders) existed before his time; he simply refrained from abolishing them. But he certainly put the people into power by making membership of the lawcourts open to every citizen; and that is the reason why he is blamed by some of his critics, who argue that he really destroyed the other elements by making these popular lawcourts, with their members appointed by lot, supreme in every case. Later, as these courts grew in strength, they sought to flatter the people in the way that men flatter a tyrant, and transformed the constitution into its present form of democracy. Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the Council of the Areopagus; Pericles introduced the system of paying the members of the lawcourts; and thus each demagogue, in his turn, increased the democratic element until the constitution reached its present form.* This, however, appears to be due to accident rather than to any deliberate design on the part of Solon. The people, who had been the cause of the acquisition of a maritime empire during the course of the Persian wars, acquired a conceit of themselves; and in spite of the opposition of the respectable citizens they found worthless demagogues to support their cause. Solon himself would seem to have given the people only the necessary minimum of power, allowing them simply to elect office-holders and to call them to account. (A people which does not have this power is a people of slaves, and an enemy [to the city].) He arranged that office-holders should be drawn exclusively from those who were notable and well-to-do, from the Pentacosiomedimni, from the Zeugitae, and from the third class, the Hippeis—while the lowest class, that of the Thetes, was ineligible for any office.*

1274^{a}22 Other legislators* were Zaleucus, for the Epizephyrian Locrians, and Charondas of Catana, for his own city and for others in Italy and Sicily which had been settled from Chalcis. There are some writers, however, who would go farther back, and argue that Onomacritus was the earliest expert in legislation. They make him a Locrian, who was trained in Crete during a visit paid there in the course of his vocation as a soothsayer: they make Thales his colleague: finally, they make Lycurgus and Zaleucus the disciples of this Thales, and Charondas the disciple of Zaleucus. In saying this they speak with too little regard to chronology; but Philolaus of Corinth certainly framed laws for Thebes. He belonged by birth to the Bacchiad family in his native city; but he was the friend and lover of Diocles, an Olympic victor who left Corinth in disgust at his mother Halcyone's incestuous passion for himself, and he accompanied Diocles to Thebes, where they lived and died together. Their tombs are still shown today: they stand in full view of one another, but one of them can be seen from the soil of Corinth, and the other cannot; and the story goes that the two friends deliberately arranged to be buried in this way—Diocles remembering his past with horror, and anxious that Corinth should not be visible from the mound under which he lay, but Philolaus desiring that it should be from his. This was the reason of their settling at Thebes; and this was how Philolaus came to make laws for that city. Among his laws there are some which deal with the production of children. They are called the 'laws of adoption'; and they are a peculiar feature of the legislation of Philolaus, intended to keep the number of family plots constant and undisturbed.

1274b5 The only peculiar feature of the legislation of Charondas is that relating to suits brought against those guilty of perjury (he was the first to institute the practice of denunciation for false witness); but in the general precision of his laws he showed himself a still better draftsman than our modern legislators. The peculiar feature of the legislation proposed by Phaleas is the equalization of property; the peculiar features of Plato's legislation* are: the community of property and of wives and children; a system of common meals for women; the rule about drinking, which provides that the sober must be in the chair at a drinking-party; and the rule about military training, which provides that soldiers must practise ambidexterity, since it is wrong for one hand to be useful and the other not.

1274b15 There are laws of Draco but he drew up these laws for an existing constitution and they have no peculiar feature worth mentioning, except the severity which they show in fixing the amount of punishments. Pittacus, like Draco, was the author only of laws, and not of a constitution. One of the laws peculiar to him is the law that a drunken man should be punished more heavily for an offence than a sober one. He noted that drunken men commit offences of violence more frequently than sober ones; but instead of holding that this entitled them to greater consideration, he preferred to take his stand on the ground of expediency. Androdamas of Rhegium was another legislator, who made laws for the Chalcidian settlements in Thrace. Some of them are concerned with homicide, and with the succession of women to property; but his legislation has no peculiar feature that need be mentioned.

1274b26 This may conclude our inquiry into matters connected with both types of constitutions, those which are actually in force, and those planned by political theorists.

BOOK III
THE THEORY OF CITIZENSHIP AND CONSTITUTIONS

A: Citizenship (Chapters 1–5)

CHAPTER 1

*To understand what a constitution (*politeia*) is, we must inquire into the nature of the city (*polis*); and to understand that—since the city is a body of citizens (*politai*)—we must examine the nature of citizenship. Citizenship is not determined by residence, or by merely having access to the courts of law. Rather 'a citizen is one who permanently shares in the administration of justice and the holding of office'. This definition is more especially true in a democracy: to make it generally applicable, we must modify it to run, 'a citizen is one who shares for any period of time in judicial and deliberative office'.*

$1274^{b}32$ When we are dealing with constitutions, and seeking to discover the essence and the attributes of each form, our first investigation may well be directed to the city [the *polis*] itself; and we may begin by asking, 'What is the city?'* This is at present a disputed question—while some say, 'It was the city that did such and such an act', others say, 'It was not the city, but the oligarchy or the tyrant.'* All the activity of the statesman and the lawgiver is obviously concerned with the city, and a constitution is a way of organizing the inhabitants of a city.

$1274^{b}38$ A city belongs to the order of 'compounds',* just like any other thing which forms a single 'whole', while being composed, none the less, of a number of different parts. This being the case, it clearly follows that we must inquire first about the citizen.* In other words, a city is a certain number of citizens; and so we must consider who should properly be called a citizen and what a citizen really is.* The definition of

a citizen is a question which is often disputed: there is no general agreement on who is a citizen. It may be that someone who is a citizen in a democracy is not one in an oligarchy. We may leave out of consideration those who enjoy the title of 'citizen' in some special sense, for example, naturalized citizens. A citizen proper is not one by virtue of residence in a given place: for even aliens and slaves may share the common place of residence. Nor [can the title of 'citizen' be given to] those who share in legal processes only to the extent of being entitled to sue and be sued in the courts. This is something which belongs also to aliens who share it by virtue of a treaty; though it is to be noted that there are many places where resident aliens are obliged to choose a legal protector, so that they only share to a limited extent in this form of association. They are like children who are still too young to be entered on the roll of citizens, or men who are old enough to have been excused from civic duties. There is a sense in which these may be called citizens, but it is not altogether an unqualified sense: we must add the reservation that the young are undeveloped, and the old superannuated citizens, or we must use some other qualification; the exact term we apply does not matter, for the meaning is clear.

$1275^{a}19$ We are seeking to discover the citizen in the strict sense, who has no such defect to be made good. Similar questions may also be raised and answered about those who are exiled or disenfranchised. The citizen in this strict sense is best defined by the one criterion that he shares in the administration of justice and in the holding of office. Offices may be divided into two kinds. Some are discontinuous in point of time: in other words, they are of the sort that either cannot be held at all for more than a single term or can only be held for a second term after some definite interval. Others, however, have no limit of time, for example, the office of jurymen, or the office of a member of the popular assembly. It may possibly be contended that such people are not holders of 'office', and do not share in 'office' by virtue of their position. But it would be ridiculous to exclude from the category of holders of office those who actually hold the most sovereign position in the city; and, since the argument turns on a word, we should not let it make a difference. The point is that we have no word to denote what is common to the juryman and the member of the assembly, or to describe the position held by both. Let us, in the interest of a clear analysis, call it 'indeterminate office'. On that basis we may lay it down that citizens are those who share in the holding of office as so defined.*

1275^{a}33 The definition of citizen which will most satisfactorily cover the position of all who bear the name is of this general kind. We must also notice that there are certain kinds of thing which may be based on different kinds of principle, one of them standing first, another second, and so on down the series.* Things belonging to this class, when considered purely as such, have no common denominator whatever, or, if they have one, they have it only to a meagre extent. Constitutions obviously differ from one another in kind, with some of them coming later in the order and others earlier; for constitutions which are defective and perverted (we shall explain later in what sense we are using the term 'perverted') are necessarily secondary to those which are free from defects. It follows that the citizen under each different kind of constitution must also necessarily be different. We may thus conclude that the citizen of our definition is particularly and especially the citizen of a democracy. Citizens living under other kinds of constitution may possibly, but do not necessarily, correspond to the definition. There are some cities, for example, in which there is no popular element: such cities have no regular meetings of the assembly, but only meetings specially summoned; and they decide different kinds of legal case by different means. In Sparta, for example, the Ephors take cases of contracts (not as a body, but each sitting separately); the Council of Elders take cases of homicide; and some other authority may take other cases. Much the same is also true of Carthage, where a number of official bodies are entitled to decide cases of all kinds.

1275^{b}13 But our definition of citizenship can be amended. In other kinds of constitution members of the assembly and the courts do not hold that office for an indeterminate period. They hold it for a limited term; and it is to some or all of these that the citizen's function of deliberating and judging (whether on all issues or only a few) is assigned. From these considerations it emerges clearly who a citizen is. We say that one who is entitled to share in deliberative or judicial office is thereby a citizen of that city, and a city, in its simplest terms, is a body of such people adequate in number for achieving a self-sufficient existence.*

CHAPTER 2

A popular and pragmatic view of citizenship makes it depend on birth, i.e. descent from a citizen parent or two citizen parents. This does not carry us far, and in any case it only relates to old established citizens. A more serious question is raised when we consider new citizens, who have been allowed to participate in the constitution as the result of a revolution. Are they actually citizens? On the criterion of sharing in judicial and deliberative office (which is a functional criterion), they are actually citizens when once they possess that function.

1275^{b}22 For practical purposes, it is usual to define a citizen as 'one born of citizen parents on both sides', and not on the father's or mother's side only; but sometimes this requirement is carried still farther back, to the length of two, three, or more stages of ancestry. This popular and facile definition has induced some thinkers to raise the question, 'How did the citizen of the third or fourth stage of ancestry himself come to be a citizen?' Gorgias of Leontini—perhaps partly from a sense of this difficulty and partly in irony—said, 'As mortars are things which are made by the craftsmen who are mortar-makers, so Larissaeans are made by the craftsmen who are Larissaean-makers'.* But the matter is really simple. If, in their day, they had a share in the constitution in the sense of our own definition, they were certainly citizens. It is obviously impossible to apply the requirement of descent from a citizen father or a citizen mother to those who were the first inhabitants or original founders of a city.

1275^{b}34 A more serious difficulty is perhaps raised by the case of those who have acquired a share as the result of a change in the constitution. We may take as an example the action of Cleisthenes* at Athens, when after the expulsion of the tyrants he enrolled in the tribes a number of resident aliens both foreigners and slaves. The question raised by such an addition to the civic body is not 'Who is actually a citizen?' but, 'Are they rightly or wrongly such?'* It must be admitted, however, that someone might also raise the further question whether a man who is not justly a citizen is really a citizen, on the grounds that the unjust comes to the same as the false. Obviously there are office-holders who have no just title to their office; but we still say that they hold office, though we do not say it is just for them to do so. The citizen also is defined by the fact of holding a sort of office (for the definition we have given to the citizen involves his sharing in office of the deliberative and judicial kind); and it follows, therefore, that these people must be called citizens.

CHAPTER 3

The question, 'Are they justly citizens?' leads to the further question 'When can a given act be considered an act of the city or polis*?' This in turn raises the general question of the identity of the city. Is the city identical with the government for the time being? Generally, what are the factors which constitute its identity? The identity of a city does not depend on its being surrounded by one set of walls, or on its consisting of one stock of inhabitants. The city is a compound; and its identity, like that of all compounds, is determined by the scheme of its composition, i.e. by its constitution.*

1276ª6 The question whether these people are, in justice, citizens or not is a different matter, which is closely connected with a larger question already mentioned.* Some people have wondered when a given act can, and when it cannot, be considered to be the act of the city. We may take as an example the case of an oligarchy or tyranny which changes into a democracy. In such a case some people are reluctant to fulfil public contracts, on the grounds that these were made, not by the city, but by the governing tyrant, and they are

unwilling to meet other obligations of a similar nature because they hold that some constitutions exist by virtue of force, and not for the sake of the common good. It would follow that if a democracy exists in this fashion [i.e. by force] we have to admit that acts done under the government of such a democracy are no more acts of the city concerned than were acts done under the oligarchy or tyranny.

1276ª17 Our discussion would seem to be closely connected with the following problem: 'On what principles ought we to say that a city has retained its identity, or conversely, that it has lost its identity and become a different city?' The most obvious mode of dealing with this question is to consider simply territory and population. On this basis we may note that the territory and population of a city may be divided into sections, with some of the population residing in one block of territory, and some of it in another. This question need not be regarded as particularly difficult: the issue which it raises can easily be met if we remember that the word 'city' is used in different senses.*

1276ª24 In the case of a population which inhabits a single territory, we may likewise ask 'When should we consider that there is a single city?' For, of course, the identity of a city is not constituted by its walls—it would be possible to surround the whole of the Peloponnese by a single wall. Babylon (which, it is said, had been captured for three whole days before some of its inhabitants knew of the fact) may perhaps be counted a city of this dubious nature: so, too, might any city which had the dimensions of a people [*ethnos*] rather than those of a city [or *polis*]. But it will be better to reserve the consideration of this question for some other occasion.* (To determine the size of a city—to settle how large it can properly be, and whether it ought to consist of the members of several races—is a duty incumbent on the statesman.)

1276ª34 Assuming a single population inhabiting a single territory, shall we say that the city retains its identity as long as the stock of its inhabitants continues to be the same (although the old members are always dying and new members are always being born), and shall we thus apply to the city the analogy of rivers and fountains, to which we ascribe a constant

a Spring of water.
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identity in spite of the fact that part of their water is always flowing in and part always flowing out? Or must we take a different view, and say that even though the population remains the same, the city, for the reason already mentioned, may none the less change?

1276^{b}1 If a city is a form of association, and if this form of association is an association of citizens in a constitution, it would seem to follow inevitably that when the constitution undergoes a change in form, and becomes a different constitution, the city will likewise cease to be the same city. We say that a chorus which appears at one time as a comic and at another as a tragic chorus is not the same—and this in spite of the fact that the members often remain the same. What is true of the chorus is also true of every other kind of association, and of all other compounds generally. If the form of its composition is different, the compound becomes a different compound. A scale composed of the same notes will be a different scale depending on whether it is in the Dorian or the Phrygian mode. If this is the case, it is obvious that in determining the identity of the city we must look to the constitution. Whether the same group of people inhabits a city, or a totally different group, we are free to call it the same city, or a different city. It is a different question* whether it is right to pay debts or to repudiate them when a city changes its constitution into another form.

CHAPTER 4

Aristotle now raises the question, 'What is the relation of the excellence of the good citizen to the excellence of the good man?' If we look at constitutions generally, we must note that different constitutions require different types of good citizen, while the good man is always the same. If we look at the best constitution, we may argue that even here there must be different types of good citizen, because there are different sorts of civic function; and thus here too the good citizen cannot be identified with the good man. On the whole, therefore, the good citizen and the good man cannot be identified. But there is one case in which they can be. This is the case of the good ruler who possesses the quality of moral wisdom required for being a good subject. The quality of moral wisdom which he possesses is the essential quality of the good man; and in his case the excellence of the good citizen is identical with that of the good man.

1276^{b}16 A question connected with those which have just been discussed is the question whether the excellence of a good man and that of a good citizen are identical or different.* If this question is to be investigated, we must first describe the excellence of the citizen in some sort of outline. Just as a sailor is a member of an association,* so too is a citizen. Sailors differ from one another in virtue of the different capacities in which they act: one is a rower, another a steersman, another a look-out man; and others will have still other such titles. It is, nevertheless, clear that, while the most accurate definition of the excellence of each sailor will be special to the man concerned, a common definition of excellence will apply to all, inasmuch as safety in navigation is the common task of all and the object at which each of the sailors aims. The same is also true of citizens. Though they differ, the end which they all serve is the safety of their association; and this association consists in the constitution. The conclusion to which we are thus led is that the excellence of the citizen must be an excellence relative to the constitution. It follows that if there are several different kinds of constitution there cannot be a single absolute excellence of the good citizen.* But the good man is a man so called in virtue of a single absolute excellence.

1276^{b}34 It is thus clear that it is possible to be a good citizen without possessing the excellence by which one is a good man. But we may reach the same conclusion in another way,* by discussing the question with particular reference to the best constitution. Although it is impossible for a city to be composed entirely of good men, each citizen must, none the less, perform well his particular function and this requires [the appropriate kind of] excellence. But, since it is impossible for all the citizens to be alike, the excellence of a citizen cannot be identical with that of a good man. The excellence of a good citizen must belong to all citizens, because that is the condition necessary for the city being the best city; but the excellence of a good man cannot possibly belong to all—unless, indeed, we hold that every citizen of a good city must also be a good man. Furthermore, the city is composed of unlike elements. Just as a living being is composed of soul and body, or the soul of the different elements of reason and appetite, or the household of man and wife, or property of master and slave, so the city too is composed of different and unlike elements, among them not only the various elements already mentioned, but also others in addition. It follows that there cannot be a single excellence common to all the citizens, any more than there can be a single excellence common to the leader of a dramatic chorus and his assistants.

1277^{a}12 Although it is clear from these considerations why they are not in all cases identical, the question may still be raised whether there are not some cases in which the excellence of the good man and that of the good citizen are the same. We say that a good ruler is a good man and possesses practical wisdom, while the citizen does not need to have practical wisdom. Indeed there are some who hold that the very training of the ruler should be, from the first, of a different kind; and it is a matter of observation that the sons of kings are specially trained in riding and the art of war. Thus Euripides says

> No subtleties for me,
> But what the city most needs,*

which implies a special training for the ruler. We may thus assume that the excellence of the good ruler is identical with that of the good man. But subjects too are citizens. It follows that the excellence of the good citizen cannot be identical with that of the good man in all cases, though it may be so in a particular case.* The excellence of the ordinary citizen is different from that of the ruler; and this may well be the reason why Jason [the tyrant of Pherae] said that he was 'a hungry man except when he was tyrant', meaning that he did not know how to live as an ordinary person.

1277^{a}25 On the other hand, people hold in esteem the capacity both to rule and to obey, and they regard the excellence of a good citizen as being a matter of ruling and obeying well. Now if the excellence of the good man is in ruling, while that of the good citizen is in both ruling and obeying, these two excellences cannot be held in the same esteem.

1277^{a}29 Since it thus seems that ruler and ruled should acquire different kinds of knowledge, rather than the same kind, while the citizen should have both sorts of knowledge, and share in both, we can now see the next step which our argument has to take.* There is rule of the sort which is exercised by a master; and by this we mean the sort of rule connected with the necessary functions of life. Here it is not necessary for the ruler to know how to do the task himself, but only to know how to use those who do: indeed the former kind of knowledge (by which we mean an ability to do menial services personally) has a servile character. There are a number of kinds of servant, because there are a number of kinds of menial service which have to be rendered. One of these forms of service is that which is rendered by manual labourers. These, as their very name signifies, are those who live by the work of their hands; and the menial craftsman [or mechanic] belongs to this class. This is the reason why in some cities the manual workers were once upon a time excluded from office, in the days before the institution of the extreme form of democracy. The occupations pursued by those who are subject to rule of the sort just mentioned need never be studied by the good man, or by the statesman, or by the good citizen—except occasionally and in order to satisfy some personal need, in which case there ceases to be any question of the relation of master and slave.

1277^{b}7 But there is also rule of the sort which is exercised over those who are similar in birth to the ruler, and are similarly free. Rule of this sort is what we call political rule; and this is the sort of rule which the ruler must begin to learn by being ruled—just as one learns to be a commander of cavalry by serving under another commander, or to be a general of infantry by serving under another general and by acting first as colonel and, even before that, as captain. This is why it is a good saying that 'you cannot be ruler unless you have first been ruled'. Ruler and ruled have indeed different excellences; but the fact remains that the good citizen must possess the knowledge and the capacity requisite for ruling as well as for being ruled, and the excellence of a citizen may be defined as consisting in 'a knowledge of rule over free men from both points of view'.

1277^{b}16 A good man, also, will need both, even though the temperance and justice required for ruling have a different character. Equally, the excellence (justice, for example) of a good man who is a subject in a free city will not be of a single kind. It will include different sorts: one sort which fits him to act as a ruler, and one which fits him to act as a subject. The temperance and the courage of a man differ from those of a woman in much the same sort of way. A man would be thought cowardly if his courage were only the same as that of a courageous woman; and conversely a woman would be thought a gossip if she showed no more decorum than that which befits a good man. The function of the man in the household is different from that of the woman: it is the function of the one to acquire, and of the other to keep.

1277^{b}25 Practical wisdom is the only form of excellence which is peculiar to the ruler. The other forms must, it would seem, belong equally to rulers and subjects. The excellence of subjects cannot be practical wisdom, and may be defined as 'right opinion'. The ruled may be compared to a flute-maker: the ruler is like a flute-player who uses what the flute-maker makes.

1277^{b}30 These considerations will show whether the excellence of the good man and that of the good citizen are identical or different—or in what sense they are identical and in what sense they are different.

CHAPTER 5

There is a further question relating to citizenship, 'Can mechanics and labourers be citizens, and if they cannot be citizens, how are they to be described?' They should not be citizens, because they cannot achieve the excellence of the good citizen, though they are necessary to the existence of the city. But the answer varies from one kind of constitution to another: in an aristocratic constitution, mechanics and labourers cannot be citizens; in an oligarchy, a rich mechanic may.

1277^{b}33 There is still a question which remains to be considered in regard to the citizen. Is the citizen in the true sense one who is entitled to share in office, or must mechanics* be also included in the ranks of citizens? If we hold that those, who have no share in public offices, are also to be included, we shall have some citizens who can never achieve the excellence of the good citizen (for this man will also be a citizen). If, on the other hand, someone of this sort is not a citizen, in what class is he to be placed? He is not a resident alien, neither is he a foreigner. Or shall we say that this point does not involve us in any absurdity? For the same is true of slaves and freedmen. The truth is that we cannot include as citizens all who are necessary to the city's existence.* Similarly, too, children are not citizens in the same sense as adult males. Adults are citizens absolutely; children are citizens only in a qualified sense—they are citizens but undeveloped ones. There were some places, in ancient times, where the class of mechanics was actually composed of slaves or foreigners only, and this explains why a great number of mechanics are slaves or foreigners even today.

1278^{a}8 The best form of city will not make the mechanic a citizen. Where mechanics are admitted to citizenship we shall have to say that the citizen excellence of which we have spoken cannot be attained by every citizen, by all who are simply free men, but can only be achieved by those who are free from the necessary tasks of life. Those who do the necessary tasks may be divided into two classes, slaves, who do them for individuals, and mechanics and labourers, who do them for the community.

1278^{a}13 If we start from this basis, and carry our inquiry a little further, the position of these mechanics and labourers will soon become evident; in fact, enough has already been said* to make it clear, once the bearing of the argument is grasped. Constitutions are various: there must thus be various kinds of citizens; more especially, there must be various kinds of citizens who are subjects. In one variety of constitution it will be necessary that mechanics and labourers should be citizens: in other varieties it will be impossible. It will be impossible, for example, where there is a constitution of the type termed 'aristocratic', with offices distributed on the basis of worth and excellence: for one who lives the life of a mechanic or labourer cannot pursue the things which belong to excellence. The case is different in oligarchies. Even there, it is true, a labourer cannot be a citizen (participation in office depending on a high property qualification); but a mechanic may, for the simple reason that craftsmen often become rich. Yet in Thebes there was a law that no one could share in office who had not abstained from selling in the market for a period of ten years. On the other hand there are many constitutions where the law goes to the length of admitting aliens to citizenship. There are, for example, some democracies where someone who has only a citizen mother is admitted; and there are many cities where the same privilege is given to those of illegitimate birth. But the policy of extending citizenship so widely is [generally] due to a dearth of genuine citizens; and it is only shortage of population which produces such legislation. When they have sufficient numbers they gradually disqualify such people: first sons of a slave father or slave mother are disqualified; then those who are born of a citizen mother but an alien father; and finally citizenship is confined to those who are of citizen parentage on both sides.*

$1278^{a}34$ These considerations prove two things: that there are several different kinds of citizens, and that the name of citizen is particularly applicable to those who share in the offices and honours of the city. Homer accordingly speaks in the *Iliad* of a man being treated

> like an alien man, without honour;*

and it is true that those who do not share in positions of honour in the city are just like resident aliens. When restrictions are imposed by subterfuge their only object is to hoodwink those inhabitants who are not citizens.

$1278^{a}40$ Two conclusions also emerge from our discussion* of the question, 'Is the excellence of the good man identical with that of the good citizen, or different from it?' The first is that there are some cities in which the good man and the good citizen are identical, and some in which they are different. The second is that, in cities of the former type, it is not all good citizens who are also good men, but only those among them who hold the position of statesmen—in other words, those who direct or are capable of directing, either alone or in conjunction with others, the conduct of public affairs.

B: Constitutions and their Classification (Chapters 6–8)

CHAPTER 6

The definition of a constitution. The classification of constitutions depends on (1) the ends pursued by cities, and (2) the kind of rule exercised by their governments. The true end of a city is a good life, and it is the common interest to achieve this: the right kind of rule is authority exercised in the common interest. We may thus distinguish 'right' constitutions, which are directed to the common interest, and 'wrong' or 'perverted' constitutions directed to the selfish interest of the ruling body.

$1278^{b}6$ Having determined these matters we have next to consider whether there is a single type of constitution, or whether there are a number of types. If there are a number of types, what are these types; how many of them are there; and how do they differ? A constitution [or *politeia*] may be defined as 'the organization of a city [or *polis*], in respect of its offices generally, but especially in respect of that particular office which is sovereign in all issues'.* The civic body is everywhere the sovereign of the city; in fact the civic body is the constitution itself. In democratic cities, for example, the people [*dēmos*] is sovereign:* in oligarchies, on the other hand, the few [or *oligoi*] have that position; and this difference in the sovereign bodies is the reason why we say that the two types of constitution differ—as we may equally apply the same reasoning to other types besides these.

$1278^{b}15$ We must first ascertain two things: the nature of the end for which a city exists, and the various kinds of rule to which mankind and its associations are subject. It has already been stated, in our first book (where we were concerned with the management of the household and the control of slaves), that 'man is a political animal'.* For this reason people desire to live a social life even when they stand in no need of mutual succour; but they are also drawn together by a common interest, in proportion as each attains a share in the good life. The good life is the chief end, both for the community as a whole and for each of us individually. But people also come together, and form and maintain political associations, merely for the sake of life; for perhaps there is some element of the good even in the simple fact of living, so long as the evils of existence do not preponderate too heavily. It is an evident fact that most people cling hard enough to life to be willing to endure a good deal of suffering, which implies that life has in it a sort of healthy happiness and a natural quality of pleasure.

1278b30 It is easy enough to distinguish the various kinds of rule of which people commonly speak; and indeed we have often had occasion to define them ourselves in works intended for the general public.* The rule of a master is one kind;* and here, though there is really a common interest which unites the natural master and the natural slave, the fact remains that the rule is primarily exercised with a view to the master's interest, and only incidentally with a view to that of the slave, who must be preserved in existence if the rule is to remain. Rule over wife and children, and over the household generally, is a second kind of rule, which we have called by the name of household management.* Here the rule is either exercised in the interest of the ruled or for the attainment of some advantage common to both ruler and ruled. Essentially it is exercised in the interest of the ruled, as is also plainly the case with other arts besides that of ruling, such as medicine and gymnastics—though an art may incidentally be exercised for the benefit of its practitioner, and there is nothing to prevent (say) a trainer from becoming occasionally a member of the class he instructs, in the same sort of way as a steersman is always one of the crew. Thus a trainer or steersman primarily considers the good of those who are subject to his authority; but when he becomes one of them personally, he incidentally shares in the benefit of that good—the steersman thus being also a member of the crew, and the trainer (though still a trainer) becoming also a member of the class which he instructs.

1279a8 For this reason, when the constitution of a city is constructed on the principle that its members are equals and peers, the citizens think it proper that they should hold office by turns. At any rate this is the natural system, and the system which used to be followed in the days when people believed that they ought to serve by turns, and each assumed that others would take over the duty of considering his benefit, just as he himself, during his term of office, had considered their interest.* Today because of the profits to be derived from office and the handling of public property, people want to hold office continuously. It is as if they were invalids, who got the benefit of being healthy by being permanently in office: at any rate their ardour for office is just what it would be if that were the case.* The conclusion which follows is clear: those constitutions which consider the common interest are right constitutions, judged by the standard of absolute justice. Those constitutions which consider only the personal interest of the rulers are all wrong constitutions, or perversions of the right forms.* Such perverted forms are despotic;* whereas the city is an association of freemen.

CHAPTER 7

These two types of constitution each fall into three subdivisions on the basis of number, i.e. according as the One, or the Few, or the Many are the ruling authority in each type. We have thus, as the three subdivisions of the 'right' type, Kingship, Aristocracy, and 'Constitutional Government' or 'Polity': as the three subdivisions of the 'wrong' type, Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Democracy.

1279a22 Now that these matters have been determined, the next subject for consideration is the number and nature of the

Two types of Constitution — ~~[illegible]~~ Right and Wrong.

different constitutions. We may first examine those constitutions that are rightly formed, since, when these have been determined, the different perversions will at once be apparent.

1279^{a}25 The term 'constitution' [*politeia*] signifies the same thing as the term 'civic body' [*politeuma*]. The civic body in every city [*polis*] is the sovereign [*to kurion*]; and the sovereign must necessarily be either One, or Few, or Many. On this basis we may say that when the One, or the Few, or the Many rule with a view to the common interest, the constitutions under which they do so must necessarily be right constitutions.* On the other hand, the constitutions directed to the personal interest of the One, or the Few, or the Masses, must necessarily be perversions. Either we should say that those who do not share in the constitution are not citizens, or they ought to have their share of the benefits. According to customary usage, among monarchical forms of government the type which looks to the common interest is called Kingship; among forms of government by a few people (but more than one) it is called Aristocracy—that name being given to this species either because the best [*aristoi*] are the rulers, or because its object is what is best [*ariston*] for the city and its members. Finally, when the masses govern the city with a view to the common interest, the form of government is called by the generic name common to all constitutions (or polities)—the name of 'Constitutional Government'.* There is a good reason for this usage: it is possible for one man, or a few, to be of outstanding excellence; but when it comes to a large number, we can hardly expect precision in all the varieties of excellence. What we can expect particularly is the military kind of excellence,* which is the kind that shows itself in a mass. This is the reason why the defence forces are the most sovereign body under this constitution, and those who possess arms are the ones who participate in it.

1279^{b}4 The perversions that correspond to the constitutions just mentioned are: Tyranny, [the perversion of] Kingship; Oligarchy [the perversion of] Aristocracy; and Democracy [the perversion of] 'Constitutional Government' [or polity]. Tyranny is a government by a single person directed to the interest of that person; Oligarchy is directed to the interest of the well-to-do; Democracy is directed to the interest of the poor. None of these benefits the common interest.

CHAPTER 8

The basis of number is not, however, adequate. The real basis, at any rate so far as oligarchy and democracy are concerned, is social class: what makes an oligarchy is the rule of the rich (rather than the few), and what makes a democracy is the rule of the poor (rather than the many). Number is an accidental, and not an essential, attribute; but the accidental generally accompanies the essential.

1279^{b}11 We must consider at somewhat greater length what each of these constitutions is. There are certain difficulties involved; and when one is pursuing a philosophical method of inquiry in any branch of study, and not merely looking to practical considerations, the proper course is to set out the truth about every particular with no neglect or omission.

1279^{b}16 Tyranny, as has just been said, is single-person government of the political association on the lines of despotism; oligarchy exists where those who have property are the sovereign authority of the constitution; and, conversely, democracy exists where the sovereign authority is composed of the poorer classes, who are without much property.*

1279^{b}20 The first difficulty which arises is a matter of definition. It could be that the majority are well-to-do and that these hold the sovereignty in a city; but when the majority is sovereign there is [said to be] democracy. Similarly it could happen that the poorer classes were fewer in number than the well-to-do, and yet were stronger and had sovereign authority in the constitution; but where a small number has sovereignty there is said to be oligarchy. Thus it may seem that the definitions we have given of these constitutions cannot be correct.

1279^{b}26 We might attempt to overcome the difficulty by combining both of the factors: wealth with paucity of numbers, and poverty with mass. On this basis oligarchy might be defined as the constitution under which the rich, being also few in number, hold the public offices; and similarly democracy might be defined as the constitution under which the poor, being also many in number, are in control. But this involves us in another difficulty. If there are no forms of oligarchy and democracy other than those enumerated, what names are we to give to the constitutions just suggested as conceivable—those where the wealthy form a majority and the poor a minority, and where the wealthy majority in the one case, and the poor minority in the other, are the sovereign authority of the constitution? The course of the argument thus appears to show that whether the sovereign body is small or large in number (as it is respectively in oligarchies or in democracies) is an accidental attribute, due to the simple fact that the wealthy are generally few and the poor are generally numerous. Therefore the causes originally mentioned are not in fact the real causes of the difference between oligarchies and democracies. The real ground of the difference between oligarchy and democracy is poverty and riches. It is inevitable that there should be an oligarchy where the rulers, whether they are few or many, owe their position to riches; and it is equally inevitable that there should be democracy where the poor rule.

1280^{a}2 It happens, however, as we have just remarked, that the former [i.e. the wealthy] are few and the latter [i.e. the poor] are numerous. It is only a few who have riches, but all alike share in free status; and it is on these grounds that the two parties dispute the control of the constitution.

C: The Principles of Oligarchy and Democracy and the Nature of Distributive Justice (Chapters 9–13)

CHAPTER 9

The principle of a constitution is its conception of justice; and this is the fundamental ground of difference between oligarchy and democracy. Democrats hold that if men are equal by birth, they should in justice have an equal share in office and honours: oligarchs hold that if they are unequal in wealth, they should in justice have unequal shares in these things. True justice means that those who have contributed to the end of the city should have privileges in proportion to their contribution to that end. The end of the city is not mere life, nor an alliance for mutual defence; it is the common promotion of a good quality of life. Thus although the citizens of a city must always inhabit a single territory, engage in intermarriage, and co-operate with each other in economic matters, the operative aim is always the promotion of a good quality of life. Those who contribute most to the realization of that aim should in justice have the largest share of office and honour.

1280^{a}7 We must next ascertain what are said to be the distinctive principles of oligarchy and democracy, and what are the oligarchical and the democratic conceptions of justice.* All parties have a hold on a sort of conception of justice; but they both fail to carry it far enough, and do not express the true conception of justice in the whole of its range. For example, justice is considered to mean equality. It does mean equality—but equality for those who are equal, and not for all.* Again, inequality is considered to be just; and indeed it is—but only for those who are unequal, and not for all. These people fail to consider for whom there should be equality or inequality and thus make erroneous judgements. The reason is that they are judging in their own case; and most people, as a rule, are bad judges where their own interests are involved. Justice is concerned with people; and a just distribution is one in which there is proportion between the things distributed and those to whom they are distributed, a point which has already been made in the *Ethics.** There is general agreement about what constitutes equality in the thing, but disagreement about what constitutes it in people.* The main reason for this is the reason just stated, they are judging, and judging erroneously, in their own case; but there is also another reason, they are misled by the fact that they are professing a sort of conception of justice, and professing it up to a point, into thinking that they profess one which is absolute and complete. Some think that if they are superior in one point, for example in wealth, they are superior in all:

others believe that if they are equal in one respect, for instance in free birth, they are equal all round.

1280a25 Both sides, however, fail to mention the really cardinal factor.* If property is the end for which people come together and form an association, one's share of the city would be proportionate to one's share of the property; and in that case the argument of the oligarchical side would appear to be strong: they say that is not just for someone who has contributed one mina to share in a sum of a hundred minae on equal terms with one who has contributed all the rest and that this applies both to the original sum and to the interest accruing upon it. But the end of the city is not mere life; it is, rather, a good quality of life. Otherwise, there might be a city of slaves, or even a city of animals; but in the world as we know it any such city is impossible, because slaves and animals do not share in happiness* nor in living according to their own choice. Similarly, it is not the end of the city to provide an alliance for mutual defence against all injury, nor does it exist for the purpose of exchange or [commercial] dealing.* If that had been the end, the Etruscans and the Carthaginians would be in the position of belonging to a single city; and the same would be true to all peoples who have commercial treaties with one another. It is true that such peoples have agreements about imports; treaties to ensure just conduct; and written terms of alliance for mutual defence. On the other hand, they have no common offices to deal with these matters: each, on the contrary, has its own offices, confined to itself. Neither party concerns itself to ensure a proper quality of character among the members of the other; neither of them seeks to ensure that all who are included in the scope of the treaties are just and free from any form of vice; and they do not go beyond the aim of preventing their own members from committing injustice against one another. But it is the goodness or badness in the life of the city which engages the attention of those who are concerned to secure good government.

1280b6 The conclusion which clearly follows is that any city which is truly so called, and is not merely one in name, must devote itself to the end of encouraging goodness. Otherwise, a political association sinks into a mere alliance, which only differs in space [i.e. in the contiguity of its members] from other forms of alliance where the members live at a distance from one another. Otherwise, too, law becomes a mere covenant—or (in the phrase of the sophist Lycophron)* 'a guarantor of just claims'—but lacks the capacity to make the citizens good and just.

1280b12 That this is the case may be readily proved. If two different sites could be united in one, so that the city [i.e. the *polis*] of Megara and that of Corinth were embraced by a single wall, that would not make a single city. If the citizens of two cities intermarried with one another, that would not make a single city, even though intermarriage is one of the forms of social life which are characteristic of a city. Nor would it make a city if a number of people, living at a distance from one another, but not at so great a distance but they could still associate, had a common system of laws to prevent their injuring one another in the course of exchange. We can imagine, for instance, one being a carpenter, another a farmer, a third a shoemaker, and others producing other goods; and we can imagine a total number of as many as 10,000. But if these people were associated in nothing further than matters such as exchange and alliance, they would still have failed to reach the stage of a city. Why should this be the case? It cannot be ascribed to any lack of contiguity in such an association. The members of a group so constituted might come together on a single site; but if that were all—if each still treated his private house as if it were a city, and all of them still confined their mutual assistance to action against aggressors (as if it were only a question of a defensive alliance)—if, in a word, they associated with each other in the same fashion after coming together as they did when they were living apart—their association, even on its new basis, could not be deemed by any accurate thinker to be a city.

1280b29 It is clear, therefore, that a city is not an association for residence on a common site, or for the sake of preventing mutual injustice and easing exchange. These are indeed conditions which must be present before a city can exist; but the presence of all these conditions is not enough, in itself, to constitute a city. What constitutes a city is an association of households and clans in a good life, for the sake of attaining a perfect and self-sufficing existence. This, however, will not come about unless the members inhabit one and the self-same place and practise intermarriage. It was for this reason that the various institutions of a common social life—marriage-connections, kin-groups, religious gatherings, and social pastimes generally—arose in cities. This sort of thing is the business of friendship, for the pursuit of a common social life is friendship. Thus the purpose of a city is the good life, and these institutions are means to that end. A city is constituted by the association of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing existence; and such an existence, on our definition, consists in living a happy and truly valuable life.

1281a2 It is therefore for the sake of actions valuable in themselves,* and not for the sake of social life, that political associations must be considered to exist. Those who contribute most to this association have a greater share in the city than those who are equal to them (or even greater) in free birth and descent, but unequal in civic excellence, or than those who surpass them in wealth but are surpassed by them in excellence. From what has been said it is plain that all sides in the dispute about constitutions profess only a partial conception of justice.*

CHAPTER 10

What person or body of people should be sovereign in a city: the people, the rich, the better sort of citizens, the one best, or the tyrant? All these alternatives present difficulties; and there is a difficulty even in a further alternative, that no person or body of people, but law, should be sovereign.

1281a11 A difficulty arises when we turn to consider what body should be sovereign in the city. The people at large, the wealthy, the better sort, the one who is best of all, the tyrant. But all these alternatives appear to involve unpleasant results:* indeed, how can it be otherwise? What if the poor, on the ground of their being a majority, proceed to divide among themselves the possessions of the wealthy—will not this be unjust? 'No, by heaven' (someone may reply); 'it has been justly decreed so by the sovereign body.' But if this is not the extreme of injustice, what is? Whenever a majority takes everything and divides among its members the possessions of a minority, that majority is obviously ruining the city. But goodness does not ruin whatever possesses it, nor can justice be such as to ruin a city. It is therefore clear that a law of this kind cannot possibly be just. The tyrant's acts too would necessarily be just; for he too uses coercion by virtue of superior power in just the same sort of way as the people coerce the wealthy. Is it just that a minority composed of the wealthy should rule? Then if they too behave like the others —if they plunder and confiscate the property of the people— their action is just. If it is, then this behaviour would also be just in the former case. It is clear that all these acts of oppression are mean and unjust. But should the better sort have authority and be sovereign in all matters? In that case, the rest of the citizens will necessarily be deprived of honour, since they will not enjoy the honour of holding civic office. We speak of offices as honours; and when the same people hold office all the time, the rest of the community must necessarily be deprived of honour. Is it better that the one best man should rule? This is still more oligarchical because the number of those deprived of honour is even greater. It may perhaps be urged that it is a poor sort of policy to vest sovereignty in a human being, rather than in law; for human beings are subject to the passions that beset their souls. But the law itself may incline either towards oligarchy or towards democracy; and what difference will the sovereignty of law then make in the problems which have just been raised?* The consequences already stated will follow just the same.

CHAPTER 11

It is possible, however, to defend the alternative, that the people should be sovereign. The people, when they are assembled, have a combination of qualities which enables them to deliberate wisely and to judge soundly. This suggests that they have a *claim to be the sovereign body; it also suggests the scope of affairs in which they should be sovereign, or the powers which they should exercise. They should exercise deliberative and judicial functions; in particular, they should elect the magistrates and examine their conduct at the end of their tenure. Two objections may be raised. (1) It may be argued that experts are better judges than the non-expert; but this objection may be met by reference to (*a*) the combination of qualities in the assembled people (which makes them collectively better judges than the expert), and (*b*) the fact that in some cases laymen are in as good a position to judge as experts (which enables them to pass judgement on the behaviour of magistrates). (2) It may be urged that the people, if they have such powers, have more authority than the better sort of citizens who hold office as magistrates, though they are not of so good a quality; but we may answer to this that the people as a whole may well be of a high quality. We have always, however, to remember that rightly constituted laws should be the final sovereign, and that personal authority of any sort should only act in the particular cases which cannot be covered by a general law.*

1281a39 The other alternatives may be reserved for later inquiry;* but the suggestion that the people at large should be sovereign* rather than the few best men would [seem to present problems which]* need resolution, and while it presents some difficulty it perhaps also contains some truth. There is this to be said for the many: each of them by himself may not be of a good quality; but when they all come together it is possible that they may surpass—collectively and as a body, although not individually—the quality of the few best, in much the same way that feasts to which many contribute may excel those provided at one person's expense. For when there are many, each has his share of goodness and practical wisdom; and, when all meet together, the people may thus become something like a single person, who, as he has many feet, many hands, and many senses, may also have many qualities of character and intelligence. This is the reason why the many are also better judges of music and the writings of poets: some appreciate one part, some another, and all together appreciate all. The thing which makes a good man differ from a unit in the crowd—as it is also the thing which is generally said to make a beautiful person differ from one who is not beautiful, or an artistic representation differ from ordinary reality—is that elements which are elsewhere scattered and separate are here combined in a unity. If the elements are taken separately, one may say of an artistic representation that it is surpassed by the eye of this person and by some other feature of that.

1281b15 It is not clear, however, that this contrast between the many, on the one hand, and the few good men, on the other, can apply to every people and to every large group. Perhaps, by heaven, there are some of which it clearly cannot be true; for otherwise the same argument would apply to the beasts. Yet what difference, one may ask, is there between some men and the beasts?* All the same, there is nothing to prevent the view we have stated from being true of a particular group.

1281b21 It would thus seem possible to solve, by the considerations we have advanced, both the problem raised in the previous chapter ['Which people should be sovereign?'] and the further problem which follows upon it, 'What are the matters over which freemen, or the general body of citizens—the sort of people who neither have wealth nor can make any claim on the ground of goodness—should properly exercise sovereignty?'* Of course there is a danger in people of this sort sharing in the highest offices, as injustice may lead them into wrongdoing, and thoughtlessness into error. But there is also a serious risk in not letting them have some share of power; for a city with a body of disfranchised citizens who are numerous and poor must necessarily be a city which is full of enemies. The alternative left is to let them share in the deliberative and judicial functions. This is why Solon, and some of the other legislators, allow the people to elect officials and to call them to account at the end of their tenure of office, but not to hold office themselves in their individual capacity. When they all meet together, the people display a good enough gift of perception, and combined with the better class they are of service to the city (just as impure food, when it is mixed with pure, makes the whole concoction more nutritious than a small amount of the pure would be); but each of them is imperfect in the judgements he forms by himself.

1281^{b}38 But this arrangement of the constitution presents some difficulties. The first difficulty is that it may well be held that the function of judging when medical attendance has been properly given should belong to those whose profession it is to attend patients and cure the complaints from which they suffer—in a word, to members of the medical profession.* The same may be held to be true of all other professions and arts; and just as medical men should have their conduct examined before a body of medics, so, too, should those who follow other professions have theirs examined before a body of members of their own profession. But the term 'medic' is applied to the ordinary practitioner, to the specialist who directs the course of treatment, and to someone who has some general knowledge of the art of medicine. (There are people of this last type to be found in connection with nearly all the arts.) We credit those who have a general knowledge with the power of judging as much as we do the experts. When we turn to consider the matter of election, the same principles would appear to apply. To make a proper election is equally the work of experts. It is the work of those who are versed in geometry to choose a geometrician, or again, of those who are acquainted with steering to choose a steersman; and even if, in some occupations and arts, there are some non-experts who also share in the ability to choose, they do not share in a higher degree than the experts. It would thus appear, on this line of argument, that the people should not be made sovereign, either in the matter of election of magistrates or in that of their examination.

1282^{a}14 It may be, however, that these arguments are not altogether well founded for the reason given above—provided, that is to say, that the people is not too debased in character. Each individual may indeed be a worse judge than the experts; but all, when they meet together, are either better than experts or at any rate no worse. In the second place, there are a number of arts in which the craftsman is not the only, or even the best, judge. These are the arts whose products can be understood even by those who do not possess any skill in the art. A house, for instance, is something which can be understood by others besides the builder: indeed the user of a house, or in other words the householder, will judge it even better than he does. In the same way a steersman will judge a rudder better than a shipwright does; and the diner, not the cook, will be the best judge of a feast.

1282^{a}23 The first difficulty would appear to be answered sufficiently by these considerations. But there is a second difficulty still to be faced, which is connected with the first. It would seem to be absurd that people of poor character should be sovereign on issues which are more important than those assigned to the better sort of citizens. The election of officials, and their examination at the end of their tenure, are the most important of issues; and yet there are constitutions, as we have seen, under which these issues are assigned to the people, since the assembly is sovereign in all such matters. To add to the difficulty, membership of the assembly, which carries deliberative and judicial functions, is vested in people of little property and of any age; but a high property qualification is demanded from those who serve as treasurers or generals, or hold any of the highest offices.

1282^{a}32 This difficulty too may, however, be met in the same way as the first; and the practice followed in these constitutions is perhaps, after all, correct. It is not the individual juryman, councillor, or assemblyman, who is vested with office, but the court, the council, or the popular assembly; and in these bodies each member, whether he be a councillor, an assemblyman, or a juryman, is simply a part of the whole. It is therefore just that the people should be sovereign on the more important issues, since the assembly, the council, and the court consist of many people. Moreover, the property owned by all these people is greater than that of those who either as individuals or as members of small bodies hold the highest offices.

1282^{a}41 This may serve as a settlement of the difficulties which have been discussed. But the discussion of the first of these difficulties leads to one conclusion above all others.

Rightly constituted laws should be [the final] sovereign;* but rulers, whether one or many, should be sovereign in those matters on which law is unable, owing to the difficulty of framing general rules for all contingencies, to make an exact pronouncement. But what rightly constituted laws ought to be is a matter that is not yet clear; and here we are still confronted by the difficulty stated at the end of the previous chapter. Laws must be good or bad, just or unjust in the same way as the constitutions to which they belong. The one clear fact is that laws must be laid down in accordance with constitutions; and if this is the case, it follows that laws which are in accordance with right constitutions must necessarily be just, and laws which are in accordance with perverted constitutions must be unjust.

CHAPTER 12

Justice is the political good. It involves equality, or the distribution of equal amounts to those who are equal. But who are equals, and by what criterion are they to be reckoned as equals? Many criteria can be applied; but the only proper criterion, in a political society, is that of contribution to the function of that society. Those who are equal in that respect should receive equal amounts: those who are superior or inferior should receive superior or inferior amounts, in proportion to the degree of their superiority or inferiority. If all are thus treated proportionately to the contribution they make, all are really receiving equal treatment; for the proportion between contribution and reward is the same in every case. The sort of equality which justice involves is thus proportionate equality; and this is the essence of distributive justice.

1282^{b}14 In all branches of knowledge and in every kind of craft the end in view is some good. In the most sovereign of these, the capacity for [leadership in] political matters, the end in view is the greatest good and the good which is most to be pursued. The good in the sphere of politics is justice;* and justice consists in what tends to promote the common interest. General opinion makes it consist in some sort of equality. Up to a point this agrees with the philosophical inquiries which contain our conclusions on ethics.* In other words, it holds that justice involves two factors—things, and those to whom things are assigned—and it considers that those who are equal should have assigned to them equal things. But here there arises a question which must not be overlooked. Equals and unequals—yes; but equals and unequals in what? This is a question which raises difficulties, and involves us in philosophical speculation on politics. It is possible to argue that offices and honours ought to be distributed unequally on the basis of superiority in any kind of goodness whatsoever—even if those concerned are similar, and do not differ, in any other respect. The reason is that where people differ from one another there must be a difference in what is just and proportionate to their merits. If this argument were right, the mere fact of a better complexion, or greater height, or any other such advantage, would establish a claim for a greater share of political rights to be given to its possessor. But is not the argument obviously wrong? To be clear that it is, we have only to consider other kinds of knowledge and ability. In dealing with a number of equally skilled flute-players, you should not assign a better supply of flutes to those who are better born. Rather those who are better at the job should be given the better supply of tools. If our point is not yet plain, it can be made so if we push it still further. Let us suppose someone who is superior to others in flute-playing, but far inferior in birth and beauty. Even if birth and beauty are greater goods than ability to play the flute, and even if those who possess them may surpass the flute-player proportionately more in these qualities than he surpasses them in his flute-playing, the fact remains that he is the one who ought to get the superior flutes. Superiority, whether in birth or in wealth, ought to contribute something to the performance of that function; and here these qualities contribute nothing to such performance.

1283^{a}3 There is a further objection. If we accept this argument, every quality will have to be commensurable with every other. You will begin by reckoning a given degree of (say) height as superior to a given degree of some other quality, and you will thus be driven to pit height in general against (say) wealth and birth in general. But on this basis—i.e. that, *in a given case*, A is counted as excelling in height to a greater degree than B does in goodness, and that, *in general*, height is counted as excelling to a greater degree than goodness does—qualities are made commensurable. [We are involved in mere arithmetic]; for if amount X of some quality is 'better' than amount Y of some other, some amount which is other than X must clearly be equal to it [i.e. must be *equally* good].* This is impossible. It is therefore clear that in matters political there is no good reason for basing a claim to the exercise of authority on any and every kind of superiority. (Some may be swift and others slow; but this is no reason why the one should have more, and the other less—it is in athletic contests that the superiority of the swift receives its reward.) Claims must be based on the elements which constitute the being of the city. There are thus good grounds for the claims to honour which are made by people of good descent, free birth, or wealth, since those who hold office must necessarily be free men and pay the property assessment. (A city could not be composed entirely of those without means, any more than it could be composed entirely of slaves.) But we must add that if wealth and free birth are necessary elements, the qualities of being just and being a good soldier are also necessary. These too are elements which must be present if people are to live together in a city. The one difference is that the first two elements are necessary for the simple existence of a city, and the last two for its good life.

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CHAPTER 13

This raises the question, What constitutes a contribution to the purpose of a political society? Wealth, birth, goodness, and the aggregate quality of numbers, may all claim to be contributors. How are these rival claims to be reconciled when they all coexist in the same society? A case may be made in favour of the aggregate quality of numbers; but a case may also be made in favour of the single man of exceptional and outstanding goodness. Such a man must either be made a king or sent into

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exile. The democratic policy of ostracism means a choice of the latter alternative; and the proportion, or balance, needed in a constitution is certainly disturbed if any one element is outstandingly eminent. On the other hand it cannot be just, in a good constitution, to refuse the recognition which is due to a man of outstanding goodness; and such a man should not be banished, but should rather be made a king. We are thus brought to the subject of kingship.

1283^{a}23 If we are thinking in terms of contribution to the state's existence, all of the elements mentioned, or at any rate several of them, may properly claim to be recognized [in the award of honours and office]; but if we are thinking in terms of contribution to its good life, then culture and goodness,* as we have noted already, may be regarded as having the justest claim. On the other hand—since it is not right for those who are equal in one respect, and only in one, to have an equal share of all things, or for those who are unequal in one respect to have unequal shares of everything—all such constitutions must be perversions. We have noted already that there is a certain sense in which all are justified in the claims they advance, though none of them is absolutely justified. √(a) The rich are justified to the extent that they have a larger share of the land, which is a matter of common concern: they are also, as a rule, more reliable in matters of contract. √(b) The free and the nobly born may claim recognition together as being closely connected. The better-born are citizens to a greater extent than the low-born; and good birth has always honour in its own country. In addition the descendants of better men are likely to be better; good birth means goodness of stock. √(c) Similarly we may also allow that goodness [of mind and character] has a just claim; for in our view the virtue of justice is goodness in matters of common concern and is necessarily accompanied by all other forms of goodness.* √(d) Lastly, the many have a justified claim against the few: taken together and compared with the few they are stronger, richer, and better.

1283^{a}42 Suppose these—I mean the good, the wealthy, and well-born, and some general body of citizens—all living together in a single city. Will there or will there not be a dispute about which of them is to rule? The decision about who should rule is not a matter of dispute in any of the constitutions we have mentioned. These constitutions differ in virtue of different groups being sovereign: one of them is distinguished by sovereignty being vested in the wealthy; another by its being vested in the good; and so with each of the rest. But we should consider how the matter is to be decided when these claims are present at the same time. Suppose, for example, that the good are exceedingly few in number: how are we to settle their claim? Should we consider the fact that they are few in the light of the function they have to discharge and ask therefore whether they will be able to manage a city? Or should we ask whether they are numerous enough to compose one?

1283$^{\mathrm{b}}$13 Here there arises a difficulty which applies to all the different claimants for political honours. It may be held that those who base their claim to rule on the ground of wealth have no case, and neither do those who base it on birth. The reason for thinking this is that if there is any one man who in turn is richer than all the rest, this one man must rule over all on the very same ground of justice; and similarly any one man who is pre-eminent in point of good birth must carry the day over those who base their claim on the ground of free birth. The same thing could perhaps happen even in aristocracies based on the claim of goodness. If someone is a better man than all the other good men who belong to the civic body, this one man should be sovereign on the very same ground of justice. Similarly if the reason why the Many should be sovereign is their being stronger than the Few, then if one man is stronger than all the rest—or if a group of more than one, but fewer than the Many, is stronger—these should be sovereign instead of the Many.

1283$^{\mathrm{b}}$27 All these considerations would seem to prove that none of the principles, in virtue of which people claim to rule and to have all others subject to their rule, is right. Take, for example, those who claim to be sovereign over the citizen body on the ground of goodness; or, equally, those who base their claim on the ground of wealth. The claims of both may be justly challenged by the masses; for there is nothing to prevent the Many—collectively if not individually—from being better, or richer, than the Few. This last reflection enables us to meet a difficulty which is sometimes raised and discussed. The difficulty is this. Suppose that the situation just mentioned does occur [i.e. that the Many are actually better, taken as a whole, than the Few]: what, in that case, is the proper policy for a lawgiver who wishes to enact right laws to the best of his power? Should he direct his legislation to the benefit of the better sort or should he direct it to that of the majority? [We may reply that] what is 'right' should be understood as what is 'equally right'; and what is 'equally right' is what is for the benefit of the whole city and for the common good of its citizens. The citizen is, in general, one who shares in the civic life of ruling and being ruled in turn. But this varies from constitution to constitution; and under the best constitution he must be one who is able and willing to rule and be ruled with a view to attaining a way of life in keeping with goodness.

1284$^{\mathrm{a}}$3 If there is one person (or several people, but yet not enough to form the full complement of a city) so pre-eminently superior in goodness that there can be no comparison between the goodness and political capacity which he shows (or several show, when there is more than one) and what is shown by the rest, such a person, or such people, can no longer be treated as part of a city. An injustice will be done to them if they are treated as worthy only of an equal share, when they are so greatly superior to others in goodness and political capacity; for someone of this sort may very well be like a god among men. This being the case, it is clear that legislation is necessarily limited to those who are equal in birth and capacity. There can be no law governing people of this kind. They are a law in themselves. It would be a folly to attempt to legislate for them: they might reply to such an attempt with the words used by the lions,* in the fable of Antisthenes, when the hares were making orations and claiming that all the animals should have equal status.

1284$^{\mathrm{a}}$17 Reasons of this nature will serve to explain why democratic cities institute the rule of ostracism.* Such cities are held to aim at equality above anything else; and with that aim in view they used to pass a sentence of ostracism on those whom they regarded as having too much influence owing to their wealth or the number of their connections or any other form of political strength. There is a story that the Argonauts left Heracles behind for this sort of reason; and the Argo itself refused to have him among the crew because he was so greatly superior to all the others. From this point of view we cannot altogether regard as just the strictures passed by the critics of tyranny on the advice once given by Periander to Thrasybulus.* According to the story, Periander said nothing to the messenger who had been sent [by Thrasybulus] for his advice; he simply chopped off the outstanding ears and thus levelled the corn [in the field where he was standing]. The messenger did not understand the meaning of his action, and merely reported the incident; but Thrasybulus guessed that he should cut off the outstanding men in the city. It is not only tyrants who may derive some benefit from this policy; nor is it only tyrants who put it into practice. Oligarchies and democracies are both in the same position; and ostracism has, in its way, the same effect of pulling down and banishing men of outstanding influence. Those who have gained an ascendancy apply the same sort of policy to other cities and peoples. The Athenians, for instance, acted in this way to Samos, Chios, and Lesbos:* once they had gained a firm grip of their empire, they humbled these cities, in violation of their former treaties. The King of the Persians did the same to the Medes, the Babylonians, and any of the others who were made presumptuous by memories of having once had an empire themselves.

1284^{b}3 The difficulty which we are discussing is one which is common to all forms of government, the right as well as the wrong; perverted forms adopt this policy of levelling with a view to their own particular interest, but the same is also true even of forms which look to the common good. This rule of proportion may also be observed in the arts and sciences generally. A painter would not permit a figure to have a foot which exceeded the bounds of symmetry, however beautiful it might be. A shipwright would not tolerate a stern, or any

other part of a ship, which was out of proportion. A choirmaster would not admit to a choir a singer with a stronger and a finer voice than any of the other members. For this reason nothing prevents monarchs who behave in this way from being in harmony with the cities [over which they rule]—provided that their own rule is beneficial to these cities; and thus the argument in favour of ostracism possesses a kind of political justice in relation to any recognized forms of pre-eminence. It is better if the legislator so frames a constitution initially that it never needs any such remedy; but the next best course, should the need arise, is to correct it by this sort of device. Actually, this is not what has happened in cities; instead of looking to the interest of their own particular constitution, they have resorted to acts of ostracism in a spirit of faction.

1284^{b}22 So far as perverted forms are concerned, it is clear that the ostracism is expedient and just from their own point of view—though perhaps it is also clear that it is not absolutely just. But in the best constitution a serious difficulty arises. It does not arise in regard to pre-eminence in other qualities such as political strength, or wealth, or an abundance of connections but where there is someone of outstanding excellence. 'What is to be done in that case?' Nobody would say that such a man ought to be banished and sent into exile. But neither would any one say that he ought to be subject to others. That would be like claiming to rule over Zeus, according to some division of offices.* The only alternative left—and this would also appear to be the natural course—is for all others to pay a willing obedience to the man of outstanding goodness. Such men will accordingly be the permanent kings in their cities.

D: Kingship and its Forms (Chapters 14–18)

CHAPTER 14

There are five forms of kingship: (1) the Spartan form; (2) kingship among barbarian peoples; (3) the dictatorship or elective form of tyranny; (4) the kingship of the Heroic Age; (5) absolute kingship, with the king exercising a plenary power like that which a father exercises over his household.

1284ᵇ35 It will perhaps be well, after the previous discussion, to make a transition, and to proceed to consider kingship, since this is, in our view, one of the right constitutions. The question we have to consider is whether this form of government is to the advantage of cities or territories which are to be properly governed; or whether this is not so and some other form is more advantageous—or, at any rate, more advantageous in some cases, even if it is not in others. We must begin by determining whether there is only one kind of kingship, or whether it has several varieties. It is easy to see that it includes a number of different kinds, and that the style of government is not the same in all these kinds.

1285ᵃ3 The kind of kingship to be found in the constitution of Sparta is regarded as the best example of kingship under law. But it involves no general sovereignty: a Spartan king simply has charge of military matters when he goes outside the country; matters of religious observance are also vested in ① the kings. This form of kingship is like a generalship with absolute command and permanent tenure. A king of this sort does not have the power to put anyone to death, except on grounds of cowardice, as happened on military expeditions in ancient times, by right of superior force. Homer may be cited as evidence: for Agamemnon was patient under abuse in the presence of the assembly, but exercised the power of life and death on the field of battle. At any rate he says:

> ✓Whomso I find apart from the fight . . . he shall have no hope of
> escaping:
> Dogs and vultures shall rend him; for mine is the power to command
> death.*

One type of kingship is thus a military command held for life; some of these are hereditary and others elective.

1285ᵃ16 Another type of kingship is the sort which is to be found among some barbarian peoples. Kingships of this sort ② all possess an authority similar to that of tyrannies; but they are, none the less, governed by law, and they descend from father to son. The reason is that these barbarian peoples are more servile in character than Greeks (as the peoples of Asia are more servile than those of Europe); and they therefore tolerate despotic rule without any complaint. So these kingships have the nature of tyrannies; but, being in accordance with law, they are at the same time stable. সুস্থিত For the same reason the bodyguards used in such cities are such as suit kings, and not tyrants. Kings are guarded by the arms of their subjects; tyrants by a foreign force. Ruling according to law, and with the consent of their subjects, kings have bodyguards drawn from their subjects: the tyrant has a [foreign] bodyguard to protect himself against them.

1285ᵃ29 These are two types of monarchy; but there is also a third, which used to exist among the ancient Greeks, and which goes by the name of *aisumnēteia*. This may be roughly described as an elective form of tyranny. It differs from kingship among the barbarians, not in being outside the law, but only in being non-hereditary. ③ Some of these held office for life: others for a fixed period, or for the discharge of a definite task. Pittacus,* শাসক for instance, was elected at Mytilene দ্বীপ to deal with the attacks of the exiles commanded by Antimenides and the poet Alcaeus. The fact of the election of Pittacus is attested by Alcaeus, in one of his drinking songs, where he bitterly says:

> ✓Meanly born Pittacus over their gall-less and heaven-doomed city
> Was enthroned by them for their tyrant, with clamour of praise, in
> the throng of the hustings.

1285ᵇ2 These forms of government were, and still are,

Antimenides + Alcaeus = দুজন নির্বাসিতগণ
নেতৃত্বে আক্রমণকে রোধ করার
জন্য Pittacus কে নির্বাচিত করা

tyrannies in their despotic power, but kingships in being elective and in resting on the assent of their subjects. But there is a fourth type of kingship—those of the Heroic Age rested on consent, and descended from father to son, in accordance with law. The founders of royal lines had been benefactors of their people in the arts or in war: they had drawn them together in a city, or provided them with territory; and they had thus become kings by general consent, and had established kingships which descended to their successors. Such kings had the sovereign functions of being commanders in war, and of offering such sacrifices as did not require a priest; they were also judges in legal actions. Sometimes they judged upon oath, and sometimes without oath: the form of the oath, when they took one, was the lifting up of their sceptre. In ancient times they enjoyed a permanent authority, which included urban, rural, and foreign affairs: at a later date they relinquished some of their prerogatives: others were taken away by the masses; in some cities only the [conduct of] sacrifices was left to the kings. Even where it could be said that a real kingship still existed, they kept only the power of military command in foreign expeditions. ④

1285b20 There are thus these four types of kingship: (1) the kingship of the Heroic Age, based on general consent but limited to a number of definite functions, with the king acting as general and judge and the head of religious observances; (2) the type of kingship among barbarian peoples, with the king exercising, by right of descent, a despotic authority, albeit in accordance with law; (3) kingship of the type which is termed *aisumnēteia*, and which is an elective form of tyranny; and (4) the Spartan type of kingship, which may be roughly defined as a permanent command of the army exercised by right of descent. These four types differ from one another in the ways just mentioned; but there is still a fifth type of kingship. This is the absolute type, where a single person is sovereign on every issue, with the same sort of power that a tribe or a city exercises over its public concerns. ⑤ It is a type which corresponds to paternal rule over a household. Just as household government is kingship over a family, so conversely this type of kingship may be regarded as household government exercised over a city, or a tribe, or a collection of tribes.

CHAPTER 15

Only the last of the five forms of kingship mentioned in the last chapter needs special examination. It raises the problem of personal rule versus the rule of law. There are arguments on either side: personal rule has the quality of initiative; the rule of law has that of impartiality. The rule of law is of major importance, and should be the main factor in all constitutions, including kingship, which should therefore be a constitutional kingship limited by law. There are, however, matters of detail which cannot be settled by law. Even so, the question arises whether such matters are best settled by one person, or by a number of people. The balance is in favour of a number of people. Where government by a single person exists, in the form of kingship, it raises two special problems: should it be hereditary, and should it be backed by a guard or standing army?

1285b33 For practical purposes there are only two types of kingship which we need consider—the type just mentioned, and the Spartan type. Most of the others are intermediate between these two: their kings are sovereign to a lesser extent than they are in the absolute type but to a greater extent than in the Spartan type. Thus our inquiry is practically reduced to two issues. The first is the issue whether it is expedient for cities to have a permanent general (either on a hereditary basis, or on some scheme of rotation). The second is the issue whether it is expedient or not that one man should be sovereign in all matters.

1286a2 Examining generalship of the kind just mentioned is more a matter of laws than of constitutions, since it may exist under any form of constitution; and we may therefore dismiss the first question for the present. The other type of kingship [absolute kingship] is a form of constitution; and we are therefore bound to study it philosophically, and to examine briefly the difficulties which it involves. Our inquiry starts from the general problem, 'Is it more advantageous to be ruled by the one best man, or by the best laws?'*

1286^{a}9 Those who hold that kingship is advantageous argue that law can only lay down general rules; it cannot issue commands to deal with events as they happen; and following written rules is therefore foolish in any art whatever.* In Egypt doctors are rightly permitted to alter the rules of treatment after the first four days, though a doctor who alters them earlier does so at his own risk. It is clear, for the same reason, that a constitution based on the letter and rules of law is not the best constitution. But, of course, that general principle must also be present in the rulers. That from which the element of passion is wholly absent is better than that to which passion naturally clings. This element [of passion] is not to be found in law but must always be present in the human mind. The rejoinder may, however, be made that the individual mind, for its part, can deliberate better, and decide better, on particular issues.

1286^{a}21 It is surely clear that [the one best man] must be a lawgiver, and there must be a body of laws, but these laws must not be sovereign where they fail to hit the mark—though they must be so in all other cases. But in cases which cannot be decided at all, or cannot be decided properly, by law, should rule be exercised by the one best man or by the whole of the people?

1286^{a}26 In the actual practice of our own day the people gather together to judge, to deliberate, and to make decisions. These decisions are all concerned with particular matters. Any individual, so far as his own contribution is concerned, may be inferior. But the city is composed of many individuals; and just as a feast to which many contribute is better than one provided by a single person, so, and for the same reason, a crowd can come to a better decision, in many matters, than any one individual.

1286^{a}31 Again, a numerous body is less likely to be corrupted. In the same way that a larger volume of water [is not so liable to pollution], the people is not so liable to corruption as the few. The judgement of a single man is bound to be corrupted when he is overpowered by anger, or by any other

similar emotion; but it is no easy task to make everyone get angry and go wrong simultaneously. Suppose that the people are all freemen, do nothing contrary to law, and act outside it only in matters which law is obliged to omit. This may not be easy when many people are involved but if the majority are both good men and good citizens, which will be the more likely to be free from corruption—the one man, or the greater number who are all good men? Is not the balance clearly in favour of the greater number?

1286^{b}1 May the many not be subject to faction, from which the one man will be free? It is perhaps an answer to this objection that they will be of good mental character just as the one man is. If we call by the name of aristocracy the rule of a number of people who are all good men, and by the name of kingship the rule of a single person, we may say that aristocracy is better for cities than kingship (whether rule is exercised by force or without force)—provided only that a number of people of similar character can be found.

1286^{b}8 Perhaps the reason why kingship was formerly common was because it was rare to find a number of men of outstanding goodness—all the more as the cities they inhabited were small. A further reason why kings were appointed was that they were benefactors—as is the function of good men. Later when it came about that there were a number of people of equal goodness, they no longer held back but sought to have something they could share in common, and so established a constitution. Later still, they deteriorated in character and enriched themselves from the public property. It is to some such origin that we may reasonably ascribe the rise of oligarchy, since they began to hold wealth in honour. From oligarchies there was first a change to tyrannies, and then from tyrannies to democracy. The reason was that, greedy for the gains which office conferred, they limited it to a narrower and narrower circle; and by this policy they strengthened the masses until they rose in rebellion and established democracies. Since cities have become still larger, we may perhaps say that it is now difficult for any form of constitution apart from democracy to exist.*

1286^{b}22 If kingship be accepted as the best form of government for cities, what is to be the position of the king's children? Are we to say that his descendants should also be kings? If they turn out as some of them have done, the result will be mischievous. It may be argued that a king, even if he has the power to do so, will not hand over the crown to his children [if they are unsuitable]. But that is hardly to be believed: it is a difficult thing to do, and it needs a degree of goodness greater than is consonant with human nature.

1286^{b}27 Another question, which raises difficulties, is that of the force which the one who is to be king should have; should he have his own bodyguard which will enable him to coerce those who are unwilling to obey? If not, how can he possibly manage to govern? Even if he were a sovereign who ruled according to law and who never acted according to his own wishes outside the law, he must necessarily have a force in order to guard the law. In the case of a king of this sort [who rules according to law] it is perhaps easy to settle the question. He ought to have some force, which should be enough to make his power greater than that commanded by any one individual or any group of individuals but less than that of the people. This was the nature of the bodyguard assigned in ancient times, when someone was made head of the city under the title of *aisumnētēs* or tyrant. It was also the size of the force which someone at Syracuse advised the people to give to Dionysius when he asked for a bodyguard.

CHAPTER 16

The general considerations of the previous chapter, so far as they favour kingship at all, are in favour of a constitutional and limited kingship. But the question still remains whether a case can be made in favour of an absolute kingship. It may be objected to such a form of kingship that it is contrary to the idea of a free society of equals, and adverse to the rule of law. True, the rule of an absolute king may be defended on the ground of his expert knowledge; and the analogy of science and the arts may be invoked in his favour. But the analogy does not really hold; and in any case expert knowledge is more likely to reside in a number of people than in one. So far, therefore, the conclusion would seem to be adverse to absolute monarchy—at any rate on general grounds.

1287^{a}1 The argument which now confronts us, and the inquiry we have still to attempt, is concerned with the king who does everything at his own discretion. What is called 'kingship under the law', as has already been noted,* is not in itself a form of constitution. A permanent military command may exist in any form of constitution—for example, in a democracy or an aristocracy; and in the sphere of civil administration too there are a number of cities with different forms of constitution which make a single person sovereign: there is an office of this kind at Epidamnus, for instance, and another, though with somewhat more limited powers, at Opus. But what is called a *pambasileia* is a form of constitution in which a king governs at his own discretion over the whole population. Now there are some who take the view that the sovereignty of one man over all the other members of a city is not even natural in any case where a city is composed of equals. On this view those who are alike by nature are naturally entitled to receive the same justice and enjoy the same status. It is harmful for our bodies if those who are unequal have equal amounts of food and clothing; the same goes for [offices and] honours. Similarly it is harmful for those who are equal to have unequal shares. For this reason justice means being ruled as well as ruling, and therefore involves rotation of office. But when we come to that, we already come to law; for such an arrangement is law. The rule of law is therefore preferable, according to the view we are stating, to that of a single citizen. In pursuance of the same view it is argued that, even if it be the better course to have individuals ruling, they should be made 'law-guardians'* or 'servants' of the law. There must, it is admitted, be public offices; but these, it is urged, cannot be vested in one man, consistently with justice, when all are alike.

1287^{a}23 Furthermore, if there are a number of cases which law seems unable to determine, it is also true that a human being would be equally unable to find an answer to these cases. Law trains the holders of office expressly in its own spirit, and then sets them to decide and settle those residuary issues which it cannot regulate, 'as justly as in them lies'.* It also allows them to introduce any improvements which may seem to them, as the result of experience, to be better than the existing laws. He who commands that law should rule may thus be regarded as commanding that God and reason alone should rule; he who commands that a man should rule adds the character of the beast.* Appetite has that character; and high spirit, too, perverts the holders of office, even when they are the best of men. Law is thus 'reason without desire'.

1287ᵃ32 The parallel of the arts is false since medical treatment according to the rules of a textbook is a poor sort of thing, and it is very much better to use the services of those who possess professional skill. Physicians never act in defiance of reason from motives of partiality: they cure their patients and earn their fee. Politicians in office have a habit of doing a number of things in order to spite [their enemies] or favour [their friends]. If patients suspected physicians of conspiring with their enemies to destroy them for their own profit, they would be more inclined to seek for treatment by the rules of a textbook. Again, physicians, when they are ill, call in other physicians to attend them; and trainers, when they are in training, use the services of other trainers, on the grounds that they cannot judge truly themselves because they are judging in their own case under the influence of their own feelings. This shows that to seek for justice is to seek for a neutral standard; and law is a neutral* standard. But laws resting on unwritten custom are even more sovereign, and concerned with issues of still more sovereign importance, than written laws; and this suggests that, even if the rule of a man be safer than the rule of written law, it need not therefore be safer than the rule of unwritten law.

1287ᵇ8 A further objection [to the rule of a single man] is that it is difficult for one person to exercise oversight over many things. He will thus find it necessary to appoint a number of officers to give him assistance. But is there any real difference between having these officers at the start and having them appointed by the choice of a single man? We may add a point which has already been made. If the good man has a just title to rule because he is better than others, then two good men are better than one. This is what is meant by

> Two men going together*

and the prayer of Agamemnon

> Would that I had ten men for my counsellors like unto Nestor.*

In our own day, too, we find a number of offices, such as jurymen, for example, who are vested with a power of decision on certain issues on which the law is not competent to pronounce; for no one disputes the fact that law will be the best ruler and judge on the issues on which it is competent.

1287ᵇ19 It is because there are some matters which law can include within its scope and others which it cannot, that difficulties arise and the question comes to be debated, 'Is the rule of the best law preferable to that of the best man?' Matters which belong to the sphere of deliberation, are obviously ones on which it is not possible to lay down a law. Those who advocate the rule of law do not deny that such matters ought to be judged by men; they claim only that they ought to be judged by many men rather than one.

1287ᵇ25 Anyone in office, if he has been trained by the law, will have a good judgement; and it may well be regarded as an absurdity that a single man should do better in seeing with two eyes, judging with two ears, or acting with two hands and feet, than many could do with many. Indeed, it is actually the practice of monarchs to take to themselves, as it were, many eyes and ears and hands and feet, and to use as colleagues those who are friendly towards their government and to them personally. If they are not friends they will not act in accordance with the monarch's policy. But if they are friends both to him personally and to his government, they will also be, as a man's friends always are, his equal and peers; and in believing that his friends should have office he is also committed to the belief that his equals and peers should have office.

These are the main arguments pressed by those who argue against the cause of kingship.

CHAPTER 17

There may, however, be a particular sort of society in which absolute kingship ought to be instituted. This is the sort of society in which one family, or one person, is of merit so outstanding as to surpass all the other members. Here justice and propriety may be argued to require that there should be absolute kingship, with plenary power and no limit to tenure.

1287^{b}36 These arguments, however, may be true when applied to some peoples, but not when applied to others. There is one sort of people which is meant by its nature for rule of the despotic type, another for rule by a king, and another still for rule of a constitutional type;* what is just and expedient varies accordingly. (But there is no society which is meant by its nature for rule of the tyrannical type, or for rule of the other types found in wrong or perverted constitutions: the societies that are under such types of rule have fallen into an unnatural condition.) What has just been said is sufficient to show that in a group whose members are equal and peers it is neither expedient nor just that one man should be sovereign over all others. This is equally true whether laws are absent, with the one man ruling as a law in himself, or are present; it is true whether the one man is a good man ruling over the good, or a bad man ruling over the bad; it is even true when the one man is superior in goodness unless his superiority be of a special character. We have now to say what that character is—though it has already been in some sense explained in an earlier passage.*

1288^{a}6 We must first determine what sorts of group are suitable for kingship, for aristocracy, and for government of the constitutional type. A people suitable for kingship is one of the sort which naturally tends to produce some particular stock [or family] pre-eminent in its capacity for political leadership. A people suitable for aristocracy is one which naturally tends to produce a stock capable of being ruled, in a manner suitable to free men, by those with the quality of leadership in their capacity for political rule. A people suitable for government of the constitutional type is one in which there naturally exists a stock possessing military capacity who can rule and be ruled under a system of law which distributes offices among the wealthy in proportion to merit.*

1288^{a}15 When it happens that the whole of a family, or a single individual among the ordinary people, is of merit so outstanding as to surpass that of all the rest, it is only just that this family should be vested with kingship and absolute sovereignty, or that this single person should become king. As we said earlier,* this is in accordance with the kind of justice which is usually pleaded in establishing any form of constitution—be it aristocratic or oligarchic, or be it, again, democratic. All forms alike recognize the claim of some sort of superiority, though the kind of superiority in question varies. Here, however, there is a special ground which we have already had reason to mention, namely that it would be improper, of course, to execute a man of outstanding superiority, to banish him permanently, to ostracize him, or to require him to take his turn at being a subject under a system of rotation. A whole is never intended by nature to be inferior to a part; and a man so greatly superior to others stands to them in the relation of a whole to its parts. The only course which remains is that he should receive obedience, and should have sovereign power without any limit of tenure, not turn by turn* with others.

1288^{a}30 These may serve as our conclusions in regard to kingship, and as our answers to the questions: what are its different forms? is it, or is it not, advantageous to cities? and, if it be so, to what cities, and under what conditions, is it advantageous?

CHAPTER 18

We may now turn to inquire by what means a good constitution, be it an aristocracy or a kingship, should be brought into existence. The same means must be used to make a good constitution as are used to make a good man. We are thus led to inquire into the nature of the good life, which is the aim of both the good man and the good constitution.

1288a32 We have laid it down that there are three types of right constitution, and that the best of these must be the one which is administered by the best. This is the type in which there is a single man, or a whole family, or a number of people, surpassing all others in goodness and where ruled as well as rulers are fitted to play their part in the attainment of the most desirable mode of life. We have also shown, at the beginning of our inquiry, that the goodness of the good man, and that of the good citizen of the best city, must be one and the same. It clearly follows that just the same method, and just the same means, by which a man becomes good, should also be used to achieve the creation of a city on the pattern of aristocracy or kingship; and thus the training and habits of action which make a good man are the same as those which make a good statesman or a good king.

1288b2 These issues determined, we must next attempt to treat of the best form of constitution, asking ourselves, 'Under what conditions does it tend to arise, and how can it be established?' In order to make a proper inquiry into this subject it is necessary . . .*

BOOK IV

ACTUAL CONSTITUTIONS AND THEIR VARIETIES

A: Introductory (Chapters 1–2)

CHAPTER 1

Politics, like other branches of knowledge, must consider not only the ideal, but also the various problems of the actual—e.g. which is the best constitution practicable in the given circumstances; what are the best means of preserving actual constitutions; which is the best average constitution for the majority of cities; what are the different varieties of the main types of constitution, and especially of democracy and oligarchy. Politics, too, must consider not only constitutions, but also laws, and the proper relation of laws to constitutions.

1288b10 It is true of all those practical arts and those branches of knowledge which are complete in the sense that they cover the whole of a subject rather than dealing with it in a piecemeal fashion, that each of them has to consider the different methods appropriate to the different categories of its subject. For instance, the art of physical training has to consider (1) which type of training is appropriate to which type of physique; (2) which is the best type of training (for the best type of training must be one which is suitable for the best endowed and best equipped physique); and (3) which is the type of training that can be generally applied to the majority of physiques—for that too is one of the problems to be solved by the art of physical training. Nor is this all. (4) If someone wants to have physical training, but does not want to attain the standard of skill and condition which is needed for competitions, it is the task of the trainer and the gymnastic master to impart the level of ability he requires. The same is obviously true of medicine, of shipbuilding, tailoring, and of all the other arts.

$1288^{b}21$ It follows that it is the task of the same branch of knowledge [i.e. politics] to consider first which is the best constitution, and what qualities a constitution must have to come closest to the ideal when there are no external factors to hinder its doing so, and secondly which sort of constitution suits which sort of civic body.* The attainment of the best constitution is likely to be impossible for many cities; and the good lawgiver and the true statesman must therefore have their eyes open not only to what is the absolute best, but also to what is the best in relation to actual conditions. A third task is to consider the sort of constitution which depends upon an assumption*—in other words, to study a given constitution with a view to explaining how it may have arisen and how it may be made to enjoy the longest possible life. The sort of case which we have in mind is one where a city has neither the [ideally] best constitution (nor even the elementary conditions needed for it) nor the best constitution possible under the actual conditions, but has only a constitution of an inferior type. In addition to all these tasks, it is important also to know the type of constitution which is best suited to cities in general. For this reason most of the writers who treat of politics, even if they deal well with other matters, fail when they come to matters of practical utility.* We have to study not only the best constitution, but ~~also the one~~ which is practicable, and likewise the one which is easiest to work and most suitable to cities generally.

$1288^{b}39$ As things are, some confine their investigations to the extreme of perfection, which requires large resources. Others, addressing themselves to what is more generally attainable, still do away with the constitutions that now exist, and simply extol the Spartan constitution or some other type. The sort of constitutional system which ought to be proposed is one such that people will have little difficulty in accepting it or taking part in it, given the system they already have. It is as difficult a matter to reform an old constitution as it is to construct a new one; as hard to unlearn a lesson as it was to learn it initially. The statesman [*politikos*], therefore, must not confine himself to the matters we have just mentioned: he must also be able, as we said previously,* to help any existing constitution. He cannot do so unless he knows how many different kinds of constitutions there are. As things are, people believe that there is only one sort of democracy and one sort of oligarchy. This is an error. To avoid that error, we must keep in mind the different varieties of each constitution; we must be aware of their number, and of the number of different ways in which they are constituted.

$1289^{a}11$ The same kind of understanding is needed to see which laws are [absolutely] best and which are appropriate to each constitution. Laws ought to be made to suit constitutions (as indeed in practice they always are), and not constitutions made to suit laws. The reason is this. A constitution is an organization of offices in a city, by which the method of their distribution is fixed, the sovereign authority is determined, and the nature of the end to be pursued by the association and all its members is prescribed.* Laws, apart from those that frame the constitution, are the rules by which the magistrates should exercise their powers, and should watch and check transgressors. It follows that one must always bear in mind both the varieties and the definition of each constitution, with a view to enacting appropriate laws. If there are several forms of democracy, and several forms of oligarchy, rather than a single form of each, the same laws cannot possibly be beneficial to all oligarchies or to all democracies.

CHAPTER 2

On this basis, after the general considerations of the previous book and the account of kingship and aristocracy there given, it remains to discuss the 'right' form of constitution called 'constitutional government' (polity) and the three 'perverted' forms called democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny. These three perversions may be graded in an ascending order—tyranny the worst; oligarchy the next worst; and democracy the least bad. The general programme of future inquiry is outlined.

$1289^{a}26$ In our first discussion of constitutions* we distinguished three varieties of right constitution (kingship, aristocracy, and 'constitutional government' [polity]), and three corresponding perversions of those varieties (tyranny being the perversion of kingship, oligarchy of aristocracy, and democracy of 'constitutional government'). Aristocracy and kingship have already been treated. To consider the best constitution is, in effect, to consider the two constitutions so named;* for, like the best constitution, they both aim to produce goodness of character duly equipped with the necessary means for its exercise. We have also defined, in a previous passage, the nature of the difference between aristocracy and kingship,* and we have explained when kingship should be established. It only remains, therefore, to discuss (1) 'constitutional government', which is called by the generic name common to all constitutions, and (2) the remaining constitutions: oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny.*

1289^{a}38 It is also obvious which of these perversions is the worst, and which of them is the next worst. The perversion of the first and the most nearly divine of the right constitutions must necessarily be the worst. Kingship must either be merely a name, without any substance, or be based on the fact of a king's great personal superiority. Tyranny, therefore, is the worst, and at the farthest remove of all the perversions from a true constitution: oligarchy, being as it is far removed from aristocracy, is the next worst: democracy is the most moderate [and so the least bad]. One of our predecessors* has already advanced the same view, but he used a different principle. On his principle all constitutions could have a good as well as a bad form; oligarchy, for example, could be good as well as bad; and going on this principle he ranked the good form of democracy as the worst of all the good forms of constitution, and the bad form of it as the best of all the bad. In our opinion these two constitutions, in any of their forms, are wholly on the side of error. It cannot properly be said that one form of oligarchy is better than another; it can only be said that one is not so bad as another.

1289^{b}11 But for the present we may leave aside discussion of this sort of judgement. We have, first, to enumerate the varieties of each type of constitution, on the assumption that democracy and oligarchy have each several different forms. Secondly, we have to examine what type of constitution, short of the best, is the most generally acceptable, and the most to be preferred; and if there is any other constitution of an aristocratic and well-constructed character but suitable, none the less, for adoption in most cities, we have to ask what that constitution is. Thirdly, and in regard to constitutions generally, we have to inquire which constitution is desirable for which sort of civic body. It is possible, for instance, that democracy rather than oligarchy may be necessary for one sort of civic body, and oligarchy rather than democracy for another. Fourthly we have to consider how someone who wishes to do so should set to work to establish these various constitutions—i.e. the different varieties both of democracy and oligarchy. Fifthly, when we have given a concise account of all these subjects, to the best of our power, we must attempt to handle a final theme. How are constitutions generally, and each constitution severally, liable to be destroyed; how can they be preserved; and what are the causes which particularly tend to produce these results?*

B: The Varieties of the Main Types of Constitution especially Democracy, Oligarchy, and 'Constitutional Government' or Polity (Chapters 3–10)

CHAPTER 3

The reason for the variety of constitutions is the varieties to be found in the 'parts' or social elements of the city—especially among the populace and the notables. A constitution is an arrangement of offices; and there will be as many constitutions as there are methods of distributing offices among the different parts of the city. There is a general opinion that there are only two sorts of constitutions, just as there are only two sorts of winds and two sorts of musical modes; but this is a simplification which cannot be accepted.

1289^{b}27 The reason why there are many different constitutions is to be found in the fact that every city has many different parts.* In the first place, every city is obviously composed of households. Secondly, in this number there are bound to be some rich, some poor, and some in the middle, with the rich possessing and the poor being without the equipment of the heavy-armed soldier. Thirdly, the common people [or *dēmos*] are engaged partly in agriculture, partly in trade, and partly in menial jobs. Fourthly, there are also differences among the notables—differences based on their wealth and the amount of their property; and these differences appear, for example, in the matter of keeping horses. This can only be done by the very wealthy, which is the reason why cities whose strength lay in cavalry were in former times the homes of oligarchies. These oligarchies used their cavalry in wars with adjoining cities: we may cite the examples of Eretria and Chalcis [in the island of Euboea] and of Magnesia on the Maeander and many other cities in Asia Minor. Besides differences of wealth, there is also difference of birth, and difference of merit; and there are differences based on other factors of the same order—factors already described as being parts of a city in our discussion of aristocracy,* where we distinguished and enumerated the essential parts from which every city is composed.

1290^{a}3 Sometimes all these parts share in the control of the constitution; sometimes only a few of them share; sometimes a number of them share. It thus follows clearly that there must be a number of constitutions, which differ from one another in kind. This is because the parts differ in kind from one another. A constitution is an arrangement in regard to the offices of the city. By this arrangement the citizen body distributes office, either on the basis of the power of those who participate in it, or on the basis of some sort of general equality (i.e. the equality of the poor, or of the rich, or an equality existing among both rich and poor). There must therefore be as many constitutions as there are modes of arranging the distribution of office according to the superiorities and the differences of the parts of the city.

1290^{a}13 There is indeed a prevalent opinion that there are only two constitutions. Just as winds, in ordinary speech, are simply described as north or south, and all other winds are treated as deviations from these, so constitutions are also described as democratic or oligarchical. On this basis aristocracy is classified as being a sort of oligarchy, under the heading of oligarchical, and similarly the so-called 'constitutional government' [polity] is classified under the heading of democracy—just as westerly winds are classified under the head of northerly, and easterly winds under that of southerly. The situation is much the same, so some people think, with the modes in music. In their case also two modes (the Dorian and the Phrygian)* are treated as basic and other arrangements are called by one or other of these two names. But though this is the prevalent view about constitutions in current opinion, we shall do better, and we shall come nearer the truth, if we classify them on a different basis, as has already been suggested.* On that basis we shall have one or two constitutions which are properly formed; all the others will be perversions of the best constitution (just as in music we may have perversions of the properly tempered modes); and these perversions will be oligarchical when they are too severe and dominant, and democratic when they are soft and relaxed.

Difference between Aligarchy and Democracy.

CHAPTER 4

Democracy does not mean only the rule of number: it also means the rule of a social class. Both criteria must be used to define democracy, as both number and social class must also be used to define oligarchy. On this basis we may now study the different varieties of democracy and oligarchy, which (as stated in the previous chapter) will depend on the varieties to be found in the 'parts' of different cities—i.e. on the different natures of their social composition. We shall accordingly classify the varieties of constitutions as we should classify the various species of animals—by the varieties of their parts and of the composition of those parts. We therefore proceed to enumerate the ten or so parts which go to the composition of a city, contrasting our enumeration with the different enumeration of Plato. We must also take note of the different forms assumed by the dēmos, *or populace, and also by the upper class, according as one or another part predominates in its make-up. This enables us to distinguish five varieties of democracy, in a descending scale which ends in 'extreme democracy'—a variety of democracy,* *analogous to tyranny, where law has ceased to be sovereign and the notion of a constitution has practically disappeared.*

1290a30 It ought not to be assumed, as some people are nowadays in the habit of doing, that democracy can be defined, without any qualification, as a form of constitution in which the greater number are sovereign.* Even in oligarchies, and indeed in all constitutions, the majority is sovereign.* Similarly, oligarchy cannot be simply defined as a form [of government] in which a few people have sovereignty over the constitution. Suppose that the total population is 1,300, that 1,000 of the 1,300 are wealthy, and that these 1,000 assign no share in office to the remaining 300 poor, although they are men of free birth and like them in other respects. Nobody will say that these people are democratically governed. Or suppose, again, that there are only a few poor men, but that they are stronger than the rich men who form the majority. Nobody would term such a constitution an oligarchy, if no share in official honours is given to the group that is rich. It is better, therefore, to say that democracy exists wherever the free-born are sovereign, and that oligarchy exists wherever the rich are sovereign, though it so happens that the former are many and the latter few—there are many who are free-born, but few who are rich. Otherwise* we should have an oligarchy if offices were distributed on the basis of height (as they are said to be in Ethiopia), or on the basis of looks; for the number of tall or good-looking men must always be small.

1290b7 Yet even this criterion [of poverty and wealth] is not sufficient to distinguish the constitutions in question. We have to remember that the democratic and the oligarchical city both contain a number of parts. We cannot, therefore, apply the term 'democracy' to a constitution under which those who are free-born rule a majority who are not free-born. (A system of this sort once existed at Apollonia, on the Ionian Gulf, and at Thera. In both of these cities honours and offices were reserved for those who were of the best birth—in the sense of being the descendants of the original settlers—though they were only a handful of the whole population.) Nor can we apply the term democracy to a constitution under which the rich are sovereign simply because they are more numerous than the poor. An example of such a constitution formerly existed at Colophon, where before the war with Lydia a majority of the citizens were the owners of large properties. There is a democracy when the free-born and poor control the government, being at the same time a majority; and similarly there is an oligarchy when the rich and better-born control the government, being at the same time a minority.

1290b21 The fact that there are a number of constitutions, and the cause of that fact, have been established. We must now explain why there are more constitutions than the two just mentioned [i.e. democracy and oligarchy], indicate what they are, and suggest the reasons for their existence. In doing so we may start from the principle which was previously stated, and which we can now take as agreed, that every city consists, not of one, but of many parts.

1290b25 If we aimed at a classification of the different kinds of animals, we should begin by enumerating what is necessary to every animal. These will include, for example, some of the sensory organs, organs for getting and digesting food, such as the mouth and the stomach, and, in addition, the organs of locomotion which are used by the different animals. Assuming that there are only so many of these organs and that they come in different forms—I mean that there are different forms of mouth, of stomach, of sensory organs, and of organs of locomotion, the number of possible combinations of these varieties will inevitably produce several different kinds of animals (for the same kind of animal cannot exhibit several varieties of mouth, or of ears). Thus when all the possible combinations have been taken into account they will produce different kinds of animals—as many kinds of animals as there are combinations of the necessary organs.

1290b37 It is just the same with the constitutions which have been mentioned. Cities too, as we have repeatedly noticed, are composed not of one but of many parts. One of these parts consists of all those people concerned with the production of food, or, as it is called, the farming class. A second, which is called the mechanical class, consists of those who are occupied in the various arts and crafts without which a city cannot be inhabited—some of them being necessities, and other contributing to luxury or to the living of a good life. A third part is what may be termed the marketing class; it includes all those who are occupied in buying and selling, either as merchants or as retailers. A fourth part is the class of hired labourers; and a fifth element is the defence force, which is no less necessary than the other four, if the population is not to be enslaved by invaders. For it is surely not possible to call a city by that name if it is naturally servile. Self-sufficiency is the mark of a city whereas the slave is not self-sufficient.

1291^{a}10 For this reason the account of this matter in the *Republic* [369d – 371e] is inadequate, though ingenious. 'Socrates' begins by stating that four elements are most necessary for the constitution of a city. He says that these are weavers, farmers, shoemakers, and builders. He then proceeds, on the ground that these four are not self-sufficient, to add other parts—smiths, herdsmen to tend the necessary cattle, merchants, and retail dealers. These are the parts which form the whole complement of the 'first city' which he sketches—as though every city merely existed for the supply of necessities, and not rather to achieve the Good, and as though it needed the shoemaker as much as it needs the farmer.

1291^{a}19 'Socrates' gives no part to the defence force until the growth of the city's territory, and contact with that of its neighbours, gets them involved in war. Moreover, even among the four original parts—or whatever may be the number of the elements forming the association—there needs to be someone to dispense justice, and to determine what is just. If the mind is to be reckoned as more essentially a part of a living being than the body, parts of a similar order must equally be reckoned as more essentially parts of the city than those which serve its basic needs. By this we mean the military part, the part concerned in the legal organization of justice, and (we may also add) the part engaged in deliberation, which is a function that needs the gift of political understanding. Whether the people these functions belong to are separate groups or the same, makes no difference to the argument. It often falls to the same people both to serve in the army and to till the fields. It is clear therefore that if these people are to be considered parts of the city alongside those first mentioned, then the element, at any rate, which bears arms is an essential part of the city.

1291^{a}33 The seventh part* consists of those who serve the city with their property. We call these the 'wealthy'. The eighth part serves the public and undertakes duties connected with public office. No city can exist without rulers; and there must therefore be people capable of discharging the duties of office and rendering the city that service, permanently or in rotation. There remain the parts we mentioned above: the deliberative part and the part which determines what is just when there is a dispute. If these parts ought not only to exist in all cities, but to exist in a way that is fine and just, it is essential that some of the citizens possess excellence [of mind and character].

1291^{b}2 The different capacities belonging to the other parts may, it is generally held, be shown by one and the same set of people. The same people, for example, may serve as soldiers, farmers, and craftsmen; the same people, again, may act both as a deliberative council and a judicial court. Goodness [of mind and character], too, is a quality to which all men pretend; and everybody thinks himself capable of filling most offices. But the same people cannot be both rich and poor. This explains why these two classes, the rich and the poor, are regarded as parts of the city in a special sense. Nor is this all. Since one of these classes is generally small, and the other large, they appear to have the status of opposed elements among the parts of the city. This is why the constitutions which are established are based on the predominance of one or other of these elements. It is also the reason why it is thought that there are only two constitutions, democracy and oligarchy.

1291^{b}14 The fact that there are a number of constitutions, and the causes of that fact, have already been established. We may now go on to say that there are also a number of varieties of both democracy and oligarchy. This is already clear from what has been previously said.* The reason for this is that both the populace [the *dēmos*] and the notables vary in kind. So far as the populace is concerned, one sort is engaged in farming; a second is engaged in the arts and crafts; a third is the marketing sort, which is engaged in buying and selling; a fourth is the maritime sort, which in turn is partly naval, partly mercantile, partly employed on ferries, and partly engaged in fisheries. (We may note that there are many places where one of these subdivisions forms a considerable body; as the fishermen do at Tarentum and Byzantium, the naval crews at Athens, the merchant seamen in Aegina and Chios, and the ferrymen at Tenedos.) In addition to these there is the sort of populace that is composed of unskilled labourers and those whose means are too small to enable them to enjoy any leisure; finally there are those who are not of free birth on both sides; and there may also be other sorts of populace of similar character. The notables fall into different sorts according to wealth, birth, merit, culture, and other qualities of the same order.

$1291^{\mathrm{b}}30$ The first variety of democracy is the one which is said to follow the principle of equality closest. In this variety the law declares equality to mean that the poor are to count no more than the rich: neither is to be sovereign and both are to be on a level. For if we hold, as some thinkers do, that liberty is chiefly to be found in democracy and that the same goes for equality, this condition is most fully realized when all share, as far as possible, on the same terms in the constitution. A constitution of this order is bound to be a democracy; for the people are the majority, and the decision of the majority is sovereign.

$1291^{\mathrm{b}}38$ This is one variety of democracy; another is that in which offices are assigned on the basis of a property qualification, but the qualification is low; those who attain it have to be admitted to a share in office, and those who lose it are excluded. A third variety is one in which every citizen of unimpeachable descent can share in office, but the law is the final sovereign. A fourth variety is one in which everyone, provided only that he is a citizen, can share in office, but the law is still the final sovereign. A fifth variety of democracy is the same in other respects but the people, and not the law, is the final sovereign. This is what happens when popular decrees are sovereign instead of the law;* and that is a result which is brought about by leaders of the demagogue type.

$1292^{\mathrm{a}}7$ In cities which have a democracy under the law there are no demagogues; it is the best of the citizens who preside over affairs. Demagogues arise in cities where the laws are not sovereign. The people then becomes a monarchy—a single composite monarch made up of many members, with the many playing the sovereign, not as individuals, but collectively. It is not clear what Homer means when he says [*Iliad* II. 204] that 'it is not good to have the rule of many masters': whether he has in mind a situation of this kind, or one where there are many rulers who act as individuals. However, a democracy of this sort, since it has the character of a monarch and is not governed by law, sets about ruling in a monarchical way and grows despotic; flatterers are held in honour and it becomes analogous to the tyrannical form of monarchy. For this reason both show a similar temper; both behave like despots to the better citizens; the decrees of the one are like the edicts of the other; the popular leader in the one is the same as, or at any rate like, the flatterer in the other; and in either case the influence of favourites predominates—that of the flatterer in tyrannies, and that of the popular leader in democracies of this variety.

$1292^{\mathrm{a}}24$ It is popular leaders who, by referring all issues to the decision of the people, are responsible for substituting the sovereignty of decrees for that of the laws. The source of their great position is that the people are sovereign in all matters while they themselves, since the multitude follows their guidance, are sovereign over the people's decision. In addition opponents of those who occupy official positions argue 'The people ought to decide': the people accept that invitation readily; and thus all offices lose authority.

$1292^{\mathrm{a}}28$ Those who attack this kind of democracy saying that it is not a [true] constitution would appear to be right. Where the laws are not sovereign, there is no constitution. Law should be sovereign on every issue, and the officials and the constitution* should decide about details. It is thus clear that, even if democracy is a form of constitution, this particular system, under which everything is managed by decrees, is not really a democracy, in the proper sense of the word, for decrees can never be general in character.

The different forms of democracy may thus be defined in this way.

CHAPTER 5

We may similarly classify four varieties of oligarchy. But constitutions which are formally and legally democratic, or formally and legally oligarchical, may in their actual working be of a different character. Legal form and actual working are two different things, and this is particularly liable to be the case after a revolution.

1292^{a}39 Among oligarchies one variety is that in which the holding of office depends on property qualifications, high enough to exclude the poor, even though they form the majority, but where it is possible for anyone who can acquire the appropriate amount of property to have a share in the constitution. A second variety is that in which the property qualification is high, and in which they themselves choose replacements for any vacancies.* (Where they choose replacements from the whole body of qualified people, the constitution may be held to incline in the direction of aristocracy: where they are made only from a limited section, it may be held to be oligarchical.) A third variety is when sons succeed to their fathers. The fourth variety has the same arrangement but, instead of the rule of law, the officials are the rulers. This variety is the equivalent, among oligarchies, of tyranny among monarchies or the variety of democracy last mentioned among democracies. An oligarchy of this sort is called a 'dynasty'.*

1292^{b}11 These are the several varieties of oligarchy and democracy. It should be noted, however, that in actual life it often happens that constitutions which are not legally democratic are made to work democratically by the habits and training of the people. Conversely, there are other cases where the legal constitution inclines towards democracy, but is made by training and habits to work in a way which inclines more towards oligarchy. This happens particularly after a revolution. The citizens do not change their temper immediately; and in the first stages the triumphant party is content to leave things largely alone, without seeking to take any great advantage of its opponents. The result is that the old laws remain in force, even though those who are changing the constitution are actually in power.

CHAPTER 6

Classifying once more the varieties of democracy, we may distinguish an agricultural or 'peasant' form from three other forms—the main criterion being the degree of leisure which its social conditions enable a people to devote to politics. In the same way, and on the same general social–economic basis, we may also distinguish four varieties of oligarchy, according to the distribution of property and the relative degree of importance attached to its ownership.

1292^{b}21 What we have already said is sufficient of itself to prove that there must be all these varieties of democracy and oligarchy.* For it is necessary either that all the groups of the people previously mentioned share in the constitution, or that some share and others do not. When the farming class and the class with moderate means are the sovereign power in the constitution, they conduct the government under the rule of law. Because they are able to live by their work, but cannot enjoy any leisure, they make the law supreme, and confine the meetings of the assembly to a minimum; while the remaining citizens are allowed to participate in the constitution as soon as they attain the property qualification determined by the law. Thus all who have acquired this amount of property have a share.* In general it is characteristic of oligarchies that the opportunity to participate is not open to everyone. Of course, there cannot be opportunity for leisure where there is no income.

1292^{b}33 This is one form of democracy; and these are its causes. A second form is based on the criterion which comes logically next, the criterion of birth. Here all who possess irreproachable descent are legally allowed to participate, but do so in practice only when they are able to find the necessary leisure. In a democracy of this sort the laws are accordingly sovereign, simply because there are not the revenues. A third form is that in which all those of free birth are allowed to participate, but they do not actually do so for the reason already given; and here, once more, the rule of law is the necessary consequence. A fourth form of democracy is the one which comes chronologically last in the actual development of cities. Here, under the influence of two causes—the large increase in the population of cities, compared with their original size, and the accumulation of a considerable revenue—all alike participate, owing to the numerical superiority of the masses, and all alike join in political activity, owing to the facilities for leisure which are provided even for the poor by the system of state-payment [for attendance in the assembly and the courts]. A populace of this kind has more leisure than anyone else, for the need to attend to their private affairs does not constitute any hindrance, while it does for the well-to-do, with the result that the latter often absent themselves from the assembly and the courts. Under these conditions the mass of the poor become the sovereign power in the constitution, in place of the laws.

1293^{a}10 These then are the forms of democracy; we have discussed how many of them there are, their [various] characters, and the causes that necessitate them. Turning to the forms of oligarchy, we may rank first the form in which a majority of the citizens have property, but the amount they possess is moderate and not excessively large, while all who acquire this moderate amount are allowed to participate in the constitution. Since the mass of the people are thus included among those who have a share in the business of government, it follows that sovereignty, under this form, will be vested in the law, rather than in mere human beings. A moderate oligarchy of this type is totally different from the personal rule of a monarch; and as its members have neither so much property that they are able to enjoy a leisure free from all business cares, nor so little that they depend on the city for

support, they will be bound to ask that the law should rule for them, and they will not claim to rule themselves.

1293^{a}21 The second form of oligarchy arises when the owners of property are fewer than they were in the first form, and the property they own is larger. Under these conditions they have greater power; and they expect to get more advantage. They themselves therefore select the members of the other classes who are to be admitted to the civic body; and not being powerful enough, as yet, to rule without law, they enact a law to this effect. A further advance is made, and a third form of oligarchy arises, when matters are strained still further and still fewer people become the owners of still larger properties. The members of the governing oligarchy now keep the offices entirely in their own hands; but they still act in terms of law—the law which provides that sons shall succeed to their fathers. The fourth and last form of oligarchy arises when matters are strained to the last degree, alike in the size of properties and the influence of connections. A 'dynasty' of the type which now emerges is closely akin to the personal rule of a monarch; and it is human beings, and not the law, who are now the sovereign. This fourth form of oligarchy corresponds to the last form of democracy.

CHAPTER 7

Having classified the varieties of democracy and oligarchy, we may now classify the varieties of the other forms. Aristocracy —apart from the true aristocracy which is really the government of the Best—has three varieties, which are all, more or less, of the nature of mixed constitutions, and thus approximate to 'constitutional government'.

1293^{a}35 There are still two forms of constitution left, besides democracy and oligarchy.* One of these is usually reckoned, and has indeed already been mentioned, as one of the four main forms of constitution, which are counted as being kingship, oligarchy, democracy, and the form called aristocracy.* There is, however, a fifth form, which is called by the generic name common to all the forms—for people call it a 'constitutional government' [or polity]—but being of rare occurrence it has not been noticed by the writers who attempt to classify the different forms of constitution—in their [accounts of] constitutions they usually limit themselves, like Plato, to an enumeration of only four forms.* The name 'aristocracy' should properly be applied to the form of constitution which has already been treated in our first part. The only constitution which can with strict justice be called an aristocracy is one where the members are not merely 'good' in relation to some standard or other, but are absolutely the 'best' [*aristoi*] so far as excellence [of mind and character] is concerned. Only in such a constitution can the good man and the good citizen be absolutely identified; in all others the 'good' are only so relatively to the particular constitution. Nevertheless there are some further forms of constitution, which differ both from oligarchies and from the so-called 'constitutional government' and are also called aristocracies. This is the case when elections to office are based not only on wealth but also on excellence. This type of constitution differs from both of the forms [just mentioned]; and is called aristocracy. [This usage is just, because] even in cities which do not make the encouragement of excellence a matter of public policy, there may still be found individuals who have a good reputation and are seen as respectable people. Accordingly, a constitution which pays regard to wealth, goodness, and [the will of] the people, as the Carthaginian does, may be called an aristocratic constitution; and the same may also be said of constitutions such as the Spartan, which pay regard to excellence and to [the will of] the people, and where there is thus a mixture of the two factors, democracy and excellence. There are thus these two forms of aristocracy in addition to the first or best form of that constitution; and there is also a third form presented by those varieties of the so-called 'constitutional government' which incline particularly to oligarchy.*

CHAPTER 8

We now come to the 'constitutional government' or polity and its varieties. Generally, a 'constitutional government' is a mixture of democracy and oligarchy; but in common usage the term 'constitutional government' is reserved for mixtures which incline more towards democracy, and the mixtures which incline more towards oligarchy are called aristocracies. This leads us into a digression on the uses of the term 'aristocracy' and the reasons why that term—through being associated in men's minds partly with the rule of gentlefolk, and partly with the rule of law—is somewhat vaguely and widely applied. The proper use of terms depends on a recognition of the fact that there are three elements to be considered in a city, the free-born poor, the wealthy, and the men of merit, and not only the two elements of the poor and the wealthy. On this basis we shall confine the term 'aristocracy' to constitutions which recognize merit in some way or other; and we shall use the term 'constitutional government', and only that term, for constitutions which recognize only the two elements of free birth and wealth.

1293^{b}22 It remains for us to speak of the so-called 'constitutional government' [polity] and of tyranny.* Here we are associating 'constitutional government' with a perverted constitution, although it is not in itself a perversion, any more than are the forms of aristocracy which we have just mentioned. But, to tell the truth, all these constitutions really fall short of the best form of right constitution, and are therefore to be reckoned among perversions; and we may add that, as has already been mentioned in our first part, the perversions among which they are reckoned are those to which they themselves give rise.* It is reasonable to mention tyranny last, because we are engaged in an inquiry into constitutions; and tyranny, of all others, has least the character of a constitution. We have thus explained the reason for the order we propose to follow; and we must now proceed to treat of 'constitutional government'. Its character will emerge the more clearly now that we have already defined the nature of oligarchy and democracy.

1293^{b}33 'Constitutional government' may be described, in general terms, as a mixture of oligarchy and democracy; but in common usage the name is confined to those mixtures which incline to democracy, while those which incline more to oligarchy are called aristocracies, the reason being that culture and breeding are more associated with the wealthier classes. Furthermore, the wealthy are generally supposed to possess already the advantages for want of which wrongdoers fall into crime; and this is the reason why they are called 'gentlemen' or 'notables'.* Now as aristocracy aims at giving pre-eminence to the best, people tend to describe oligarchies too as cities governed by gentlemen.

1294a1 It seems impossible that there should be good government* in a city which is ruled by the poorer sort, and not by the best of its citizens; and, conversely, it is equally impossible for a city which is not well governed to be an aristocracy. But good government does not consist in having a good set of laws which are not actually obeyed. We have to distinguish two senses of good government—one which means obedience to such laws as have been enacted and another which means that the laws obeyed have also been well enacted. (Obedience can also be paid to laws which have been enacted badly.) The latter sense admits, in its turn, of two subdivisions: people may render obedience to laws which are the best that are possible for them, or to ones which are absolutely the best.

1294a9 Aristocracy is thought to consist primarily in the distribution of office according to merit: merit is the criterion of aristocracy, as wealth is the criterion of oligarchy, and free birth of democracy. The principle of the rule of majority-decision is present in all constitutions. Alike in oligarchies, in aristocracies, and in democracies, the decision of the majority of those who share in the constitution is final and sovereign. In most cities the form of government is called 'constitutional government', since the mixture attempted in it seeks only to blend the rich and the poor, or wealth and free birth, and the rich are regarded by common opinion as holding the position of gentlemen. But in reality there are three elements which may claim an equal share in the mixed form of constitution: free birth, wealth, and merit. (So-called 'nobility' of birth, which is sometimes reckoned a fourth, is only a corollary of the two latter, and simply consists in inherited wealth and merit.) Obviously, therefore, we ought always to use the term 'constitutional government' for a mixture of only two elements, where these elements are the rich and the poor; and we ought to confine the name 'aristocracy' to a mixture of three, which is really more of an aristocracy than any other form so called, except the first and true form. We have now shown that there are other forms of constitution besides monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy; what the nature of these other forms is; how aristocracies differ from one another, and 'constitutional governments' differ from aristocracy; and, finally, that these are not far removed from one another.

CHAPTER 9

We may now consider finally the various forms which 'constitutional government' proper may take. There are three possible ways of combining democracy and oligarchy. The first is to mix democracy as a whole with oligarchy as a whole. The second is to take the mean between the two. The third is to take some elements from democracy and some from oligarchy. It is a good criterion of a proper mixture of democracy and oligarchy that you should be able to describe a mixed constitution indifferently as either. Sparta may be cited as an example of such a mixture.

1294a30 We may now discuss, in continuation of our argument, how what is called 'constitutional government' [polity] comes into existence by the side of democracy and oligarchy and in what way it ought to be organized. In the course of that discussion it will also be evident what are the distinguishing marks of democracy and oligarchy; for we have first to ascertain the difference between these two forms, and then to form a combination between them by taking, as it were, a token* from each. There are three different principles on which such a combination or mixture may be based. The first is to take and use simultaneously both democratic and oligarchical laws. We may take as an example those about jury service.* In oligarchies the rich are fined if they do not serve on juries, and the poor receive no pay for serving. In democracies, on the other hand, the poor are given pay [for jury service] while the rich are not fined [if they fail to serve on juries]. To follow both of these practices is to adopt a common or middle term between them; and for that reason such a method is characteristic of a 'constitutional government', which is a mixture of the two constitutions. This is, accordingly, one of the possible ways of combination. A second is to take the mean, between the two different systems. Some cities, for example, require no property qualification at all, or only a very low qualification, for membership of the assembly: others require a high qualification. Here we cannot use both practices to provide a common term; we have, rather, to take the mean between the two. The third way is to combine elements from both, and to mix elements of the oligarchical rule with elements of the democratic. In the appointment of magistrates, for example, the use of the lot is regarded as democratic, and the use of the vote as oligarchical. Again, it is considered to be democratic that a property qualification should not be required, and oligarchical that it should be. Here, accordingly, the method appropriate to an aristocracy or a 'constitutional government' [polity] is to take one element from one form of constitution and another from the other—that is to say, to take from oligarchy the practice of choosing office-holders by voting, and from democracy the practice of requiring no property qualification.

1294^{b}13 This is the general method of mixture. The sign that a good mixture of democracy and oligarchy has been achieved is that the same constitution is described both as a democracy and as an oligarchy. Obviously the feelings of those who speak in this way are due to the excellence of the mixture. This happens in the case of the mean because each of the two extremes can be traced within it. The constitution of Sparta is an example. There are many who wish to describe it as a democracy, on the ground that its organization has a number of democratic features. The first such feature concerns the way in which the young are brought up: the children of the rich have the same upbringing as those of the poor, and the type of education they receive is one which the children of the poor could afford. The same policy is followed in the next stage of their lives and when they become adults. No difference is made between the rich and the poor: the provision of food at the common mess is the same for all, and the dress of the rich is such as any of the poor could also provide for themselves. Another such feature is the fact that, of the two most important offices, one is elected by the people and the other is open to them (that is, they elect the Council of Elders and are eligible for the Ephorate). On the other hand, some people describe the Spartan constitution as an oligarchy, on the ground that it has many oligarchical features. For example, office-holders are all appointed by vote, and none by lot, the power of inflicting the penalty of death or banishment rests in the hands of a few people, and there are many other similar features. A properly mixed constitution should look as if it contained both democratic and oligarchical elements—and as if it contained neither. It should owe its stability to its own intrinsic strength, and not to external support; and its intrinsic strength should be derived from the fact, not that a majority are in favour of its continuance* (that might well be the case even with a poor constitution), but rather that no section at all in the city would favour a change to a different constitution.

We have now described the way in which a 'constitutional government', and what are called aristocracies, ought to be organized.

CHAPTER 10

It now remains to consider, in conclusion, the varieties of tyranny. Two of its varieties, as we have already incidentally noticed (in Book III, ch. 14), are kingships rather than tyrannies: i.e. the kingships found among 'barbarians', and the dictatorships, or 'elective' tyrannies, of the early Greeks. The third variety is tyranny proper—the irresponsible rule of an autocrat acting for his own advantage.

1295^{a}1 It remains to speak of tyranny, not because there is much to be said about it; but because it, too, has been included in our classification of constitutions and must therefore have a place in our inquiry. Kingship has already been discussed in our first part,* where we dealt with kingship in the most usual sense of the term and inquired whether it was beneficial or prejudicial to cities, what sort of person should be king, from what source he should be drawn, and how he should be established in office. Two forms of tyranny were distinguished in the course of our discussion,* because, as both of them are forms of government conducted in obedience to law, the nature of their power in some sense overlaps with that of kingship. There are some among the barbarian peoples who have monarchs elected with absolute power and monarchs of the same type, termed *aisumnētai* [or dictators], once existed among the early Greeks. There are some differences between the two forms; but they may both be called royal, because they rule in accordance with law and over consenting subjects, and also tyrannical, because they rule as masters [over slaves], and follow their own judgement. But there is also a third form of tyranny, which seems to be a tyranny in the strictest sense of the term and is the converse of absolute kingship.* This form of tyranny is bound to exist where a single person rules over people who are all his peers or superiors, without any form of accountability, and with a view to his own advantage rather than that of his subjects. It is thus a form of rule exercised over unwilling subjects, for no free man will voluntarily endure such a system.

These, for the reasons that have just been given, are the forms of tyranny; and this is their number.

C: The Type of Constitution which is most Generally Practicable (Chapter 11)

CHAPTER 11

We are here concerned with the best constitution and way of life for the majority of people and cities. Goodness itself consists in a mean; and in any city the middle class is a mean between the rich and the poor. The middle class is free from the ambition of the rich and the pettiness of the poor: it is a natural link which helps to ensure political cohesion. We may thus conclude that a constitution based on this class, i.e. a 'constitutional government' or polity, is most likely to be generally beneficial. It will be free from faction, and will be likely to be stable. But 'constitutional governments' have been historically rare, partly for internal reasons, and partly because the policy of the Athenian and the Spartan empires has encouraged extremes in preference to a middle way. Still, the 'constitutional government' may serve as a standard in judging the merits of actual constitutions.

$1295^{a}25$ We have now to consider what is the best constitution and the best way of life for the majority of cities and the majority of mankind.* In doing so, we shall not employ a standard of excellence above the reach of ordinary people, or a standard of education requiring exceptional natural endowments and equipment, or the standard of a constitution which attains an ideal level. We shall be concerned only with the sort of life which most people are able to share and the sort of constitution which it is possible for most cities to enjoy. The 'aristocracies', so called, of which we have just been treating, either lie at one extreme, beyond the reach of most cities, or they approach so closely to what is called 'constitutional government' [polity] that the two can be considered as a single form.

$1295^{a}34$ The issues we have just raised can all be decided in the light of one body of fundamental principles. If we were right when, in the *Ethics*, we stated that the truly happy life is one of goodness lived in freedom from impediments and that goodness consists in a mean, it follows that the best way of life is one which consists in a mean, and a mean of the kind attainable by each individual.* Further, the same criteria should determine the goodness or badness of the city and that of the constitution;* for a constitution is the way in which a city lives. In all cities there are three parts: the very rich, the very poor, and the third class which forms the mean between these two.* Now, since it is admitted that moderation and the mean are always best it is clear that in the ownership of all gifts of fortune a middle condition will be the best. Those who are in this condition are the most ready to listen to reason. Those who are over-handsome, over-strong, over-noble, or over-wealthy, and, at the opposite extreme, those who are over-poor, over-weak, or utterly ignoble, find it hard to follow the lead of reason. Those in the first class tend more to arrogance and serious offences: those in the second tend too much to criminality and petty offences; and most wrongdoing arises either from arrogance or criminality. [It is a further characteristic of those in the middle that] they are least prone either to refuse office or to seek it,* both of which tendencies are dangerous to cities.

1295^{b}13 It must also be added that those who enjoy too many advantages—strength, wealth, friends, and so forth—are both unwilling to obey and ignorant how to obey. This [defect] appears in them from the first, during childhood and in home-life: nurtured in luxury, they never acquire a habit of obedience, even in school. But those who suffer from a lack of such things are far too mean and poor-spirited. Thus there are those who are ignorant how to rule and only know how to obey, as if they were slaves, and, on the other hand, there are those who are ignorant how to obey any sort of authority and only know how to rule as if they were masters [of slaves]. The result is a city, not of freemen, but only of slaves and masters: a state of envy on the one side and of contempt on the other. Nothing could be further removed from the spirit of friendship or of a political association. An association depends on friendship—after all, people will not even take a journey in common with their enemies. A city aims at being, as far as possible, composed of equals and peers, which is the condition of those in the middle, more than any group. It follows that this kind of city is bound to have the best constitution since it is composed of the elements which, on our view, naturally go to make up a city. The middle classes enjoy a greater security themselves than any other class. They do not, like the poor, desire the goods of others; nor do others desire their possessions, as the poor desire those of the rich, and since they neither plot against others, nor are plotted against themselves, they live free from danger. Phocylides* was therefore right when he prayed:

> Many things are best for those in the middle;
> I want to be at the middle of the city.

1295^{b}34 It is clear from our argument, first, that the best

form of political association is one where power is vested in the middle class, and, secondly, that good government is attainable in those cities where there is a large middle class—large enough, if possible, to be stronger than both of the other classes, but at any rate large enough to be stronger than either of them singly; for in that case its addition to either will suffice to turn the scale, and will prevent either of the opposing extremes from becoming dominant. It is therefore the greatest of blessings for a city that its members should possess a moderate and adequate property. Where some have great possessions, and others have nothing at all, the result is either an extreme democracy or an unmixed oligarchy; or it may even be, as a result of the excesses of both sides, a tyranny. Tyranny grows out of the most immature type of democracy, or out of oligarchy, but much less frequently out of constitutions of the middle order, or those which approximate to them.* We shall explain the reason for this later, when we come to treat of the ways in which constitutions change.*

1296^{a}7 Meanwhile, it is clear that the middle type of constitution is best. It is the one type free from faction; where the middle class is large, there is less likelihood of faction and dissension than in any other constitution. Large cities are generally more free from faction just because they have a large middle class. In small cities, on the other hand, it is easy for the whole population to be divided into only two classes; nothing is left in the middle, and all, or almost all, are either poor or rich. Democracies are generally more secure and more permanent than oligarchies because of their middle class. This is more numerous, and has a larger share of [offices and] honours, than it does in oligarchies. Where democracies have no middle class, and the poor are greatly superior in number, trouble ensues, and they are speedily ruined. It must also be considered a proof of its value that the best legislators have come from the middle class. Solon was one, as he makes clear in his poems: Lycurgus was another (after all he was not a king); and the same is true of Charondas and most of the other legislators.*

1296^{a}22 What has just been said also serves to explain why most constitutions are either democratic or oligarchical. The middle class in these cities is often small; and the result is that as happens whenever one class—be it the owners of property or the masses—gains the advantage, it oversteps the mean, and draws the constitution in its own direction so that either a democracy or an oligarchy comes into being. In addition, factious disputes and struggles readily arise between the masses and the rich; and the side, whichever it is, that wins the day, instead of establishing a constitution based on the common interest and the principle of equality, exacts as the prize of victory a greater share in the constitution. It then institutes either a democracy or an oligarchy. Furthermore, those who have gained ascendancy in Greece* have paid an exclusive regard to their own types of constitution; one has instituted democracies in the cities [under its control], while the other has set up oligarchies: each has looked to its own advantage, and neither to that of the cities it controlled. These reasons explain why a middle or mixed type of constitution has never been established—or, at the most, has only been established on a few occasions and in a few cities. One man, and one only,* of all who have hitherto been in a position of ascendancy, has allowed himself to be persuaded to allow this sort of system to be established. And now it has also become the habit for cities not even to want a system of equality. Instead they seek to dominate or, if beaten, to submit.

1296^{b}2 It is clear, from these arguments, which is the best constitution, and what are the reasons why it is so and it is easy to see which of the others (given that we distinguish several varieties of democracy and several varieties of oligarchy) should be placed first, which second, and so on in turn, according as their quality is better or worse. The nearest to the best must always be better, and the one farthest removed from the mean must always be worse, unless we are judging on the basis of a particular assumption. I use the words 'on the basis of a particular assumption' because it often turns out that, although one sort of constitution may be preferable, there is nothing to prevent another sort from being better suited to certain peoples.

D: What Sort of Constitution is Desirable for What Sort of Civic Body? (Chapters 12–13)

CHAPTER 12

In constitutions quantity and quality have to be balanced against one another. When the weight of numbers among the poor more than balances the quality of the other elements, a democracy is desirable. When the quality of the other elements more than balances the weight of numbers among the poor, an oligarchy is desirable. When the middle class more than balances both the others—or even one of the others—a 'constitutional government' (polity) is desirable. Considerations on the value of such constitutional governments and on the folly of devices intended to trick men into believing that they have rights when they have none.

1296^{b}13 The next topic to consider, after what we have said, is: 'What particular constitution is suited to what particular people and what sort of constitution is suited to what sort of population?'* Now, we must first grasp a general principle which holds for all constitutions—that the part of a city which wishes a constitution to continue must be stronger than the part which does not.*

1296^{b}17 Quality and quantity both go to the making of every city.* By 'quality' we mean free birth, wealth, culture, and nobility of descent; by 'quantity' we mean superiority in numbers. Now quality may belong to one of the parts which compose a city, and quantity to another. For example, those who are low-born may be more numerous than the high-born, or the poor than the rich; but the superiority of one side in quantity may not be as great as their inferiority in quality. Quantity and quality must thus be placed in the balance against one another. Where the number of the poor exceeds the proportion just described,* there will naturally be a democracy; and the particular variety of democracy will depend on the form of superiority which is shown, in each particular case, by the mass of the people. If, for example, the farmers exceed the others in number, we shall have the first form of democracy: if the mechanics and day-labourers are most numerous, we shall have the 'extreme' form, and the same will be true of the intermediate forms between these.* Where the superiority of the rich and the notables in point of quality is greater than their inferiority in point of quantity, there will be an oligarchy; and the particular variety of oligarchy will similarly depend on the particular form of superiority which is shown by the oligarchical body.

1296^{b}34 A legislator should always make the members of the middle class partners in the constitution. If the laws he makes are oligarchical, he should direct his attention to the middle class, and, if they are democratic, he should seek to attach that same class to those laws. Where the middle class outweighs in numbers both the other classes, or even one of them, it is possible for a constitution to be permanent. There is no risk, in such a case, of the rich uniting with the poor to oppose the middle class: neither will ever be willing to be subject to the other; and if they try to find a constitution which is more in their common interest than this, they will fail to find one. Neither class would tolerate a system of ruling in turns: they have too little confidence in one another. A [neutral] arbitrator always gives the best ground for confidence; and the 'man in the middle' is such an arbitrator. The better, and the more equitable, the mixture in a constitution, the more durable it will be. An error often made by those who desire to establish aristocratic constitutions is that they not only give more power to the well-to-do, but they also deceive the people. Illusory benefits must always produce real evils in the long run; and the encroachments made by the rich are more destructive to a constitution than those of the people.

CHAPTER 13

A number of devices are used to deceive the masses and there are counter-devices used by democracies. But a better policy is to pursue a middle way, and to aim at an honest compromise rather than to use such devices. This policy may be illustrated from a study of the proper nature of a civic army and the methods by which it can be honestly recruited. This leads us to consider the effects of the nature and composition of the army on Greek constitutional development.

1297^{a}14 The devices adopted in constitutions* for appearance's sake in order to fob off the masses are five in number. They relate to the assembly; to public offices; to the lawcourts; to the possession of arms; and to the practice of athletics. As regards the assembly, all alike are allowed to attend; but fines for non-attendance are imposed on the rich alone, or are imposed on them at a far higher rate. As regards public offices, those who possess a property qualification are not allowed to decline office on oath,* but the poor are allowed to do so. As regards the lawcourts, the rich are fined for non-attendance, but the poor may absent themselves with impunity; or, alternatively, the rich are heavily fined and the poor are only fined lightly—as happens under the laws of Charondas. In some cities a different device is adopted in regard to attendance at the assembly and the lawcourts. All who have registered themselves may attend but those who fail to attend the courts and the assembly after registration are heavily fined. Here the intention is to stop people registering, through fear of the fines they may thus incur, and ultimately to stop them from attending the courts and assembly as a result of their failure to register. Similar measures are also employed in regard to the possession of arms and the practice of athletics. The poor are allowed not to have any arms, and the rich are fined for not having them. The poor are not fined if they absent themselves from physical training while the rich are; and so while the latter are induced to attend by the sanction of a fine, the former are left free to abstain in the absence of any deterrent.

1297^{a}34 The legal devices just mentioned are of an oligarchical character. Democracies have their counter-devices: they give the poor payment for attendance at the assembly and the lawcourts; but they do not fine the rich if they fail to attend. It is thus clear that if anyone wants to achieve a mixture that is just, he must combine elements drawn from both sides: in other words, he must provide pay for the one class and impose fines on the other. On this scheme all would share in a common constitution: otherwise, the constitution belongs to one side only. The constitution should draw only on those who have arms. But it is not possible to define the qualification [required for this purpose] absolutely, or to say that it must consist of a fixed amount in all cases. One must seek to discover the highest amount which ensures that those who have a part in the constitution are in a majority over those who do not and fix that as the qualification. Even when they have no part in the constitution, the poor are ready enough to keep quiet, provided that no one handles them violently or deprives them of any of their property. But this is not easy, since it is not always the case that the members of the citizen body are obliging. For example, in time of war, the poor are usually reluctant to serve, if they are given no subsistence allowance, and are thus left without any means. But if they are provided with subsistence they are willing enough to fight.

1297^{b}12 There are some places where the constitution includes not only those who are actually serving as soldiers, but also those who have previously served.* The Malian constitution, for example, included both, but only those who were actually serving could be elected to office. The first form of constitution which succeeded to monarchy in Greece was one composed of those who were soldiers. At first it consisted only of cavalry. (Military strength and superiority were then the prerogative of that arm; infantry is useless without a systematic organization; and as the experience and organization in such matters did not exist in early times, the strength of armies lay in their cavalry.) When, however, cities began to increase in size, and infantry forces acquired a greater degree of strength, more people were given a part in the constitution. For this reason, what we now call 'constitutional governments' [polities] were in the past called 'democracies'. It is not surprising that the old constitutions should have been oligarchical and, earlier still, monarchical. With their populations still small, cities had no large middle class; and the body of the people, still few in number, and poor in organization, were more ready to tolerate being ruled by others

1297^{b}28 We have now explained* why there is a variety of constitutions, and why there are forms other than those commonly enumerated. (Democracy is not one form; and the same is true of other constitutions.) We have also explained the differences between the various forms, and the causes of the character of each. In addition we have explained which generally speaking is the best constitution, and also, so far as other constitutions are concerned, which sort of constitution suits which sort of civic body.

E: The Methods of Establishing Constitutions, in Relation to the Three Powers—Deliberative, Executive, and Judicial (Chapters 14–16)

CHAPTER 14

There are three elements or powers in the government of a city. The first is the deliberative; and that may be arranged on three different systems. The first system assigns all matters of deliberation to all the citizens: it is the system of democracy, and it may be carried into effect in four different ways. The second system assigns all matters to some of the citizens: it is the system of oligarchy, and it may be carried into effect in three ways. A third system assigns some matters to all the citizens, and others to some of them: this system is characteristic of an aristocracy and of 'constitutional governments' (polities). How the deliberative element may best be arranged, as a matter of policy, in democracies and in oligarchies.

1297^{b}35 Now, in treating of the topics that come next, we have to find a proper basis on which to treat them and then to speak both in general terms and separately for each constitution. There are three elements in every constitution* and a good legislator must bear these in mind when he considers what is suitable in each case. If all these elements are in good order, then the whole constitution will also be in good order and, to the extent that these elements differ, so constitutions will also differ. The first of the three is the deliberative element concerned with common affairs: the second is the element concerned with public offices (and here it has to be settled what these offices are to be, what matters they are to control, and how their occupants are to be appointed): the third is the judicial element.

1298a3 The deliberative element is sovereign (1) on the issues of war and peace, and the making and breaking of alliances (2) in the enacting of laws; (3) in cases where the penalty of death, exile, and confiscation is involved; and (4) in the appointment of officials and in calling them to account* [on the expiration of their office]. It is necessary either to give the decision on all these issues to all the citizens, or, to give the decision on all the issues to some of the citizens (by referring them all to one official body or to a combination of such bodies, or by referring different issues to different bodies), or, to give the decision on some issues to all the citizens, and on other issues to some of them.

1298a9 The arrangement which assigns all issues to all the citizens, is characteristic of democracies, for this sort of equality is what the people desire. But there are a number of different ways in which all decisions might be given to them.* First, all the citizens may meet to deliberate in turn, and not in a single body. (This was the scheme in the constitution of Telecles of Miletus;* and there are other constitutions in which the different boards of officials meet together for deliberation in a single body, but the citizens join the boards in turns—drawn from the tribes and the smallest units [within the tribes]—until they have all been included in the cycle.) Under this scheme the citizens assemble only for the purpose of enacting laws, for dealing with constitutional matters, and for hearing the announcements of the magistrates. A second scheme is that all the citizens should meet to deliberate in a single body, but only for the purposes of appointing officials enacting laws, dealing with issues of war and peace, and examining officials. The other matters will then be left for the deliberation of the officials assigned to deal with each branch; but appointment to such offices, whether this is done by election or by lot, will be open to all the citizens. A third scheme is that the citizens should meet for the purposes of appointing and examining the magistrates, and deliberating on issues of war and foreign policy, but other matters should be left to the control of boards of officials which, as far as possible, are kept elective—boards, that is, of the kind to which knowledgeable people must be appointed. A fourth scheme is that all should meet to deliberate on all issues, and boards of officials should have no power of giving a decision on any issue, but only that of making preliminary investigations. This is the way in which extreme democracy*—a form of democracy analogous, as we have suggested, to the form of oligarchy called 'dynasty' and to the tyrannical form of monarchy—is nowadays conducted.

1298a33 All these schemes are democratic, whereas the system under which some citizens deliberate about all matters is oligarchic. This system also has a number of different varieties. One of these is when the members of the deliberative body are eligible on the basis of a moderate property qualification, and are therefore fairly numerous. They do not make changes in matters where the law prohibits change, but obey its rules, and all who acquire property to the amount of the qualification required are allowed to share in deliberation. This is an oligarchy, but one of a constitutional kind by virtue of its moderation. When membership of the deliberative body belongs only to selected people—and not to all [those who acquire property to the amount of the qualification required] —but these people act in obedience to the rules of law, the system, like the previous one, is oligarchic in character.* When those who possess the power of deliberation recruit themselves by co-optation, or simply succeed by heredity, and have the power of overruling the laws, the arrangement is one which inevitably means oligarchy.

1298b5 A third system of arrangement is that some of the citizens should deliberate on some matters, but not on all. When, for example, all the citizens exercise the deliberative power in regard to war and peace and the examination of officials but the officials (who may be elected or chosen by lot) exercise that power alone on issues other than these, then the constitution is an aristocracy or a constitutional government [polity]. If some issues of deliberation are assigned to people appointed by election, and others to people chosen by lot (whether that is open to all or only to candidates selected in advance), or if all issues go to a mixed body with some elected and some chosen by lot, then the arrangement is in one way an aristocratic constitution and in another a constitutional government [polity].

1298^{b}11 These are the different forms of the deliberative body which correspond to the different constitutions. Each constitution is organized on the basis of one or other of the systems we have distinguished.

1298^{b}13 A democracy of the type which is nowadays held to be most fully democratic (by which I mean one where the people has sovereignty even over the laws) will find it advantageous, so far as improving the quality of the deliberative body is concerned, to apply to it the scheme which oligarchies apply to the lawcourts. Oligarchies impose a fine to ensure that those whom they want to have serving as jurymen do actually do so, whereas democrats provide pay for the poor. It is in the interest of a democracy to apply the same scheme to the assembly, since they will deliberate better when all deliberate together, the populace along with the notables and the notables along with the populace. It is also in the interest of a democracy that the members of the deliberative body should be either elected or chosen by lot with equal numbers from each section.* It is also in its interest, when the members of the populace greatly exceed in number those [notables] who have political experience, that payment for attendance at the assembly shouldn't be given to all the citizens, but only to so many as will balance the number of the notables or, alternatively, that the lot should be used to eliminate the excess of ordinary citizens over the notables.

1298^{b}26 In oligarchies it is advantageous either to co-opt [to the deliberative body] some members drawn from the populace, or, alternatively, to erect an institution of the type which exists in some cities, under the name of 'preliminary councillors' or 'guardians of the laws', and then to allow the citizen body to deal only with such issues as have already been considered, in advance, by these people. On this plan the people at large will share in deliberation, but they will not be able to abrogate any rule of the constitution. Another line of policy which is in the interest of oligarchies is that the people should only be free to vote for measures which are identical, or at any rate in agreement, with those submitted to them; or, alternatively, that the people as a whole should be allowed to give advice but that decisions should be taken by those who hold office. In fact they should do the opposite of what happens in [so-called] 'constitutional governments' [polities]. The people should be sovereign for the purpose of rejecting proposals, but not for the purpose of passing them; and any proposals which they pass should be referred back to those in office. In constitutional governments [polities] they do the reverse of this.* The few [i.e. the officials] are sovereign for the purpose of rejecting proposals, but not for the purpose of passing them; and any proposal which they pass is referred back to the many.

This is our analysis of the deliberative or sovereign element in the constitution.

CHAPTER 15

The second element is the executive, or the system of offices. Differences in the system of offices turn on four points—number; functions; tenure; and methods of appointment. Definition of the term 'office'; and a general consideration of the number, functions, and tenure of offices, with a discussion of the relation of different offices [*e.g. the* Boule *and the* Probouloi] *to different constitutions. The methods of appointment: the three main factors to be considered, the choice of alternatives presented by each, and the various modes of handling the choice of alternatives. The arrangements for the appointment of public officials best suited to different constitutions: democracy, constitutional government* [*polity*], *oligarchy, and aristocracy.*

1299^{a}3 The next subject, after those we have just considered, is the classification of offices.* This element of the constitution also admits of a number of different arrangements. These concern: (1) the number of the offices; (2) the subjects with which they deal; and (3) the length of the tenure of each. (In some cities they are held for six months; in some for a shorter period; in others for a year; and in others, again, for an even longer time. We have also to inquire whether offices should be held for life, or for a long term of years, or neither for life nor for a long term but only for shorter periods, and whether, in that case, the same person should hold office more than once, or each should be eligible only for a single term.) A further point to be considered (4) is the method of appointment. This raises three questions—who should be eligible; who should elect them; and how should the election be conducted?

1299ᵃ12 We have first to distinguish the various methods which it is possible to apply to each of these questions, and then, on that basis, we have to determine the particular forms of office which suit a particular form of constitution. We are confronted, however, with an initial difficulty of definition. What is to be included under the term 'office'? A political association needs many positions of responsibility. We cannot, therefore, reckon as office-holders all those appointed to a position by election or lot. We can hardly include, for example, the priests of the public cults, whose position must be reckoned as something different from the political offices. The same is true of those responsible for producing plays, and of heralds. People are also elected to go on embassies. Political functions are those which involve the task of directing either the whole body of the citizens in some particular sphere of action (as, for example, a general directs them on a military expedition), or some section of the citizens (as happens, for example, with the inspectors of women and children). Others functions are economic; and here the officers elected to measure the corn for distribution (they are to be found in many cities) may be cited as an example. Still other functions are subordinate in character, involving duties which, in wealthy cities, the public slaves are set to discharge. The title of 'office' should, on the whole, be reserved for those which are charged with the duty, in some given field, of deliberating, deciding, and giving instructions, particularly the last since giving instructions is the special mark of one who holds office. But these matters make no difference in practice. No decision has been reached about what is merely a dispute over terminology, though it offers an opportunity for speculative inquiry.

1299ᵃ31 In dealing with all constitutions, but especially in dealing with those of small cities, it is a matter of more importance to distinguish what sort and number of offices are necessary to the city's existence, and what sort are of value—even if they are not actually necessary—in ensuring a good constitution. In large cities it is both possible and proper that a separate office should be allotted to each separate function. Because there are a great many citizens it is possible for a large number of people to enter office: it permits some of the offices to be held only once in a lifetime, and others (though held more than once) to be held again only after a long interval; and each function gets better attention when it is the only one undertaken, and not one among a number of others.

1299ᵇ1 In small cities, on the other hand, a large number of functions have to be accumulated in the hands of but a few people. The small numbers of the citizens makes it difficult for many people to be in office together; and if there were, who would be their successors? It is true that small cities sometimes need the same offices, and the same laws, as large ones. But it is also true that large cities have frequent need of their offices, while small cities need theirs only at long intervals. There is thus no reason why small cities should not impose a number of duties simultaneously, since they will not interfere with one another; and anyhow it is necessary, where the population is small, to make official positions like spit-hooks* [with many functions].

1299ᵇ10 If we can say how many offices must necessarily exist in every city and how many are valuable, though not necessary—someone who knows this will easily be able to combine together those offices which ought to be combined into one office. In addition, we must not omit to consider which matters need the attention of different offices in different places,* and which ought to be controlled by one office with overall responsibility. The maintenance of order is an example: should there be one person to keep order in the market-place and another somewhere else, or should there be a single person to keep order everywhere. We must consider, too, whether functions should be allocated according to the subject to be handled, or according to the sorts of people concerned: for example, should there be one officer for the whole subject of the maintenance of order, or a separate officer for children and another for women?

1299^{b}20 We have also to take into account the difference of constitutions. Does the scheme of offices vary from one constitution to another, or is it the same for all? Do the same offices form the government in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy—with the one difference that those who hold office do not come from the same, or a similar, social class, but are drawn from a different class in each different constitution (in aristocracies, for example, from the cultured class; in oligarchies from the wealthy; and in democracies from the free-born)? Or do some kinds of office exist as a result of these very differences, so that in some cases the same offices are suitable, but in other cases they are bound to differ? It may be appropriate, for example, that in some constitutions offices should be powerful while in others the same offices should be weak.

1299^{b}30 Some offices, it is true, are altogether peculiar to one type of constitution. A preliminary council [the *probouloi*] is an example. Such a body is not democratic, whereas the ordinary council, or *boulē*, is democratic.* There ought, indeed, to be some sort of body charged with the duty of preliminary deliberation on behalf of the people; otherwise the people will not be able to attend to their ordinary business. But if such a body is small in size, it becomes an oligarchical institution; the preliminary councillors must be few in number, and must therefore be oligarchical. Where both kinds of office are to be found, the preliminary councillors are a check on the councillors; they are an oligarchical element, and the council is democratic. Yet even the authority of the council itself is subverted in democracies of the extreme type, where the people assembles in person to transact the whole business of the city. This usually happens when there is a high rate of pay to those who attend the assembly. People then have the leisure to hold frequent meetings and decide all issues themselves.

1300^{a}4 Officers for the maintenance of order among women and children, and other officials charged with similar duties of supervision, are aristocratic in character, not democratic (how could one prevent the wives of the poor from going out?); nor are they oligarchic, since the wives of a ruling oligarchy live a life of luxury.

1300^{a}8 Enough has been said, for the present, about these matters: and we must now attempt to give a full account of the appointment of public officials.* The differences here are connected with three factors, which produce, in combination, all the possible modes. The three factors are:

(1) those appointing;
(2) those eligible for appointment;
(3) the method of appointment.

Each of these three factors involves two alternatives. Thus:

(1) those appointing may be all the citizens, or only a section;
(2) those eligible for appointment may be all the citizens, or only a section—a section determined by a property qualification, or birth or merit or some similar characteristic (in Megara, for example, only those who had returned from exile together and fought together against the populace were eligible for appointment);
(3) The method of appointment may be election, or it may be lot.

In addition we may also have a conjunction of both alternatives, with the result that:

(1) for some offices those appointing may be all the citizens, and for others only a section;
(2) for some offices those eligible may be all the citizens, and for others only a section;
(3) for some offices the method of appointment may be election, and for others it may be lot.

1300^{a}22 Four modes are possible in handling each of the choices of alternatives [given the alternative which consists in all the citizens appointing];

(1) all may appoint from all by election;

(2) all may appoint from all by lot; or
(3) all may appoint from a section by election;
(4) all may appoint from a section by lot.

Similarly if a section of the citizens appoints:

(1) they may appoint from all by election;
(2) they may appoint from all by lot;
(3) they may appoint from a section by election;
(4) they may appoint from a section by lot.

1300^{a}26 If they appoint from all, they may do so either successively from sections—such as tribes and wards and clans—until all have eventually been included, or continuously from all, appointing to some offices in one of these ways and to others in another. By this I mean that they may appoint to some offices 'from all by election' and to others 'from all by lot'. There are thus twelve modes in all, if we omit the other two conjunctions.

1300^{a}31 Of these methods of making appointments, two are democratic:*

(*a*) all appoint from all either by election or lot;
(*b*) all appoint from all both by election and lot, using the one method for some offices and the other for others.

A method characteristic of constitutional government [polity] is:

> all should appoint but not at the same time. They may either make these appointments from all using election or lot or both these methods, or they may appoint from all to some of the offices, but appoint from a section to others. By 'using both these methods' I mean appointing to some offices by lot and to some by election.*

1300^{b}1 An arrangement which suits an oligarchy is:

> a section appoints from a section—by election, or lot (it does not matter that this does not actually occur), or a mixture of both.

An arrangement which suits an aristocracy is:

> a section appoints from all, or all appoint from a section, by the method of election.*

1300^{b}5 Such is the number of the methods which may be used in connection with [the appointment of officials], and such is their distribution among different types of constitution. As we consider the different kinds of offices and their functions, it will become clear which method is suitable to each office and how the appointments ought to be made. By the function of an office I mean functions such as control of the revenue or control of the defence force. The functions of offices differ in kind, for example, between that of a general and that of an officer charged with the superintendence of contracts made in the market.

CHAPTER 16

*The third element is the judicial element; or the system of lawcourts (*dikastēria*). An enumeration of eight different types of lawcourts, and a consideration of the three main ways in which courts may be constituted. The types of constitution to which these different ways are best suited.*

1300^{b}13 Of the three elements in the constitution, the judicial alone remains to be considered. We must follow the same plan in determining the different forms which this may take. The ways in which lawcourts differ are: (1) in their membership; (2) in the subjects with which they deal; and (3) the manner of appointing the members. By 'their membership' I mean whether the courts are to be constituted from all the citizens or from a section; by 'the subjects with which they deal' I mean how many kinds of courts there should be; by 'the manner of appointment' I mean whether appointment should be by vote or by lot.

1300^{b}17 We must first determine how many kinds of courts there are. These may be said to be eight. There is one for the review of the conduct of public officials; a second for dealing with any offence against any point of public interest; a third for cases which bear on the constitution; a fourth (which includes in its scope both officials and private persons) for cases of disputes about the amount of fines; a fifth for contracts between private persons, where a considerable amount is involved; in addition there are those which deal with homicide and with cases concerning aliens. [It should be noted that] the court which deals with homicide has a number of divisions, which may either be combined under one set of judges or come before different sets. One of these divisions is concerned with deliberate homicide; a second with involuntary homicide; a third with homicides where the act is admitted, but its justification is disputed; and a fourth for actions brought, upon their return, against those who have previously been exiled for involuntary homicide. An example of the last division is the court at Athens which is known as the 'Court at Phreatto', but cases of this sort are always infrequent, even in large cities. The court for cases of aliens has two divisions: one for cases between alien and alien, and one for cases between alien and citizen. Finally, there is an eighth court for contracts which only involve a small sum—a matter of a drachma, or five drachmas, or some sum a little larger. Here a decision has to be given, but there is no need for a large court to give it.

1300^{b}35 We need not go further into these courts and those dealing with homicide and aliens. We must speak of those which have a political character, as they deal with issues which, unless properly handled, create factional divisions and constitutional disturbance. Here we must have one or other of the following systems. (1) All the citizens [are eligible to] judge on all the matters we have distinguished, and are chosen for the purpose either (*a*) by vote or (*b*) by lot. (2) All the citizens [are eligible to] judge on all these matters; but for some of them the courts are appointed by election, and for others by lot. (3) [All citizens are eligible to judge, but] only on part of these matters; and the courts concerned with that part should all be similarly recruited, partly by vote and partly by lot. This means four different systems [if we count the two alternatives under (1) as separate systems]. There will be an equal number of systems if a sectional method be followed [i.e. if it is only a section of the citizens, and not all, who are eligible to sit in the courts]. In that case we may have (1) judges drawn from a section by vote to judge on all matters; or (2) judges drawn from a section by lot to judge on all matters; or (3) judges drawn from a section by vote for some matters and by lot for others; or (4) some courts, dealing with the same matters, recruited partly by vote and partly by lot. It will be seen that these last four systems, as has just been said, correspond exactly to the previous four. In addition, we may have a conjunction of both sorts of systems; for example, we may have some courts with members drawn from the whole civic body, others, again, with a mixed membership (the same court being, in that case, composed of members drawn from the whole and of members drawn from a section); and again we may have the members appointed either by vote, or by lot, or by a mixture of both.

1301^{a}10 This gives us a complete list of all the possible systems on which courts can be constituted. The first sort of system, in which the membership of the courts is drawn from all, and the courts decide on all matters, is democratic. The second sort, in which the membership is drawn from a section, and the courts decide on all matters, is oligarchical. The third sort, [which is a conjunction of the first two, and] in which the membership of some courts is drawn from all, and that of others from a section, is characteristic of aristocracies and 'constitutional governments' [polities].